Managing common pool resources: local environmental knowledge and power dynamics in mopane worms and mopane woodlands management: the case of Bulilima District, South-Western Matabeleland, Zimbabwe by Sithole, Mkhokheli
Managing Common Pool Resources: Local Environmental Knowledge and 
Power Dynamics in Mopane Worms and Mopane Woodlands 
Management: The Case of Bulilima District, South-Western Matabeleland, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mkhokheli Sithole 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy to the Department of Development Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Muchaparara Musemwa 
i 
 
Declaration 
 
I, Mkhokheli Sithole, declare that this work is my own, that all sources used or quoted have 
been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this thesis was 
not previously submitted by me or any other person for degree purposes at this or any other 
university. 
 
 
 
Signature……………     Date………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the dynamics of power and the significance of local environmental 
knowledge in natural resource management in Zimbabwe’s communal areas.  It uses a case 
study of Bulilima District, broken down into into 3 components (Wards) for manageability of 
the study, to analyse the power configurations and the role played by local environmental 
knowledge in influencing decision-making processes among actors in the district with regard 
to mopane worms (Imbrasis beilina is the scientific name while icimbi is the vernacular 
name) and mopane woodlands (Colophospermum mopane is the scientific name while iphane 
is the vernacular name). It examines the significance of local environmental knowledge, i.e. 
indigenous knowledge and knowledge that developed as a result of a combination of 
knowledges from different ethnic groups and modern science. The study further examines the 
dynamics of the gendered nature of mopane worms and woodlands tenure regimes by putting 
under the spotlight the spaces and places where men and women interact, use and exert 
control over mopane worms and woodlands. It places history at the centre of our 
understanding of contemporary power dynamics and helps us to appreciate the importance of 
how local environmental knowledge has changed over time. To this end, the study argues that 
some of the contemporary conflicts over resources have their roots in the colonial era when 
the colonial government appropriated land from the locals and introduced discourses and 
practices such as conservation. Furthermore, it argues and demonstrates that the state is a 
critical player in determining access, use and control of natural resources. Based on rich 
ethnographic data collected by means of critical observations, in-depth interviews, narratives, 
and archival data, as well as aided by a brief survey, the study concluded that natural resource 
governance is a complex phenomenon in developing states.  Power and knowledge play 
significant roles in influencing access, use and control of mopane worms and woodlands. 
Furthermore, while some locals still possess indigenous knowledge, practices and belief 
systems related to natural resource management, these are now less significant in influencing 
decisions on natural resource management. Indeed, the interplay of knowledge and power in 
resource management sees scientific culture and outside knowledge taking precedence over 
local forms of knowledge in the management of natural resources in the district. 
 
Key words: power, local environmental knowledge, indigenous knowledge, ZANU PF, 
natural resource management, access, mopane worms and woodlands, Bulilima, Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The world is increasingly facing a natural resource management (NRM) crisis in which 
natural resources are being harvested at unsustainable levels. Much blame has been placed on 
centralized state control which is so far removed from the day to day management of the 
resources (Eguavoen and Laube, 2010; Fabricius et al., 2013). There is, however, an 
increasing consensus that the cause of resource degradation is institutional. If the right rules 
and governance structures are in place and are objectively implemented, natural resources 
could be used wisely and conservation goals can be realized (Acheson, 2006). How to get 
that right seems to be an elusive goal. This situation has influenced a shift in the ideology of 
most post-colonial African countries with regards to the control of natural resources. For 
instance, there has been a ‘paradigm shift’ away from costly state-centred control towards 
more devolved models in which local people play a more active role (Murphree, 1991; 
Shackleton et al., 2001, Nemarundwe, 2003). These models are applied in the approaches of 
adaptive co-management, trans-disciplinary planning, community-based natural resource 
management, and transitions management (Kellert et al., 2000; Folke et al., 2005; Geels, 
2002; 2005; Tress et al., 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Armitage et al., 2007; 2008; Berkes, 2009; 
Raymond et al., 2010 ). These models were influenced by the decentralisation policies 
enacted to facilitate the participation of local communities in resource management 
(Nemarundwe, 2003). 
 
Colonial natural resource management policies had resulted in over-centralisation because 
they were designed within the context of conquest, disempowerment and subjugation 
(Appiah-Opoku and Hyma, 1999; Mandondo, 2000a; Ribot, 1999). Much of the colonial 
legislation was inherited piecemeal by most developing countries which nationalised their 
natural resources but failed to provide a comprehensive management system especially on 
resources that do not have high returns (Gibson, 1999; Mandondo, 2000a; Nemarundwe, 
2003; Eguavoen and Laube, 2010). However, post-colonial state control over the use and 
management of natural resources, particularly in the communal areas, has largely been 
ineffective because the state lacks the resources and capacity to enforce such controls. The 
resources are thus left to be governed de-facto by the local people. 
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The failure by post-colonial states in governing natural resources in an effective and 
sustainable manner while half-heartedly adopting western models, has resulted in the 
dismantling of indigenous cultures, knowledge and institutions used to manage resources 
effectively (Fairhead and Leach, 2004, Hara et al., 2009). Independent African states 
inherited policies that assumed ignorance among rural users. The policies currently in 
operation are fuzzy, inchoate, and fall between local traditional governance systems which 
are ill-defined and state control which permeates to the lowest structures of the communities. 
Unlike Turner (2004) and Eguavoen and Laube (2010) who argued that state influence is 
usually far removed from day to day management of resources in developing states, in 
Zimbabwe, the state is present at local levels through both formal and informal structures that 
influence decision making. The National Youth Service (NYS) for example, is being used by 
the state to deploy youths into communities, more as ZANU PF’s intimidatory machinery 
than anything.
1
 Private and independent media and other groups have extensively 
documented some of the atrocities that were carried out by these youths since the beginning 
of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRRP)2 to an 
extent that they are now informally referred to as the militia.
3
 It should be noted, however, 
that the National Youth Service graduates are not involved in the management of natural 
resources in Bulilima. It is presence nevertheless that demonstrates the power of ZANU PF at 
such lower levels. Indeed the researcher came across a group of youths who boasted of being 
products of the National Youth Service and demanded to know the researcher’s business in 
Bulilima despite having been cleared by the relevant authorities. 
 
                                                 
1
 Interview with one councillor from MDC-T, one of the opposition parties, who requested 
anonymity ( 22/12/2014) 
2
 FTLRRP was a government initiated land redistribution programme which began in July 
2000. Under this programme the government compulsorily acquired land for equitable 
distribution to the black majority under the 1A and A2 models. The A1 model consists of the 
villagised scheme and the self-contained plots. The A2 model consists of big farms for 
commercial production (Mabhena, 2010; Mutema, 2012; Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlements, 2001). 
3
 See for example `ZIMBABWE: “Green Bombers” deserting poor conditions in camps` 
2004, IRIN News, 23 January http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx? ReportId=48241–
Accessed 20 June 2014; “Hundreds of ZANU PF youths are still being trained at torture 
camps scattered around Mashonaland Central” 2002, The Daily News, 21 March; The 
Solidarity Peace Trust (2003) An overview of youth militia training and activities in 
Zimbabwe, October 2000–August 2003  
 
3 
 
The central concern of this thesis, therefore, is to understand power configurations and 
significance of local environmental knowledge (LEK) in the management of natural 
resources, particularly mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima District. The mopane tree 
is the dominant tree species and it occasionally hosts an outbreak of mopane worms which 
are an important source of livelihood to the locals (see Toms et. al., 2003, Illgner and Nel, 
2000). Interventions targeting sustainable utilisation of these resources require an in-depth 
understanding of how the resources are governed and how knowledge held by users 
influences decision making in the contemporary natural resource management system. This 
requires an ethnographic study that analysess contemporary power dynamics and local 
environmental knowledge by reflecting on how historical events influence these phenomena. 
Power-knowledge nexus is fundamental to our understanding of natural resource governance 
in this thesis.  
 
Mopane worms and woodlands are natural resources that people have used and continue to 
use for their livelihoods in Bulilima District. The status of these resources, local people’s 
access to them, their use and control have been shaped by historical and political events 
dating back to the pre-colonial era while some of them are the product of the post-colonial 
era. It is within this context that this thesis examines power configurations and LEK as 
variables that affect natural resource management in Bulilima District. The thesis explores 
roles played by various actors that include local communities, traditional authorities, 
government and quasi-government authorities. For instance, it has been documented that 
quite often national interests and strategies towards natural resources tend to be in contrast 
with local people’s multiple livelihood strategies for using a variety of natural resources 
(Matose, 2009). Such contrasting dynamics reflect power relations and have a significant 
impact on how resources are managed. Furthermore, analysis of access, use and control of 
mopane worms and woodlands resources in this thesis, is done from a gendered perspective, 
informed by the realisation that natural resource use is inherently gendered. Indeed results 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 show that mopane worms and woodlands are gendered 
resources, hence men and women compete and negotiate spaces and places to access, use and 
control them by exercising various forms of power and applying local environmental 
knowledge they possess with regards to the two resources.    
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1.2. Decentralisation of natural resource management systems 
 
Concepts of LEK and power dynamics in this study should be understood in a 
decentralisation context, a policy tool that has been adopted by many developing countries 
across the globe (Turyahabwe1 et al., 2007). Decentralisation is seen as a policy thrust where 
bundles of entrustments, including regulatory and executive powers, responsibility and 
authority in decision making, institutional infrastructure and assets, and administrative 
capacity, are variously transferred to local groupings (Crook and Manor, 1998; Agrawal and 
Ostrom, 1999; Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999; Pomeroy, 1999 in Mandondo, 2000a). It is 
however a broad and contested concept (Moyo and Ncube, 2014). For instance Rondinelli 
(1986) argues that different types of decentralisation can be  distinguished  based  on  the  
degree  of  responsibility for  and  discretion  in  decision  making   that   is   transferred   by   
the   central   government   to   provincial   and   local government units. It is from this 
complexity that four main forms of decentralisation have emerged, namely, administrative, 
political, fiscal and market.
4
 Administrative decentralisation (which includes deconcentration    
and delegation) refers to  the  transfer of  limited  policy making,  planning  and management 
functions  (and  resources)  from  central  to  local  levels  (with  authority  over  decision 
making  and  use  of  resources  remaining  atthe  centre)  while  political  decentralization 
refers  to  the  statutory  devolution  of  some  political,  economic  and  local  policy  making 
powers  to  democratically  elected  local  governments.On the other hand, fiscal 
decentralisation includes efforts  to change  the  distribution  and  sources  of  resources  
available  to  local  governments  while market decentralis ation involves attempts to transfer 
substantive control over resource allocation to non-State actors (Moyo and Ncube, 2014, pp 
291-292).   
 
Zimbabwe, like many other sub-Saharan countries, have pursued  the  administrative  type  of  
decentralisation  either by  transferring  selected  public  functions  to  sub-regional  entities  
or  field  office  units  supervised  by central     government     (deconcentration)     or     by     
transferring     defined     authority, responsibility and financial resources to semi-autonomous 
                                                 
4
 See works by Rondinelli D A “Administrative decentralisation and economic development: 
the Sudan's experiment with devolution” (1981) 19(4) The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 595; Friedman, H. (1983). Local political alternatives for decentralized development. 
Decentralization and development: policy implementation in developing countries; Harris R 
“Centralization and decentralization in Latin America” in Cheem a & Rondinelli (1983) at 
1839 and Leonard D “Inter-organizational linkages    for    decentralized    ruraldevelopment:    
overcoming administrative weaknesses” in Cheema & Rondinelli (Eds) (1983) at 271. 
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sub-regional entities that are ultimately  accountable  to  the  central  office  (delegation) 
(World Bank, 2001; Moyo and Ncube, 2014).  
 
With regards to natural resource use, some scholars concur that the idea behind 
decentralisation is to increase resource user participation in natural resource management 
(NRM) decisions and benefits by restructuring the power relations between central state and 
communities through the transfer of management authority to local-level organisations 
(Shackleton et al., 2002; Ribot, 2003). It is widely believed that downwardly accountable 
authorities with meaningful discretionary powers are the basic institutional elements of 
decentralisation that lead to local efficiency, equity and development (Mawhood, 1983; 
Ribot, 1996; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Mandondo, 2000a; Barr, 2006; Barry et al., 2010). 
 
While in theory, the advantages of devolving resource management to local governments are 
compelling, questions have been asked about the commitment in transferring power to local 
authorities. For instance, Shackleton et al., (2002) noted that in most Asian and African 
countries, local people did not believe that devolution policies had yielded many benefits to 
them. Indeed similar sentiments were highlighted by various scholars (Ribot, 1995; 1999a; 
Oyono, 2002) who noted that decentralisation in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Malawi, 
Niger and Zimbabwe are transferring decision making powers to various unaccountable local 
bodies, threatening local equity and environment. In a recent publication, Mfune (2013) 
concluded that the successes of transferring power to local natural resource authorities in 
Zambia depended on the prevailing political will of the authority devolving power and the 
capacity of local actors receiving devolved powers. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the key decentralisation actors in the local arena who exercise powers over 
public resources include elected officials (councillors within the Rural District Councils 
(RDCs), Village Development Committee (VIDCO) and Ward Development Committee 
(WADCO), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), traditional leaders and powerful 
individuals within communities.
5
 Communities are considered as the ideal units for 
                                                 
5
 The VIDCO normally consists of 100 households, with slight variations from area to area, 
and it is presided over by an elected chairperson while the WADCO is a body over-arching 
several VIDCOs, usually six per ward. The WADCO draws its membership from leaders of 
its constituent VIDCOs and is presided over by an elected councilor representing the ward at 
the district level in the (RDDC). 
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decentralised natural resource governance systems. This is inspired by the appeal of 
smallness, with identifiable groups of users sharing common interests, norms and beliefs              
consensus in the definition of the term community (Hillery, 1955; Cousins, 1993; Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999). Contemporary arguments on the concept of community in policy 
development are linked to the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century thought, when rapid social and 
economic change became an increasing concern amongst social scientists (Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999). Community may be used to describe geographical units such as village, ward 
or district. In some cases, community is used as an analytical category where characteristics 
of the group define what the community is (Madzudzo, 1997). Agrawal and Gibson (2001) 
noted that there is power in seeing community as small integrated units using locally evolved 
norms and rules to conserve natural resources. This idea however faces challenges because it 
erroneously views community as a unified organic whole. Quite often, there are differences 
within communities which might affect natural resource management outcomes, local politics 
and interactions (Western and Write, 1994; Warburton, 1998; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). 
Sharpe (1998) for example, stresses the internal dynamics of power, class, ethnicity, gender 
and political allegiances that make community a complex social structure. In this study, 
communities are treated as complex social structures made up of actors with multiple 
dynamics that affect access, use and control of natural resources. 
 
Linked to the criticism of decentralisation is the idea of community participation in natural 
resource management. Sanchez et al., (1988) pointed out that when decentralisation was 
considered, often it entailed vague, poorly-theorized notions of giving power to the citizens. 
Similar sentiments were raised by Hussein (1995) and Mayoux (1995) who noted that the so-
called participatory initiatives often failed in practice to empower community members with 
a genuine voice in or control over decision-making. Others argue that in some cases local 
elite groups capture project benefits partly because agencies have found it expedient to work 
with (and sometimes align interests with) existing power holders rather than the marginalized 
and excluded (Brohman, 1996; Desai, 1996; Goodwin, 1998 in Few, 2000). In this study, 
while decentralisation is understood in the context of improving participation of local people 
in Bulilima, the extent and efficacy of this participation is measured in terms of the power 
and role that different stakeholders have in the decision-making process. Discrepancies in 
social groups as reported in literature (see for instance Arnstein, 1969; Cornwall, 2008; 
Pretty, 1995) have inspired a number of typologies of participation, e.g. Cornwall, (2008), 
Arnstein (1969), Pretty (1995) and Agarwal (2001). Arnstein distinguished eight forms of 
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participation corresponding to different levels of citizens’ power (Few, 2000). Pretty’s  
typology includes manipulative and passive participation, where people are told what is to 
happen and act out pre-determined roles, and self-mobilisation, in which people take 
initiatives largely independent of external institutions (Pretty 1995). Agarwal’s typology was 
adopted for this study as it is more relevant to the nature of participation practiced in 
communal areas where community management of resources is active. 
 
Table 1.1 Typology of participation 
 
Form/Level of participation 
(presented in ascending order) 
Characteristics/Features 
Nominal participation  Membership in the group. 
Passive participation Being informed of decisions ex-post facto; or 
attending meetings, listening in on decision 
making without speaking up. 
Consultative participation Being asked an opinion on specific matters 
without guarantee of influencing decisions. 
Activity-specific participation Being asked to undertake specific tasks. 
Active participation Expressing opinions whether solicited or not, 
or taking initiatives of other sorts. 
Interactive participation (empowering) Having influence in the group’s decisions. 
 
Adapted from Agarwal (2001) 
 
These typologies have however, been criticised for focusing on the roles that groups or 
individuals  play  in  the process  rather  than  on  who  has  initiated  the  process (Buchy and 
Race, 2001). Some scholars such as Kaufman (1997:154) urge researchers to look  at power  
differences  not  only as  inequality  between  groups ,  but as  having  the “capacity ...  to  
control  and  dominate  other  social  structures  and natural resources”. Another criticism has 
come from the fact that participatory approaches have failed to address the issue of 
“charismatic leaders” (Jewitt, 1995:1003) or the “catalistic facilitator” (Robins, 1995:84), 
where power is vested in individuals. Buchy and Race (2001) noted that participatory 
processes have the potential of giving power to individuals. In Bulilima, local actors such as 
traditional leaders, elected councilors and influential individuals are entrusted with ensuring 
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that there is local participation in natural resource management within the communities. 
However, the role that these special individuals play because of their socio-political or 
professional status, or because of their specific personalities, has not been fully explored. 
This thesis thus further analyzes how participatory processes have influenced power 
dynamics in Bulilima. 
 
 It is important to note that while the focus of the study is not so much on the Community 
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme, this programme dominates 
natural resource management narratives in Bulilima. The Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)
6
 which was introduced in 1989 in 
Bulilima (see Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1996) has been used as a reference point when 
discussing natural resource management issues in Bulilima (Interview with Bulilima CEO, 14 
December, 2013). As such, it would be remiss to ignore CAMPFIRE in this study. In this 
regard, discussions with the Bulilima RDC officials revealed that the idea of putting mopane 
worms under a CAMPFIRE programme was once mooted but never operationalized because 
it was felt that the worms were not likely to be economically viable. Mopane worms and 
woodlands are found in different tenure areas that include the CAMPFIRE project area. This 
means that their management varies depending on the tenure and this determines who has 
what access and control in these different tenure areas. 
 
1.3. Objectives of the study 
 
The main aim of this study was to explore power dynamics and the significance of LEK in 
the management of mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima District situated in South-
western Matabeleland, Zimbabwe. This overarching aim was further simplified into 
researchable objectives and questions outlined below. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 CAMPFIRE is a community based natural resources management (CBNRM) programme 
developed by the Government of Zimbabwe through the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources Management. The programme is designed to promote the enhancement of 
rural livelihoods, rural development, and the conservation of biodiversity and the rich natural 
heritage of Zimbabwe (see Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995; Dzingirai and Madzudzo, 1999). 
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1.3.1. Research Objectives and Questions: 
 
1. Key objective one: To contextualise Zimbabwe`s natural resource management 
history. 
 How were natural resources managed during the precolonial, colonial 
and post-colonial periods in Zimbabwe generally and in Bulilima, 
particularly?  
 
2. Key objective two: To determine how power is configured between actors, 
institutions and institutional structures that use and manage mopane worms and 
woodlands in Bulilima. 
 How is power configured, exercised and experienced at different 
governance levels, places and spaces?  
 What are the institutional structures and their roles in mopane worms 
and woodlands management? 
 Are there areas of conflict with regards to natural resource 
management in Bulilima and if so, how are conflicts resolved?  
 
3. Key objective three: To investigate the significance of LEK and in the management 
of Mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima. 
 What local environmental knowledge exists about mopane worms and 
woodlands? 
 Who possesses this knowledge? 
 How significant is this knowledge in influencing natural resource management 
decisions compared to other types of knowledge? 
 
4. Key objective four: To analyse the gendered tenure of Mopane worms and 
woodlands management. 
 Which are men and women’s spaces and places with regard to mopane worms 
and woodlands in Bulilima? 
 How do gendered domains in mopane worms and woodlands affect women and 
men’s access, use and control of mopane worms and woodlands? 
 
10 
 
The predominant postulation behind this study is that recognition of the power dynamics, 
knowledge systems and gender dimensions in natural resource use in communal areas will 
assist policy makers in proposing natural resource initiatives that ensure sustainable use of 
mopane worms and woodlands in order to meet human livelihood needs. To fulfil the 
objectives, this study uses a case study of Bulilima District, broken down into Bambadzi, 
Makhulela and Dombolefu wards. Bambadzi and Makhulela are old resettlements established 
in the 1960s while Dombolefu is relatively new, having been established in the 1980s. The 
three wards are known for abundant occurrence of mopane worms compared to other wards.
7
  
 
There are a number of reasons why a case study approach was preferred. Firstly, it provided 
scope to move from the general to the specific as it allowed for generation of in-depth 
insights into the issues that were being examined. Secondly, studies that are specific to 
natural resource management in Bulilima have tended to focus on Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMFIRE) with emphasis on wildlife 
resources without consideration of the complex resource set up within physical and social 
spaces (Madzudzo, 1997; Dzingirai and Madzudzo, 1999; Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1996; 
Magadza, 2006). In most of these writings, the debate has been about conflict of interests 
between social groups over access to natural resources communally managed under 
CAMPFIRE.  This study builds on these studies but introduces a fresh historical perspective 
in the management of two resources in a manner that has not been done before. The study 
contributes towards an understanding of how power dynamics and LEKsystems influence the 
sustainable management of mopane woodlands and mopane worms in Bulilima. Moreover, 
this study raises critical theoretical debates about natural resources that are not so important 
to the state but are so to the locals who depend on such resources. 
 
1.4. Problem Statement 
 
Decentralisation of NRM to local actors and institutions in many developing states was an 
attempt to reduce the state’s role in natural resource governance while improving efficiency 
in resource use. As a result, much of common pool resource literature has tended to focus on 
how decentralised natural resources are sustainably managed, how institutions established to 
manage them are coping and the general resource characteristics after decentralisation 
(Kadirbeyoglu and Ozertan, 2015). While numerous scholars (Ostrom et al., 1994; 
                                                 
7
 Information obtained from Bulilima CEO 
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Nemarundwe, 2001; Matose, 2002; 2008; 2009; Anderson, 2006) have done comprehensive 
research on how contextualising interactions among local actors leads to institutional 
outcomes shaping their actions, analysis of power dynamics and the significance of LEK on 
natural resource governance has generally been neglected. Kadirbeyoglu and Ozertan, (2015) 
noted that power asymmetry among local natural resource users can determine how a 
resource is managed, thus influencing access, use and control of a  resource. Similarly, 
knowledge also has a similar effect on natural resource management. 
 
Schneck (1987) analyzed Foucault’s power/discourse essay and concluded that there is a very 
close link between knowledge and power. Knowledge creates and enhances power yet 
common pool resource (CPR) governance literature has not thoroughly analysed this 
dimension, particularly how LEK influences power dynamics with regards to natural resource 
access, use and control. Decentralization on its own therefore will not result in efficient 
resource use without ascertaining power dynamics that play an important role in determining 
who has access to what resource at a local level. Similarly, understanding the significance of 
LEK is crucial in determining the decision making influence of those who still possess and 
use this knowledge. 
 
An analysis of CPRs in a historical context has also not been dealt with satisfactorily in CPR 
governance literature, yet history plays a key role in understanding expressions and sources 
of power asymmetries, as well as associated knowledge systems shaping contemporary 
resource management systems. The legacy of the colonial management of traditional leaders 
is still felt in contemporary management of natural resources in the rural communities of 
Zimbabwe. It is therefore critical that power analysis on actors and institutions that use 
mopane resources must necessarily include a historical dimension that would contextualise an 
understanding of contemporary power and LEK systems in the communities. For instance, 
the colonial system encouraged certain forms of power in traditional leaders and communal 
tenure system to support colonial states and oppress the masses (Chanock, 1991; Mamdani, 
1996). Since independence, the government of Zimbabwe has faced challenges in addressing 
tenure laws, meaning that resource users operate in a legal limbo that places limitations on 
their resource autonomy. The Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme 
(FTLRRP) which started in 1999 ushered in a new dispensation which has seen the majority 
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of formerly white owned farms occupied by different classes of indigenous black people
8
. As 
a result, the formal administration of land in formerly white-owned areas has been replaced 
by an incoherent system of land management which enjoys some space in the traditional 
administration and political/party administration nexus. In this legal uncertainty, political and 
economic elites accumulate wealth and power based on tenure arrangements and 
management practices bequeathed to them by the departing colonial authorities. 
 
1.5. Rationale  
 
Utilization of natural resources in Zimbabwe’s rural areas has occurred in a system that is 
complicated by blurry resource rights and colonial political influence (Logan and Moseley, 
2002; Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007). Two important Acts passed after 1980: the Communal 
Land Act of 1982 and the Traditional Leadership Act of 1998 transferred all powers for the 
allocation of land and natural resources to the Rural District Councils (RDCs) and further 
placed land administration powers in a traditional system of chiefs and headmen. This was 
done under the umbrella of decentralization, a system which sought to transfer natural 
resource management responsibilities and powers from central government to local 
institutions (Fisher, 1991; Dillinger, 1994; Crook and Manor, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999; World Bank, 2000). However, these institutional tools are parallel administrative 
systems with the potential of causing conflicts in natural resource management (Pollard and 
Cousins, 2008). Furthermore, the decentralization attempts in developing countries such as 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Malawi, Niger, Zambia, the Gambia and Zimbabwe have 
been perceived as transferring insufficient decision-making powers to various unaccountable 
local bodies, threatening local equity and the environment (Schroeder, 1999; Oyono, 2002; 
Ribot, 2003). In some studies, it has been argued that decentralization has totally ignored 
indigenous knowledge and management systems to the detriment of the natural resources 
(Haller and Chabwela, 2009; Magole 2009a; b; Mhlanga, 2009; Matose, 2009; Büscher, 
2010; Eguavoen and Laube, 2010; Burns and Stohr, 2011). In such a context, where claims to 
CPRs occur in a complex tenure system and where decentralisation has resulted in the local 
elites capturing most of the benefits (Ribot, 2000; Woodhouse et al., 2000), there was a 
compelling need to explore power dynamics among various actors who utilise mopane worms 
                                                 
8
 FTLRRP is a form of land redistribution in Zimbabwe which began in July 2000 through the 
Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase 11. It envisaged acquiring 5 million 
hectares and resettling new farmers on all acquired land (Murombedzi, 2005; Barry, 2004; 
Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003) 
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and woodlands in Bulilima. In this study, this is done in a broader historical, political and 
social context, taking into account political and social events that occurred in Bulilima in the 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
 
Research on institutional change in natural resource management has attracted a lot of 
scholarly attention, but most of these studies concentrated on how the state dismantled local 
institutions in the governance of fisheries and flood plains (see for example Haller and 
Chabwela, 2009; Demotts et al., 2009). They also rely heavily on archival data which does 
not lend itself to producing rich and detailed information about the lived experiences of 
natural resource users. Moreover, there are limited studies on the historical trajectory of 
natural resources in areas that have been affected by both ethnic and political struggles such 
as Bulilima District. This researcher was thus interested in the broader conceptual and 
theoretical questions prompted by knowledge systems and power dynamics in mopane worms 
and woodlands use. For that reason, this study aims to produce deeper insights into the 
phenomenon through rich, contextual, and nuanced data rarely captured in archives. It 
privileges an ethnographic approach, involving sustained observations, participation in the 
observed practices and events, archival research and in depth interviews with participants – 
the aim of which is to produce rich and detailed data on power relations and knowledge 
systems among and between resource users. This research seeks to carry out this analysis 
using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework approach and the Power 
Cube approach because these two can help explain different forms of power in various 
constellations of property and access rights. Although this study is based on a case study 
research, analysing power dynamics and LEK systems associated with natural resource 
management in Bulilima can help improve understanding of other contestations of natural 
resource governance in other regions of the world with similar socio-political and economic 
characteristics.  
 
With regards to the study area, and the subject under discussion, the existing literature on 
mopane worms and woodlands is fragmented and mainly focussed on analysing livelihood 
issues (see for example Gondo, et al., 2010; Akpalu et al., 2007; Gardiner, 2006; Stack et al., 
2003). Most of these studies are limited to mopane worms and livelihoods. Other studies 
conducted in the same area (Madzudzo, 1997; Dzingirai and Madzudzo, 1999; Madzudzo and 
Hawkes, 1996; and Magadza, 2006) have debated among other things, human-wildlife 
conflict, grazing and access to resources managed under the CAMPFIRE program. For 
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instance, Dzingirai and Madzudzo (1999) attempted to show how social groups within a 
community have divergent perceptions of how resources should be managed, often resulting 
in conflicts while Madzudzo (1997) looked at the distribution of benefits derived from 
CAMPFIRE proceeds where he concluded that funds realised through the CAMPFIRE 
program were unequally distributed with the RDC getting a larger share than the intended 
beneficiaries. 
 
Those studies that concentrated on CAMPFIRE and wildlife resources in Bulilima set the 
stage for power and knowledge analysis in that most of them sought to highlight power 
dynamics in resource management and access. This study therefore builds on these studies 
but introduces a fresh historical perspective, than has hitherto been the case, in order to have 
a better understanding of power dynamics and LEK systems at play in Bulilima. Moreover, 
theoretical debates on natural resources that are not important to the state but to the locals 
who depend on the resources are raised. This follows an observation by Heltberg (2010) that 
natural resources which are not of commercial value are rarely a concern for policy-makers 
hence little is done to conserve them.  
 
A number of studies have also been done on the management of Mopane woodlands (see for 
example Gandar, 1983; Tietema, et al., 1991; Mushove and Makoni, 1993; von Maltitz and 
Shackleton, 2004; Gardiner, 2006; Makhado et al., 2012). Most of these studies have focused 
on the scientific aspect of management. The social aspects of management that include 
governance issues have not been given much emphasis and have also been analyzed on a 
short time-scale. This study analyses management of mopane worms and woodlands from a 
historical perspective stretching over three epochs – pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. 
 
In order to fully comprehend the problem at hand, it is vital to situate Bulilima District as a 
study area within its specific historical and political context. In the last three decades, 
Matabeleland South region, where Bulilima is located, has experienced intense contestations 
of political power between the locals, various political parties, and even Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs).  The region is a restless frontier where identities (ethnic, regional and 
national) and politics are in a constant shift (Alexander, 1991; Phimister, 2008; Mabhena, 
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2010; Msindo, 2012). The history of Bulilimamangwe
9
 is a history of many ethnic groups 
such as the Rozvi, Venda, San, Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga and the Ndebele. This region has 
undergone a series of political changes which can be traced back to the invasion by the 
Ndebele in the 1830s, invasion by the British South Africa Company (BSACo) in the 1890s, 
the Ndebele uprising in the early 1890s and the liberation war which culminated in 
Zimbabwe`s independence in 1980 (Msindo, 2012). The defeat of the Ndebele by the British 
colonizers in 1893 and the crafting of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 resulted in a 
new configuration of power and new knowledge systems as Ndebele chiefs were installed to 
govern Kalanga people, leading to a strain in relations between the Ndebele and the Kalanga 
(Msindo, 2012; Dube, 2012 in Landman, 2013). However, the struggle for independence 
brought together the two main ethnic groups, Kalanga and Ndebele, culminating in the 
formation of the Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People`s Union (PF-ZAPU) (Ranger, 
1999; Mabhena, 2010; Msindo, 2012; Dube, 2012 in Landman, 2013). The struggle for 
independence and the ultimate victory of PF-ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) brought new configurations of power in Matabeleland region.
10
 
The new ZANU-PF led government faced stiff opposition from PF-ZAPU dominated areas 
such as Bulilima. The period from 1980 to 1987 witnessed a power struggle between ZANU 
(PF) and PF-ZAPU for the control of largely Matabeleland and parts of Midlands regions 
under ZAPU control.
11
 During this period, the repression of the civilian population and their 
local and national leaders effectively denied Matabeleland a voice in decisions concerning 
development and land distribution (Kriger, 1988; 2006; Moore, 2005; Alexander 1991). 
Power meant the control of land and its natural resources. Mabhena (2010) argued that the 
ZANU (PF) led government had to impose new administrative structures on top of ZAPU-led 
administrative structures so as to control the activities of ZAPU councilors and other 
administrators. It is clear that this resulted in a struggle for power. 
 
                                                 
9
 Bulilima and Mangwe districts were initially part of one big district known as 
Bulilimamangwe. In 2002 Bulilimamangwe district was split into three districts (Bulilima, 
Mangwe and Plumtree) as it was considered by the government of Zimbabwe to be 
administratively too large. Plumtree is the only urban district (Munyati et al.,(Ed), 2006). 
10
 PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF were originally one party known as Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (ZAPU). In 1963 ZAPU split into ZANU and ZAPU on regional, ethnic and strategic 
differences (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). 
11
 For more detail on this see Alexander (1991); Phimister, (2008); Mabhena, (2010);  
16 
 
 The Unity Accord of 1987 ushered in a new era of peace in Bulilima and other areas of 
Matabeleland and Midlands.
12
 The people of Matabeleland however remained sceptical of the 
unity accord as shown by their immediate shift of allegiance when the new Movement of 
Democratic Change party came along in 1999 (Mabhena, 2010). As of October 2015 
however, the members of parliament for Bulilima East and West constituencies (Hon. 
Mathias Ndlovu and Hon. Lungisani Nleya, respectively) were members of the ruling ZANU 
PF party. There are also more councilors representing ZANU PF (13 in total) compared to 5 
from MDC-T and 1 from MDC (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 2013). Of the 3 
wards under study, Makhulela has a councilor from MDC-T while councilors representing 
other two wards are from ZANU PF. The councilor from Makhulela pointed out that his 
authority was being openly challenged by the District Administrator (DA) (closely linked to 
the ruling party) who often encouraged traditional leaders to make decisions without the 
councilor’s knowledge. The study also found out that other structures such as war veterans 
and Border Gezi youths
13
 often openly defied directives coming from the councilor because 
he represented an opposition party even though he had been democratically elected by the 
people. 
 
This brief political history of Matabeleland South region, in general, and Bulilima in 
particular, is vital because it helps situate our understanding of the evolving power dynamics 
in the district. Different political regimes that attempted to control Bulilima district from 
1980 also had a huge influence on how natural resources were, and still are, being exploited. 
 
                                                 
12
 The unity accord was signed by ZAPU and ZANU in 1987 resulting in an end to political 
hostilities that were being perpetrated by ZANU PF led government soldiers known as the 5
th
 
brigade in Matabeleland and Midlands areas. The hostilities are known as Gukurahundi in 
vernacular Shona language which means cleaning of the chuff after harvests (Alexander, 
1991 Stiff, 2000; Phimister, 2008).  
13
 Border Gezi Youth is a term given to youths who undergo National Youth Service (NYS) 
in Zimbabwe. Border Gezi (December 17, 1964 – April 28, 2001) was a Zimbabwean 
politician. He was a close ally of Robert Mugabe within ZANU-PF and served as Minister for 
Gender, Youth and Employment from 2000. He is widely responsible for having presided 
over a National Youth Service system that was responsible for serious atrocities in Zimbabwe 
(see for example `ZIMBABWE: “Green Bombers” deserting poor conditions in camps` 2004, 
IRIN News, 23 January. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=48241. Accessed 20 
June 2014; “Hundreds of ZANU PF youths are still being trained at torture camps scattered 
around Mashonaland Central” 2002, The Daily News, 21 March. (CISNET Zimbabwe 
CX63395). Accessed 20 June 2014; THE SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST (2003). An 
overview of youth militia training and activities in Zimbabwe, October 2000–August 2003. 
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1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. After this introductory chapter, the second presents the 
conceptual frameworks for analysing power dynamics and LEK in common pool resources. 
The chapter reviews literature on Common Property Resources (CPRs), New Institutionalism 
(NI), power and political ecology. Issues such as struggles over power, practices, justice, 
knowledge, trust, social capital, accountability and ethnicity are increasingly being taken 
cognizant of by researchers in an attempt to understand how certain institutions influence the 
value placed on resources by users in order to govern resource access, use and benefits 
(Robbins, 2004; Collomb et al., 2010). The chapter further critiques the concept of 
knowledge and its effect on natural resource management. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodological approach adopted for the study. A predominantly qualitative approach is 
followed in both data collection and analysis. The chapter further discusses the challenges 
faced during fieldwork and how some of them were overcome. The second part of Chapter 3 
provides a detailed description of the study area, Bulilima District and the three wards 
sampled for this study. A general overview of the district’s economy, geography and 
population is given. Chapter 4 is a historical analysis of natural resource management in 
Zimbabwe and in Bulilima. This chapter is based on archival reviews, document analysis as 
well as narratives from purposively sampled key informants. The chapter goes back into 
history, chronicling major events that have shaped the management of natural resources 
during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras so as to understand the key processes 
and mechanisms influencing the contemporary governance of natural resources.
14
  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to presentation, analysis and discussion of results. Findings 
are discussed and linked to the conceptual frameworks critiqued in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 
analyses patterns of interaction, power dynamics, institutional structures and the gendered 
nature of exploiting mopane worms and woodlands. Interactions among actors result in 
diverse power relations that further influence use, access and control of mopane worms and 
woodlands. The chapter further interrogates the role played by women in influencing 
                                                 
14
 In using these temporal parameters the researcher is mindful of their limitations as these 
are Western demarcations of time related to colonialism. They ignore African perceptions of 
periodisation and privilege those of European colonial settlers. The researcher is therefore 
using them for heuristic purposes as there is no space in this thesis to delve deeper into a 
critique of this issue. 
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decisions in the study area. Chapter 6 focuses on the significance of LEK systems on mopane 
worm and woodland use and management. Focus is on the type of LEK used by communities 
to ensure sustainable management of mopane resources. LEK faces challenges from western 
scientific knowledge used mainly by the state and other organizations to control natural 
resource management in the study area. Chapter 7 discusses and summarizes the key 
arguments presented in the thesis. It reflects on the arguments in all the previous chapters, 
linking the objectives of the study, the conceptual frameworks and methodology used. The 
chapter ends by giving a suitable conclusion that raises further questions on natural resource 
management that could be pursued as further research in another work. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSING 
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE IN COMMON POOL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter establishes the foundation for exploring power dynamics between and among 
natural resource users and the significance of local environmental knowledge in the 
management of common pool resources. It further discusses the reasons behind the selection 
of key concepts and theories that help illuminate this study. Major concepts such as power 
relations, LEK systems and situated practices of different actors located in specific contexts 
and mediated by sets of changing institutions which may lead to different outcomes, are 
analysed. This study is built on Hardin’s (1968) ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ theory which 
argues that users of common property cannot be left to decide how to use it and that their use 
has to be controlled to avoid over-exploitation. It is with the objective of preventing the 
Hardinian ‘tragedy of the commons’ that governments in Africa, and other parts of the world 
had, until the beginning of the 1980s, assumed direct control of common pool resources such 
as forests, water bodies, game and wildlife at the expense of the locals who were denied the 
opportunity of managing their own resources. It is therefore critical that theoretical 
discussions anchoring this study begin with an analysis of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
framework. Other relevant frameworks discussed include new institutionalism (NI), common 
property resource (CPR), theoretical discussions on power and political ecology. The chapter 
also analyses formal and informal institutions governing the management of common pool 
resources in Southern Africa. It concludes by discussing two analytical frameworks used in 
understanding the dynamics of power and the significance of local environmental knowledge 
in mopane worms and woodlands in the Bulilima District. 
 
2.2. Conceptual frameworks 
 
The governance of common pool resources has come under the global spotlight given that in 
most cases, common pool resources are directly related to the natural environment and the 
sustainability of the natural environment has become a major global topic (Hardin, 1968; 
Wade, 1987, 1988; Ostrom, 1990, 2005; Baland and Platteau 1996; Agrawal, 2005).  
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Common pool resources are characterized by property rights that are either open access or 
distinctly common property rights. In the case of state property, it is argued that without 
proper enforcement, state resources may end up resembling open access resources where it is 
a ‘free for all’ (Ostrom, 2008; Musole, 2009).  In his seminal paper, Hardin (1968) argued 
that in the case of non-private common property (absence of private property rights) the 
community will continue to utilise the resource aiming at individual utility maximisation 
without necessary investments, leading to the eventual degradation of the resource. This he 
termed the ‘tragedy of the commons’.  He argued that there was no incentive to invest in the 
upkeep of common property as other members are likely to benefit without sharing the 
investment costs, thereby benefitting unduly. This problem is attributed to the characteristics 
of common property resources summarized by Ostrom (2008) and Quinn et al. (2007) as non-
excludability and rivalry in consumption. Hardin used the metaphor of common pasture users 
who have privately owned animals. The argument goes: 
 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons. Ruin is the destination towards which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom 
of the commons. In vying with each other to benefit individually from the commons, 
each one of the users keeps increasing the number of animals he brings into the 
common pasture even if he realizes that this in the long run will lead to the destruction 
of the common pasture through overgrazing. Each user therefore decides upon a 
course that is rational from his or her individual point of view but which leads to the 
irrational over-exploitation of the common pool resource and its ultimate and 
unavoidable destruction (Hardin, 1968: 1244-45). 
 
Hardin concludes that common ownership of pasture and private ownership of livestock 
breeds conflict between the group’s interest and that of the individual, and it is the group’s 
interest that is overridden. This is because an individual will often act in a selfish way. From 
this argument follows the conclusion that the only way out of such a conundrum lies in 
privatization of common resources or instituting rules and regulations backed by external 
coercive sanctions (ibid: 1245-47). 
 
2.2.1. Critique of Hardin`s tragedy of the commons 
 
Extant literature abounds with numerous examples of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Berkes, 
1985; Jodha, 1987; Cordell, 1989). The solution according to Hardin (1968) was the 
introduction of private property rights as these would create an incentive to maintain common 
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property more efficiently and avoid tragedy. However, a number of scholars have criticised 
the idea that private property rights are a panacea to the tragedy of the commons. Challen 
(2000) pointed out that the definition of common property is ambiguous given that multiple 
rights regimes may be present for the same object. One example of such a scenario would be 
a case where the state owned the private property rights to land then gave demarcated parcels 
of land to different communities as common property (ibid). Related to the ambiguity in 
definition, Ostrom (1990) used the framework of property rights hierarchies to show the 
subordinate and superordinate nested structure of property rights regimes. The hierarchical 
nature further amplified the ambiguity in definition as it was clear that the state had supreme 
rights which it would distribute down to the lowest point as private individual rights based on 
the inherent transactional costs as explained in Challen (2000). Given the absence of 
interplanetary and intergalactic relations, Ostrom’s (1990) hierarchy argument makes the air 
we breathe and the sunshine perhaps the only remaining common access resources.   
 
Ostrom (2008) argued that the assumptions Hardin had used, such as zero communication 
within the community members amongst others, were highly unrealistic and it was only 
because of such assumptions that the conclusions were justifiable. In the real world, 
community members are known to contribute to each other’s social capital and may at times 
work for the common good (Hanifan, 1916; Putnam, 1995; Ostrom, 2008). Therefore, it has 
been argued that with proper institutions and aids, common property resources may be 
adequately managed by the locals themselves (Steins, 2001; Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005; 
Quinn et al., 2007). 
 
Hardin was further criticized for his failure to distinguish between ‘common property’ and 
‘open access’ regimes and his positing of selfish users of the commons (Peters, 1994). Four 
broad categories of management regimes are delineated in the literature on common pool 
resource management: state, private, common property and non-property or open access 
(Ostrom 1990; Murphree, 1993). Nemarundwe (2003) further noted that these four property 
regimes are good for analysis because, in practice, resources are rarely managed under only 
one regime. Other scholars (Grifiths, 1986; Sowerwine, 2004; Eguavoen and Laube, 2010) 
advanced the same compelling arguments and stated that resource governance is not a 
straightforward process but consists of often inconclusive negotiations where issues of 
access, power, and authority are at stake. Assumptions of inherently selfish users of commons 
who favor short-term maximization of individual interests are not supported by evidence.  
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Contemporary and historical literature cites what are known as rules of exclusion and other 
regulatory mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990; Feeny et al., 1990; Peters, 1994).  
 
Literature on resource governance systems in Zimbabwe, generally states that property 
regimes found in the communal areas are usually not strictly common property resource 
systems but mixes of state, common property and private property (Campbell et al., 2001; 
Nemarundwe, 2003). Communal lands are legally state lands under the Communal Lands 
Acts (1982), yet in practical terms, communities have traditional freehold tenure over 
residential and arable plots and usufruct rights over the surrounding commons (Nemarundwe, 
2003). These resource systems also have multiple rules (state, RDC and local) with multiple 
legitimating bases (e.g. legal and customary) and different enforcement structures and 
processes, often resulting in conflicts (Mandondo, 2000a). Hara et al., (2009) noted two 
paradoxical processes leading to the same result. On the one hand, local users experience 
processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation over access and use 
rights for natural resources. On the other, there are cases where open access to common pool 
resources has developed. While the exclusion of disempowered groups of users is evident in 
the former case, the latter situation often leads to reduced access possibilities for these actors, 
because more mobile and powerful resource users profit from the free access (Haller and 
Merten, 2008).  In Chapter 5, grazing areas are described as free access areas with regards to 
mopane worm harvesting. As such, outsiders exploited the resource without any sanctions. 
 
A vast body of literature on forest-based commons has been criticized for focusing primarily 
on how variations in institutional arrangements shape resource-related outcomes (Agrawal, 
2007). This work includes principles of institutional design (Ostrom, 1999), the need for fit 
between institutions and their political-ecological context (Dietz et al., 2003; Ribot, 1999), 
the nature of institutional mediation (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997), the importance of local 
enforcement (Agrawal 2005; Gibson et al., 2005), possibilities of social resistance (Guha, 
1989; Peluso, 1992), the necessity of broad-based participation in institutionalized 
governance (Ribot, 2002), the relationship between indigenous peoples and forests (Rangan 
and Lane, 2001), and the role of local variation in shaping resource-related outcomes 
(Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006). While this work contributes towards an understanding of how 
resources can be efficiently governed, it is rather silent on the role played by history, power 
and knowledge in influencing resource management.  
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2.2.2. New Institutionalism (NI) 
 
Throughout this thesis, institutions and institutional frameworks are pivotal in the 
understanding of power dynamics and knowledge systems responsible for mopane worms 
and woodland management in Bulilima District. This section thus discusses institutions under 
the umbrella of new institutionalism, with the aim of relating knowledge and power dynamics 
to the institutions governing natural resource use in the district. The new institutionalism 
theory proposed by North (1990) and further developed by various scholars (Ostrom 1990; 
Becker and Ostrom 1995; Ensminger 1992; Acheson 2003) was found relevant in this study 
due to its emphasis on property rights, rules and regulations for the governance of common 
pool resources.  
 
North (1990:3) typically defines institutions as ‘... the rules of the game in a society, or more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. They are the set of 
informal and formal rules that facilitate and constrain human behaviour, or define ‘the rules 
of the game’ (Bromley, 1989; Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1971; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; North, 1990). 
Institutions are considered as providing mechanisms whereby individuals can transcend 
social dilemmas while characteristics of social outcomes are not only explained by individual 
preferences and the optimisation of behaviour, but also on the basis of institutional 
preferences (Acheson, 1989; Bates, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). Institutions often form nested 
structures in which higher level institutions set limits to the procedures and alternatives that 
are available at lower levels. In most cases, they constitute agents in particular ways, vesting 
them with different powers, immunities, rights, and duties (Bromley, 1991). 
 
At a more pragmatic level, institutions play a role both in causing and in mitigating 
environmental problems (Bromley, 1991; O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999; Young, 2002). They 
shape the perception of and professed solutions to such problems. Institutions are embedded 
in the specifics of culture, history, and social practices, which vary substantially across 
different social settings (Cleaver, 2000; Granovetter, 1985; Mosse, 1997). The impact of 
institutions on environmental problems and decisions, therefore, varies from one context to 
another. This means that generalisations from specific cases must be made with caution, 
giving adequate attention to their context (Edwards and Steins, 1999; Mehta et al., 1999). 
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New institutionalism theorists argue that people have an interest in institutions because the 
latter reduce costs of transactions, providing clear arrangements of who is entitled to utilize a 
resource, when and where. The theorists believe that credible commitments with mutual 
monitoring and establishment of certain institutions can encourage individuals to become 
more involved in collective action towards the realisation of a shared goal (Ostrom, 1990). 
Credible commitments can be made when individuals are presented with rules that meet a 
number of criteria or design principles that include clearly defined boundaries, congruence 
between allocation and access rules and local conditions, individuals being able to modify 
rules, monitoring being done by accountable individuals, and non-compliance being followed 
by graduated sanctions (ibid). The commitment is to follow the rules as long as most 
similarly situated individuals adopt the same commitment and the long-term net benefits are 
greater than the costs. The core argument made by new institutionalism is that institutions or 
decision-making arrangements provide the mechanism with which individuals can transcend 
the tragedy of the commons (Nemarundwe, 2003). 
 
Neo-classical institutionalists describe institutions as cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour (Scott, 1995). 
They view the decision-maker as a perfectly rational individual who acts on calculated 
rationality. New institutionalism on the other hand, assumes a situation of bounded 
rationality, and that coordination of economic activities involves more than just transactions 
in markets in which price is the sole consideration. The two schools are relevant for this study 
since both are pivotal to discussing power relations amongst actors, interested groups and 
their values among other issues.  
 
In this study, institutions are therefore understood as ‘the prescriptions that humans use to 
organise all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, including institutionalised cultural 
values as well as formal organisations’ (Ostrom, 2005:1, cited in Jones and Boyd, 2011: 
1264). Holmes-Watts and Watts (2008) warn that merely focusing on institutions as formal 
and informal rules may provide too narrow a perspective given that there is often a mismatch 
between rules and what people actually do. Rules cannot easily be analysed independent of 
what people do (Richardson, 2004). Instead, focussing on actors, their interests, their value 
systems, whom and what these actors represent, what they say they do and what they actually 
do in practice may provide a deeper understanding of the role of different institutions in 
natural resource governance. This view is particularly pertinent in this study as there is a need 
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to analyse practices of community members to understand how issues of power manifest 
themselves. Understanding how knowledge pertaining to natural resource management is 
generated and maintained is important in ascertaining who the dominant actors are in a 
community. Moreover, actors are responsible for initiating or maintaining institutions at 
different and multiple levels including local, regional and multi-national levels (Vacarro and 
Norman, 2007). This implies that issues of power are manifested at different and multiple 
scales.  Institutions are social constructs and therefore are not neutral (Vatn, 2005).  Robbins 
(2004) notes that the power to form institutions to support one’s interests may bear unequal 
and oppressive outcomes. It is for this reason that the analysis of power between stakeholders 
can be crucial in understanding the distribution of natural resources among people (Sheil and 
Wunder, 2002). A focus on asymmetries of power among actors provides valuable 
perspectives in understanding and explaining institutional performance. This means that 
natural resource value in rural livelihoods is realised through social and political contestations 
that are shaped by complex institutions at local and external levels (Kepe, 2008a; Robbins, 
2004; Cousins, 1999). Therefore, different social and institutional settings at the local level 
can determine how different actors regard natural resources and hence influence the 
arrangements for governance of those resources. 
 
Kepe (2008a) cautions that institutions responsible for natural resource governance are often 
characterised by conflict and ambiguity as much as by harmony and complementarity. In 
particular, power relations are embedded within institutional forms, making contestation over 
institutional practices, rules and norms always important (Scoones, 1998). Therefore, 
institutions are shaped in a space of interests, values, conflict and coordination. In sum, a 
deeper understanding of institutions (including actors), interactions and power dynamics may 
be the key to better inform policy for good natural resource governance and management. 
 
Some scholars have been influenced by the NI theory to conduct empirical studies on 
collective action in common pool resource management contexts (see Bromley, 1992; McCay 
and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990) and this body of literature is now referred to as common 
property resource theory (CPR) (Steins, 1999). The CPR theory suggests that individuals will 
collectively manage common resources when the benefits from the institutional set-up (i.e. 
rules and means of enforcement) are limited to a small and stable community (Berkes, 1993; 
McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). However, it is critical to note that less attention 
has been paid to historically-based analysis of processes which trigger institutional change. A 
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few scholars have attempted to analyse the influence of history and politics on natural 
resource management. For instance Ensminger (1992) analyzed pasture use among the Orma 
in Kenya. She pointed out that in order to understand institutional change related to common-
pool resource management, issues of power and ideology are crucial elements. In a similar 
vein is the more recent work of Arun Agrawal, who provides a review of anthropological 
research on resource management, emphasizing that in the analysis of the commons, issues 
about power and ideology between and within communities, need to be analyzed in historical 
depth (Agrawal 2001; 2003; 2005 in Haller and Merten, 2008). This study seeks to contribute 
towards building knowledge on this glaring gap. It analyses issues of power dynamics and 
local knowledge in Bulilima paying particular attention to the historic context that has shaped 
the current state of natural resource management in the district. The study argues, among 
other things, that the way natural resources were managed before shapes the current state of 
affairs. This study therefore contributes to debates on the relevance of history in 
understanding contemporary power and ideology discourses in natural resource management.  
 
As scholarly debates in NI grew, distinct branches began to emerge. These included theory of 
collective action, new economic history, public choice and political economy, law and 
economics, transaction cost economics, economics of information, the legal environment and 
property rights, and social capital economics (Olson and Kähkönen, 2000). Of relevance to 
the subject matter of this study, the major branch of NI briefly discussed in this section is 
property rights. 
 
a) Property rights  
 
Understanding dynamics of power in natural resource management entails appreciation of 
property rights held by various actors in Bulilima. Property rights provide the basic economic 
incentive system that shapes resource allocation (Becker, 1977; Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 
1964). For instance, when bundles of goods and services are exchanged in the market, a set of 
rights to those bundles is also exchanged in the process (Demsetz, 1967). As Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973) elaborate, what are transacted and owned are not the physical structures 
(bare land, bricks and mortar, gadgets and academic theories) but the associated rights. 
Adding to this concept, Furubotn and Richter (2000) state that in the case of a sale, what 
effectively happens is a transfer of a ‘bundle’ of property rights from one person to another. 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) further note that the value of any exchange depends on the 
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bundle of property rights implied in the transaction. Thus, it is not the resource itself that is 
owned but the bundle or a portion of rights (often circumscribed and frequently by the 
prohibition of certain actions) to use it (Musole, 2009).  
 
The concept of property rights has been defined from a legal and economic perspective. 
Under continental civil law, property rights are related to physical objects or tangibles only, 
while the Anglo-American common law relates property rights to both tangibles and 
intangibles (including patents, copyrights and contract rights) (see Alchian 1965; Musole, 
2009). Furubotn and Richter (2000) allege that property rights could be absolute (practiced 
universally towards all parties) or relative (applicable only towards certain parties). In an 
economic perspective, concepts regarding the difference between a right and mere use have 
been extensively debated (Demsetz, 1967, Heyne, 2000; Furubotn and Richter 2000; Cole 
and Grossman, 2000).  
 
With reference to the concept of ‘right and mere use’, Cole and Grossman (2000) claim that a 
resource can be controlled without possessing a right. They note that in the case of a right, 
society, through formal law or informal social norms, enforces one’s control or use without 
penalty for use. However, Cole and Grossman (2000) also maintain that there are numerous 
things one could do without penalty but that does not necessarily give one the rights (e.g. 
firms polluting unabated). As such, mere continued use does not mean one has the rights 
(Cole and Grossman, 2000). Zhu (2002) who differentiates legal (rights defined by the state 
and recognised by law) from economic rights (the ability of individuals to exercise their 
rights over an asset) gives another side to the definition of property rights. These multiple 
definitions show that it is essential for economists to distinguish rights from other interests 
(Musole, 2009). 
 
In New Institutional theory, North (1990) defines property rights as rights individuals 
appropriate from their own labour and the goods and services they possess. This definition, 
though economic in nature, leaves the concept of possession unexplained as possession in 
some way relates to the fundamentals of ownership and property rights. Barzel (1989) 
avoided the idea of explaining the meaning of possessions by using the same word 
‘possessions’, and opted to state what an individual who controlled property rights could do 
with an object. These are the rights or the power, to consume, to obtain income from, and 
alienate these assets (Barzel, 1989). Therefore, from an economic perspective, Musole (2009) 
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states that it is the ability of the individual to exercise the rights to use, obtain an income, sell, 
or transfer an asset that matters. 
 
According to Roman Law, ownership consists of the right to use an asset (usus), the right to 
capture benefits from an asset (usus fructus), the right to change its form and substance 
(abusus), and the right to transfer all or some of the rights specified above to others at a 
mutually agreed price (Pejovich, 1990). This view seems to capture the economic and legal 
definitions of modern property rights. In addition to their complex definition, Grafton, 
Squires and Fox (2000) argue that it is important that rights be divisible, exclusive, 
transferable, durable and flexible. Libecap (1989) further emphasises that property rights 
institutions are determined through the political process, either involving negotiations among 
immediate group members or lobbying activities.  
 
Challen (2000) outlines five major arguments for the emergence of property rights over 
objects valuable to humanity. These arguments were, first, the first occupancy argument that 
gave an individual the right to an object simply because she/he owned it first. This argument, 
however, has been criticised by, among others, Bromley (1989) for the reason that it gave an 
unfair advantage to those born earlier. The second is the labor argument which advocates for 
ownership of what one has produced through individual ingenuity, strength and initiative. 
This argument has also fallen prey to criticism in the case of ownership of children and 
ownership of goods produced under contractual employment by another party (Becker, 1977; 
Bromely, 1989). The third is the utility argument that advocates for the giving of property 
rights to one who would most increase overall social utility. The fourth is the political liberty 
argument that the ability to control and accumulate creates incentives and allows humans to 
express themselves fully. This argument has been strongly criticised in the recent past as it 
has been linked to primitive accumulation and insatiable egotist appetites that have seen the 
environment suffer and poverty increase as the rich got richer and the poor got poorer (Tolle, 
2005). The fifth point is the argument that property rights help develop good morals and lead 
to better management of the object. The amount of control (absolute or partial) determines 
the strength of property right that the owner wields over the asset (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1973). The ownership of property rights may be characterized by singular or multiple 
interests, thus, in the same property, more than one party can claim some ownership interest 
at any given time (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Enever & Isaac, 2002; Fraser, 1993; Musole, 
2009).  
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In response to this quandary over rights, ownership scholars have defined the major property 
rights ownership structures that exist in most societies using four categories: open access, 
communal, private, and state property (see for example Libecap, 1986; Feeny, at al., 1990; 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Musola (2009) explains the four categories showing that in the 
case of state ownership, the state (or extensions of the state, such as local authorities and 
municipalities) possesses the property rights, which it may transfer temporarily to private 
users or to communities. Private property ownership is characterised by exclusive rights to 
use resources, receipt of income generated from them and free transferability of the whole or 
part of the ownership rights. In an open access property rights regime, rights are not 
specifically assigned to any individual or group and anyone is free to use the resource at will. 
In the case of communal property, specific communities are assigned rights, which can 
exclude outsiders from using the resource and regulate use by members (Musola, 2009). 
  
Assessing rights held by individuals or groups in Bulilima is critical to understanding 
whether they have access or control of mopane worms and woodlands. The ability to hold 
rights to a resource also determines the level of influence one has in terms of influencing 
decisions with regards to that resource. While most resources in communal areas of 
Zimbabwe are supposedly held under a common property system where locals have rights of 
including and excluding others, reality on the ground is complex with powerful actors often 
withholding most of these rights. Women for example have fewer chances of owning land 
and resources on it but can gain access to these resources through usufruct rights availed by 
customary laws (Rocheleau and Edmunds, 1997). This study thus disaggregates rights held 
by various actors and assesses how these rights enable them to accesses, use and control 
mopane worms and woodlands. The nature of rights held also determines the power relations 
between various actors in the district. 
 
2.2.3. Common Property Resources (CPRs) theory 
 
This study also draws extensively from Common Property Theory. Environmental 
degradation and resource depletion have stimulated lots of debate about common pool 
resources and common property. This discourse has focused on the notable failures of state 
management and market-oriented policies (see reviews in Ostrom et al., 2002) while 
promoting community management as an alternative actor to govern natural resources 
30 
 
(Agrawal, 2003). This has resulted in the birth of common property theory extensively 
discussed by scholars such as Elenor Ostrom.  
 
Common property resources refers to natural resources to which more than one individual has 
access, but where each person’s consumption reduces availability of the resource to others 
(Ostrom, 1990).  While more than one individual has access under common property 
resources, the resources may be excludable. Ostrom’s design principles highlight how 
common property resources could be managed without falling prey to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (see Table 2.1). First, rules should clearly define who has what right to natural 
resource access and use. Second, adequate conflict resolution mechanisms should be in place. 
Third, an individual’s duty to maintain the resource should roughly match the benefits. 
Fourth, monitoring and sanctioning should be carried out either by the resource users (local 
people) or by someone who is accountable to the users. Fifth, sanctions should be graduated, 
lenient for a first violation and stricter as violations are repeated. Sixth, governance is more 
successful when decision processes are democratic, in the sense that a majority of users are 
allowed to participate in the design and amendment of the rules. Seventh, the right of users to 
self-organize is clearly recognized by outside authorities. Lastly, where common property 
resources are part of larger systems, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
conflict resolution and governance activities can all be organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table: 2.1. Common property management design principles 
 
Design principles derived from studies of long-enduring institutions for governing sustainable 
resources 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
The boundaries of the resource system (e.g., pasture, irrigation system, or fishery) and the 
individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly defined. 
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs 
Rules specifying the amount of resource products that a user is allocated are related to local 
conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements  
Many of the individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group 
who can modify these rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behavior, are at least partially 
accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from officials accountable to these 
users, or from both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among 
users or between users and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external 
governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource.   
For resources that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
 
Source: Ostrom (1990). 
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The above conceptualization provides a relevant framework within which the management of 
mopane woodlands and worms can be understood. Ostrom’s design principles, although 
silent on issues of power, arguably have ‘power dynamics’ embedded in them. When rules 
are defined and implemented, conflicts resolved, and sanctions imposed, there is no escaping 
the exercise of power. This could be individual power from community members or 
institutional power from the rules themselves. 
 
2.2.4. Governance of common pool resources in Southern Africa 
 
Past generations, particularly pre-colonial generations, had the capacity to develop relatively 
effective indigenous institutions for the management of their resources (Haller and Chabwela, 
2009; Magole, 2009a; b; Mhlanga, 2009; Magole et al., 2010). As Haller and Chabwela 
(2009) note, power and access to natural resources were embedded in religious beliefs. In 
pre-colonial Zimbabwe, resource conservation was achieved through common property 
regimes, with precise rules of inclusion and exclusion, rights and obligations (Murphree and 
Cumming, 1993). Within the socio-cultural milieu that prevailed then, customary institutions, 
notably chiefs, headmen and spirit mediums, who were seen as the designate representatives 
of the ancestral spirits, had authority to sanction the manner in which the resources were 
used, including forests and woodlands (Ranger, 2003; Bernard and Kumalo, 2004; Mukwada, 
2006). This form of common property ownership was very efficient in resource management 
in the sense that it was economically viable, ecologically sustainable and organizationally 
efficient due to the fact that compliance with the rules that regulated the use of the resources 
was internally generated and not externally imposed (Murphree and Cumming, 1993).  
 
In Zambia, Haller and Chabwela (2009) have recounted the complex resource management 
history of the Kafue Flats wetlands. Here, resource abundance and reportedly effective 
governance of common pool resources by indigenous institutions had been replaced by 
conflict and competition between local and immigrant resource users, as well as between 
indigenous and state institutions. Fisheries and other resources were degraded and overused 
while there had been an increased vulnerability and food shortages among the poor families 
who suffered from loss of access to common pool resources that were taken freely by more 
powerful users (Merten and Haller, 2008). Haller and Chabwela (2009) argue that immigrant 
fishermen had more bargaining power to change the previous common property regime to 
open access, from which they derived more profit. According to Haller and Chabwela (2009), 
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the current dysfunctional situation obtaining in Zambia is because the state is both present 
and absent. It is present in its ideological claims of resource ownership and management 
authority, but is largely absent in terms of effective, competent resource management.  This 
study resonates with other studies on common pool resource management that were done in 
Zimbabwe (see for example Mandondo, 2000a, Mapedza, 2007, Mhlanga, 2009). However, 
most of these studies tend to be biased towards analysing resources that have more economic 
value to the state. In Zambia, it is the fish while in Zimbabwe it is mainly commercial forests 
and wildlife. Furthermore, most of these studies are silent on ethnic relations and how they 
affect power dynamics in the management of resources. In Bulilima, the relationship between 
the Ndebele and the Kalanga is very crucial in the understanding of power dynamics and 
natural resource management. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the installation of Ndebele 
chiefs to preside over Kalanga communities created conflicts that still exist in the post-
colonial Zimbabwe (Msindo, 2012).  
 
Common pool resource literature is also silent on post-colonial political conflicts that have a 
potential of influencing power configurations in resource management. Studies that focus on 
natural resource management in Zimbabwe (see for example Mukamuri, 1995; Sithole, 1997; 
Mandondo, 2000a; Matose, 2002; 2008; Nemarundwe, 2001; 2003; 2005) omit the potential 
influence Gukurahundi had on power and knowledge configurations in Matabeleland region 
where Bulilima District is. They are nonetheless pivotal to this research as they lay a firm 
foundation for the understanding of power configurations between the state and local people 
(see historical analysis of Zimbabwe’s natural resource management in Chapter 4).  
 
A study by DeMotts et al., (2009) conducted in Botswana on the dynamics of common pool 
resources in the management of Okavango Delta came up with interesting counter-examples 
to what literature in the previous paragraphs postulates. Common pool resources were 
generally not found to be under any stress because local people were not entirely dependent 
on them. The diamond revenues which have resulted in a strong economic base seem to have 
trickled down to the people in this study area.
15
 This scenario, however, is not universal to all 
communities in Botswana. Magole’s research on ‘shrinking commons’ in Lake Ngami 
grasslands in Botswana is consistent with literature that sees disintegration in traditional 
management systems of common pool resources (Magole, 2009a). DeMotts et al.,’s (2009) 
                                                 
15
 Botswana has developed a relatively strong economic base due to income from diamonds 
and tourism (see Parson, 1984; Mbaiwa, 2003). 
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study is important however because it helps us understand that limited livelihood alternatives 
in an environment where natural resource management institutions are either weak or 
fragmented usually result in the degradation of common pool resources. This is usually the 
case when communities depended heavily on a resource. In Bulilima, mopane woodlands 
constitute a major resource hence they are under enormous stress from locals and other 
people coming from outside the district. 
 
2.2.5. Theoretical Discussions of Power 
 
While Common Property Resources Theories (CPRs) and New Institutionalism (NI) theories 
are useful in providing frameworks for the analysis of property rights and institutions, which 
are crucial in the understanding of power configurations, they however lack a coherent view 
about specific mechanisms of power and how these mechanisms work to shape the fields of 
power in which mopane worms and woodlands resource systems are embedded. Literature on 
social power provides a useful theoretical framework for analysing these specific 
mechanisms used by various actors to access, use and control mopane worms and woodland 
resources in Bulilima.  
 
There has been a tendency amongst scholars to focus on sustainable management of natural 
resources and successful institutions while ignoring the possibility that all successful 
enforcement institutions are also coercive and that the burden of coercion tends to fall 
unequally on those who are less powerful (Agrawal, 2003). Agrawal proposes a useful angle 
of analysis in strongly suggesting that issues of power dynamics need to be at the core of 
institutional analysis if scholars are to come up with relevant and effective conclusions on 
natural resource management. If institutions are the product of conscious decisions of specific 
individuals and groups, as many commons theorists argue, then it may also be reasonable to 
suppose that institutional choices by powerful groups deliberately aim to disadvantage 
marginal and less powerful groups (ibid). The other side of the coin of institutional 
sustainability then turns out to be unequal allocation of benefits from commonly managed 
resources; not as a by-product but as a necessary consequence. 
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a) What is Power? 
 
Power has become one of the most contentious concepts in sociology (Law, 1991; Scott 
1994). Lukes (1986) refers to it as an ability to make a difference to the world while Giddens 
(1985: 7) defines it as ‘transformative capacity’ or ‘the capability to intervene in a given set 
of events so as in some way to alter them’. Power has also been said to involve the capacity 
to mobilize ‘resources’ such as technical knowledge, rhetorical skills, the possession of 
authority or the tools of force (Giddens, 1993). The general consensus among some scholars 
(Clegg, 1989; Nelson and Wright 1995; Latour, 1986 among others) is that power is a 
description of a relation, not a thing which people have. It is widely accepted in literature that 
Michel Foucault influenced much thinking of power as a relational concept. For instance 
Foucault (1979) proposes what he calls an ‘analytics of power’ where power should be 
understood in terms of relations. Power relations are non-egalitarian and mobile. Foucault 
further notes that power is not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot; it is the operation of 
the political technologies throughout the social body. The functioning of these political rituals 
of power is exactly what sets up the non-egalitarian, asymmetrical relations (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1983). It is the spread of these technologies and their everyday operation, localized 
spatially and temporally, that Foucault is referring to when he describes them as ‘mobile.’ If 
power is not a thing, or the control of a set of institutions, or the hidden rationality to history, 
then the task for the analyst is to identify how it operates (ibid). The aim, for Foucault, ‘is to 
move less toward a theory of power than toward an analytics of power: that is, toward a 
definition of a specific domain formed by power relations and toward a determination of the 
instruments that will make possible its analysis’. Power is thus exercised rather than 
possessed and is constituted in social relationships such as networks, alliances and conflicts. 
Foucault thus sees individuals as always simultaneously exercising power and undergoing the 
effects of power: they are constituted by power and at the same time are the vehicles of 
power (Few, 2000). As Clegg (1989) notes, power is not a thing nor is it something that 
people have in a proprietorial sense. People possess power only in so far as they are 
relationally constituted as doing so (ibid:  207). Thus power is a relational concept, shaped by 
the different types of relationships that actors engage in and negotiate around each other. 
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b) What exercises social power? 
 
While the majority of ‘power scholars’ agree that power is exercised than possessed, there are 
complications in explaining what exactly exercises this power. Few (2000: 76) asked whether 
it was human agents alone (acting either as individuals or as collectives) or structures within 
society (ideological, cultural, social, economic, administrative) that exercise power. It is for 
such complications that this study analyses both human agents and structures in an attempt to 
establish what exercises power with regards to mopane worms and woodlands management 
in Bulilima. Burns and Stohr (2011) note that power is central to governance systems – both 
in their functioning and also in establishing or changing them. At its core, there is an 
understanding of power as the application of action, knowledge, and resources to resolve 
problems and to further interests (Lukes, 1974; Few 2002). Few (2002) cited in Adger et al. 
(2005)  makes a key distinction between, on the one hand, sociological aspects of power 
relating to tactical exercises of power through mechanisms of social interaction and, on the 
other hand, structural implications of power that are manifested through the distribution of 
resources and influence. Thus, power may be exercised through different mechanisms at 
different temporal and spatial scales. Peterson (2000) advocates a simple hierarchy: the 
exercise of power at local levels is overt and power at higher temporal and spatial scales is 
always covert or structural. Lukes (1974) goes further in explaining what exactly exercises 
social power by developing a ‘three dimensional’ view of power, which broadly sees people 
using power for their own selfish ends (see Table 2.2 below). 
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Table 2.2 Luke’s three dimensions of power 
 
Dimension Form of power Power of actor A over actor 
B 
First Dimension power mobilized 
through resources 
A and B have conflicting 
interests on an issue. A is 
better able to use power 
effectively in the decision-
making arena. 
Second Dimension power mobilized 
through decision 
processes 
A controls the decision-
making process by limiting 
access and agendas. B is 
aware of the issue but unable 
to get access to the decision 
arena. 
Third Dimension power mobilized to 
prevent conflict 
A controls the political 
agenda. B is unaware of the 
issue and has no will to 
contest it. Conflict fails to 
materialize in the first place. 
 
Source: Luke (1974). 
 
The model assumes power is exercised when there are conflicts of interest (overt, covert or 
latent). The third dimension acknowledges structural mechanisms that serve to hide actors’ 
consciousness of issues (hegemony) as well as direct management of meaning by more 
powerful actors (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998).  Luke’s three dimensions of power model 
are relevant to this study because all the three dimensions were revealed in this study. For 
instance, the conflict around access to resources in the CAMPFIRE project area between 
cattle owners and Bulilima RDC (see Chapter 5, pp. 117-120) can be classified as first 
dimension. Under the CAMPFIRE project, RDCs have Appropriate Authority status granted 
in 1991 (SI 12/ 1991 and 61/1991) which they use to dominate decision making in the arena 
(Frost and Ivan 2005; Murphree, 1997). Second and third dimensions were also found to be 
operational in the study area whereby local government formal and informal institutional 
structures such as VIDCO, WADCO, War Veterans, ZANU PF youths and even traditional 
authorities under the control of the ruling government deliberately controlled decision 
making by consciously or unconsciously excluding some groups, especially those perceived 
to be in opposition to ZANU PF. 
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c) Power/knowledge nexus 
 
The link between power and knowledge lies at the heart of the analyses of how social power 
operates. This link was well developed by Foucault’s (1980) assertion that the constant inter-
play between the ‘exercise of power’ and the production of knowledge leads to the continual 
expansion of both sources of power and new disciplines of knowledge. This was emphasized 
by Umans (1998:27) who saw “knowledge as both a mental and social construction which 
emerges as a product of interaction between actors”, and that therefore “knowledge processes 
are embedded in relations of power, authority and legitimacy”. He argues that scientists, for 
example, try to establish a “hegemonic knowledge” by using “power techniques such as 
claiming universality, objectivity and neutrality” (Umans 1998: 27). 
 
Through rhetoric statements that are taken as absolute truths, unparalleled knowledge systems 
are developed and they become powerful discourses used by experts to entrench hegemonic 
knowledge within societies (McLain, 2000). Foucault gives an example of expert knowledge 
in various disciplines of conservation and scientific forestry which should be considered as a 
product of environmental discourse (Foucault, 1980). McLain (2000) explains the strategic 
importance of discourse in understanding how power works in the expansion of expert 
knowledge as follows:  
 
Discourse . . . connects thoughts with practice and thus can be used strategically to 
influence existing fields of power. And while knowledge is not identical with power, 
it is so intimately linked with power that knowledge production processes, the 
acceptance of certain kinds of knowledge over others, and the ways in which different 
types of knowledge are and can be used, form an integral part of any understanding of 
power (McLain, 2000, pp. 40- 41). 
 
This therefore implies that power is implicit in the creation of discourses, and discourses 
themselves can also act as power resources (Few, 2000). 
 
Scholarship on the effects of knowledge in furthering social and political control by the State 
(Peet and Watts, 1996; Singh and van Houtum, 2002) has largely drawn from Foucault’s 
‘governmentalisation of the state’ and subject formation, with the main emphasis placed on 
understanding how science, scientific disciplines and knowledge influence governance 
through the exercise of power (Foucault, 1982:221). To illustrate this argument, Hill (1996) 
in Matose (2009),  traces the development of conservation policy in Zimbabwe and how it led 
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to the consolidation of state power, through the expropriation of community-owned lands to 
make them protected areas (national parks and forests) and, in the post-colonial period, 
through decentralised natural resources management programmes. Hill (1996:106) contends 
that ‘the state uses conservation policies in much the same way it uses taxation, investment, 
interest rate or land resettlement policies: to establish and extend its own interests’. In a 
similar context, the Bulilima case is selected to debate how different actors  since the 1980s 
have transformed the management of natural resources in the area through various institutions 
and technical practices such as new technologies. 
 
It is important to point out that knowledge has political as well as technical meanings (Hara et 
al., 2009). Various scholars have argued that the politics of environmental knowledge in the 
colonial era have continued through decades of technocracy in independent African 
governments (Turner, 2004; Hara, et al., 2009; Eguavoen and Laube, 2010). In many of the 
cases, it was found that a colonial legacy which was later inherited by post-colonial 
governments set up a governance system which ignored indigenous knowledge and commons 
practice (Haller and Chabwela 2009; Magole 2009a; b; Mhlanga, 2009). In some instances, it 
was found that indigenous management regimes were replaced by sectoral or fragmented 
systems that focused on technical, ‘anti-political’ rationales (Büscher, 2010). In yet others, it 
was found that unequal power relations were less and less counter balanced by traditional 
Common Property Resources (CPR) rules and institutions, making it ever more difficult for 
so-called ‘stakeholders’ to negotiate their ‘stake’. Overally, however, and in line with 
Brockington et al.’s (2008) argument related to protected areas, new institutional 
arrangements for natural resources management were found to empower some and 
disempower others; hence distributing fortunes and misfortunes unevenly.  
 
The dismantling of local institutions came with a complete disregard of indigenous 
knowledge (Hara et al., 2009). Independent African states inherited policies that assumed 
ignorance among rural users. Natural Resource Management (NRM) policy therefore 
imposed exogenous principles and procedures without consulting the resource users who 
were meant to apply these principles, sometimes at major cost to their own livelihoods. It is 
no surprise that the knowledge systems on which most NRM policy has been based typically 
failed to recognise the tenure regimes under which local resources exist in different ecologies 
of many African environments – arrangements that local users understood (Hara, et al, 2009). 
Only more recently have researchers, and some governments and development workers, 
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come to accept the paradigm shift that is necessary in order to optimise the sustainable use of 
natural resources in southern Africa. They have begun to recognise the value of indigenous 
environmental and technical knowledge in natural resource use and management (ibid). There 
is an emerging literature on the potential of using the ecological knowledge of the resource 
users themselves and their local institutions as a complement to scientiﬁc knowledge, thereby 
expanding the sources of information for ecosystem management (Johannes, 1978; 1998; 
Becker and Ostrom 1995; Berkes, et al., 1995; Scoones 1999; Olsson and Folke, 2001). 
There are many examples of local, community-based resource management systems that have 
proven to be advantageous for natural resource use (McCay and Acheson, 1987; Berkes, 
1989; Feeney, et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). In a classic study, Acheson (1988) described the 
formal and informal institutional structure surrounding the lobster ﬁsheries in Maine. Hanna 
(2000) also analysed the soft-shell clam ﬁshery in Maine, where local ecological knowledge 
was included in resource plans to complement scientiﬁc knowledge and then applied in 
resource management institutions nested across scales (Olsson and Folke, 2001). 
 
Hara et al. (2009) further argue that common pool resources in Southern Africa have been 
viewed by outsiders as zones of open access whose users have no knowledge or system of 
governance, a belief that is far from the truth. Most common pool resources in Africa have 
been managed by local institutions that controlled access through membership and the 
regulation of timing, technology, opening and closing times, and so on (ibid). While 
indigenous systems are certainly not perfect, they do coordinate the use of common pool 
resources under common property regimes. Indigenous local institutions often include 
different types of resources within one tenure system, as in the Kafue Flats (Haller, 2007). 
 
The concepts of conservation and sustainable use have been another arena of contestation 
between knowledge systems in the governance of the southern African commons. Colonial 
and early independent administrations failed to recognise the provisions for sustainable use 
that were integral to indigenous NRM, often imposing their own regulatory frameworks 
based on alien legal systems. Partly because of the depredations of colonial hunters, they also 
found it necessary to excise large areas from existing uses and dedicate them entirely to 
conservation (Murphree and Hulme, 2001; Haller and Merten, 2006; Galvin and Haller, 
2008). This kind of sector-specific approach to NRM often imposed major livelihood costs on 
local people, whose own management approach – integrated with cultural and religious 
dimensions of their world view – only needed to preserve specific areas as conservation 
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zones. In this indigenous approach, conservation was an integral part of NRM. In the 
exogenous knowledge system, conservation and use were disaggregated and spatially 
segregated – with inevitably disruptive, divisive results (Hara, et al., 2009). 
 
Hara et al., (2009) make an important observation by noting that there is no simple contrast 
or clash between imported and indigenous knowledge systems in the governance of the 
southern African commons. Instead, there are uncertain, variable and contested blends of the 
two, with each society’s dispensation reflecting the politics of both kinds of knowledge. As 
one seeks to understand the current condition of mopane worms and woodlands management 
in Bulilima, one must identify, describe and unravel the webs of knowledge that locals and 
outsiders apply in their use and management of these natural resources. 
 
Quite often the phrase ‘indigenous knowledge’ is used interchangeably with ‘local 
knowledge’. However, this study asserts that ‘indigenous knowledge’ creates difficulties in 
analysis because it implies knowledge held by original indigenous societies whose culture has 
not been tempered with (Beinart and Brown, 2013). The communities which participated in 
this study could hardly be called indigenous. For instance, the environmental landscape in 
Bulilima was found to have been shaped and transformed by various events and trajectories 
which included the invasion by the Ndebele and the British South African Company in the 
1860s and 1890s respectively (Msindo, 2012) and migration patterns which have continued 
since then. The term local knowledge is therefore appropriate for this study because of its 
pluralism. Be that as it may, Beinart and Brown (2013) further caution that the idea of ‘local’ 
is often offset against global influences. For instance, rural communities can be seen as 
participants in the modern world through trade, colonialism, education and social media. In 
Bulilima, the impact of such processes is very evident within communities: many people use 
cell phones; many have been to school, while some own vehicles. However, this does not 
imply that indigenous knowledge has been completely wiped out in this area. Indeed, there 
were some sections of the communities, who remained strongly committed to inherited forms 
of indigenous knowledge. For instance, the San people have remained on the margins of 
civilization where their interaction with global knowledge systems has been minimal.   
 
In most African countries, the transfer of powers to local authorities is fraught with 
inconsistencies (Ribot, 2003). This is more glaring in forests where most of the powers are 
centralised (Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Conyers, 2001). The influence of Hardin’s ideas on 
42 
 
resource management is still alive today as forests are being privatised without concern for 
ecological or social implications (Ribot, 2003). In India for instance, forests which were once 
the de-facto common property of local communities were taken over by the national 
government. The state restricted access to and management of the forests by traditional users 
(Guha, 1990; Peluso, 1992). This however failed, resulting in severe forest degradation. 
Forest services across Africa transfer non-commercially valuable use rights while retaining 
central control over the lucrative aspects of the sector (Ribot, 2002). There is a general 
disregard of local institutions and knowledge. The current forms of management seem to 
have been inherited from colonial governments which instituted customary law and 
communal tenure not to support local management but to promote the interests of the colonial 
state and the European settlers (Mamdani, 1996; Eguavoen and Laube, 2010). Chiefs were 
given power over resources partly to collect tax for government. At the same time, colonial 
powers started to fragment originally integrated resource systems into different formal legal 
settings, which clashed with traditional approaches to overlapping claims and resource use 
coordination (Basset and Crummey 2003; Hara et al., 2009). 
 
In rural communities village elites such as traditional leaders and government representatives 
are usually perceived as powerful. These may be individuals who own larger pieces of land, 
more livestock, have broader networks and have better access to a diversity of income 
sources or can be those who hold leadership positions in the village (Nemarundwe, 2003). 
Bulilima District is generally a livestock rich area where cattle ownership is associated with 
riches and power. Power is contested between individuals who own large herds of cattle and 
those who do not own much within the community. The district has witnessed massive 
movement of people to neighbouring Botswana and South Africa mainly because of 
economic and ecological pressures (see Maphosa, 2005; 2007; 2011; Matsa and Simphiwe, 
2010). These migrants could be economically and politically influential in decision-making 
back in their villages. Their social identity is not only constructed through their position in 
the kinship hierarchy, but also through social and economic achievement and networks that 
may be used to gain access to key natural resources  (ibid) such as land,  mopane worms and 
woodlands. With the introduction of formal education in colonial times, followed by 
modernisation and economic transformation, access to land and other natural resources can 
no longer be seen as the only important source of power. More often than not when wealth 
ranking is done in the communal areas context of Zimbabwe, traditional leaders, who often 
have bigger land holdings than most ordinary villagers, are ranked in the below average to 
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poor categories. This reflects that land is not the only source of power, yet historically, land 
was the most important source of power for those who had it. In addition to having access to 
land and other key natural resources such as woodlands and water, access to capital, labour 
and non-material goods such as information, knowledge and education are increasingly 
becoming more important in influencing power relations in a given community. 
 
The concept of power is thus a useful analytical tool for understanding leadership and 
conflicts between community members and outsiders as well as conflicts among community 
members themselves. This study revealed struggles between groups who migrate to Bulilima 
District to harvest mopane worms and groups endogenous to the areas, struggles between 
cattle owners and the Rural District Council (RDC), and finally, struggles between formal 
and informal institutions. Understanding and unsettling processes of power and exclusion that 
disadvantage some groups of actors in relation to others required that attention be paid to 
struggles over meaning as much as struggles over mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima.  
 
The investigation of the nature of power and resistance also possesses significant inherent 
theoretical and practical merit (Scott, 1985). Attention to strategies followed by actors who 
are outside the hegemony of power in relation to resource useis critical to understanding how 
attempts at control and regulation are always challenged by those who are subjected to 
control (Agrawal, 2003). As such, focus on how power works within communities of 
Bulilima and in the management of common-pool resources such as mopane worms and 
woodlands can help strengthen scholarship on common property (ibid). This is likely to 
facilitate a better understanding of how power and status are related to access and use of 
resources such as mopane woodlands and worms in Bulilima District. Moreover, power is not 
just what planning and management attempt to exclude but rather, power and politics inspire 
the process of management thoroughly and unavoidably (Agrawal, 2003). Management is not 
just about providing technical solutions to objective problems of development and 
environmental conservation. It may be important to consider that these problems and their 
solutions may themselves be part of a political process. Without attention to the politics that 
generate underdevelopment and environmental degradation as universal problems, it may be 
impossible to address poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation effectively. 
This last point resonates well with this study. It has been stated in chapter one that part of the 
interest in this study lies in the historical context of Bulilima District in view of the political 
dynamics that transpired since Zimbabwe obtained its independence in 1980. An analysis of 
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how political dynamics shaped current power relations will go a long way in ascertaining the 
nature and specificities of natural resource management in Bulilima District. 
 
While the conceptual frame work of power helps understand various dimensions in which 
power is exercised through institutions to achieve certain goals, it however does not clearly 
specify how women in gendered natural resource systems gain access, use and control 
resources. It has been noted in literature that despite the pressure of decentralization policies, 
women’s access to many natural resource management institutions has not increased because 
the institutions have been heavily dominated by men, especially in patrilineal societies 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997; Nemarundwe, 2005). Because of unequal power relationships 
between women and men in most societies (Rocheleau and Edmunds, 1997), this study 
analyzed the gendered nature of the management of mopane worms and woodlands and 
women’s involvement in local formal and informal institutions that govern access, use and 
control of natural resources (see also Nemarundwe’s (2005) study on Women, decision-
making, and resource management in Zimbabwe). 
 
One way of analyzing women`s involvement in natural resource management is to adopt the 
idea of gendered spaces and places, a conceptual framework for the analysis of women’s role 
in natural resource management institutions (Fortmann, 1995; Leach, 1994; Rocheleau and 
Edmunds, 1997). Focus is on the separation of women’s and men’s activities and authority in 
space (Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997). For instance, women’s role in natural resource 
management in Bulilima must be understood in terms of opportunities and spaces created by 
the actions of men.  Having said that, this does not mean that women have no access to some 
of the resources in the District. Their ability to access these resources is found in between 
spaces not so important to men.  This framework thus becomes crucial in analyzing the kinds 
of spaces created and how women and other less powerful groups use them to influence 
decision making in mopane worm and woodland management in the district. 
 
2.2.6. Political Ecology: linking power and the environment 
 
The Political Ecology approach was found relevant to this study because it incorporates 
power and politics in the understanding of socio-environmental relationships in Bulilima. 
According to Bryant (1997:10): 
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At the heart of a political ecology reading of the Third World’s environmental 
problems is the idea that the relationship between actors (i.e. states, businesses, non-
governmental organizations, farmers, etc.), and the links between actors and the 
physical environment, are conditioned by power relations. 
 
Decentralization policies (see discussion in Chapter 1) mean that the state is significantly 
involved in natural resource governance by ensuring that certain rights are devolved to the 
locals. However, reality on the ground in Zimbabwe reveals that the central state still 
withholds key discretionary powers leading to conflicts with local users (see Mandondo, 
2000a for example). Political ecology theory therefore becomes pertinent in providing the 
framework for understanding the struggles between these actors and the political role of the 
state in defining and supporting local resource management systems in Bulilima. 
 
Human-environment interaction is certainly political and usually results in conflicts. The 
third-world political ecology developed as a result of the perceived apolitical nature of 
existing environmental research (Peet and Watts, 1996a; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Billon, 
2001). An understanding of the Third World’s politicized environment is to be found in the 
analysis of how unequal power relations are often linked to conflicts over access to, and the 
use of, diverse environmental resources (Bryant, 1998; Logan and Moseley, 2002). Few 
(2000) notes that tensions can exist both between external actors (state, businesses and 
NGOs) and local resource users, and also between the members of user communities. Actors 
can exert power over the environment of other actors by attempting to control their access to 
environmental resources but also through influencing the priorities of environmental projects 
and state management agencies (Bryant, 1997). Few (2000) notes that such attempts often run 
into counter-measures from weaker actors, both via passive forms of resistance and from 
more active resistance such as acts of sabotage. Furthermore, powerful state and non-state 
actors may seek to legitimize their actions in the eyes of the public, justifying them in terms 
of the common good (Bryant, 1997). For example in Bulilima, the state through the RDC 
justifies the existence of the CAMPFIRE project by arguing that it is an effective way of 
conserving wildlife while contributing to economic development of the district (Murphree, 
1997; Frost and Ivan, 2005). Chapters 5 and 7 analyse and discuss ongoing conflict between 
local cattle owners and the RDC. Cattle owners constantly defy council regulations and allow 
their cattle to graze in the CAMPFIRE project area.  
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The main task of political ecologists is to reveal how power relations operating at multiple 
scales shape environmental use and management behavior (Mayer, 1996; Moore, 1993; 
Peluso, 1992; Grossman, 1993; Bryant, 1997 cited in MacLain, 2000). There are various 
strategies that political ecologists use to analyze power relations (MacLain, 200) (see Box 1 
below). 
 
Box 1: Strategies that political ecologists use to analyze power relations 
 
1. Focusing first on the land user or household level and working up to national, regional 
and global scales  through the construction of chains of explanation of the factors that 
influence site-specific resource use and management patterns (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Black 1990; Grossman, 1993); 
2. Demonstrating linkages between social, economic, political and environmental factors  
that affect site-specific resource use  and management patterns (Grossman, 1993; 
Bryant and Bailey, 1997, Peet and Waats, 1996; Rocheleau et al., 1996); 
3. Incorporating historical depth to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the links between 
power relations and resource use and management (Neumann, 1998; Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997, Peet and Waats, 1996);  
4. Deconstructing categories of social actors as a way to demonstrate the complexities  
of social interactions involved in resource use and management (Neumann, 1998; 
Bryant and Bailey, 1997, Peet and Waats, 1996);  
5. Focusing attention on an interactive, two-way relationship between social and 
economic structures and human agency (Rocheleau et al., 1996; Peet and Waats, 
1996;  Bryant and Bailey, 1997) 
 
Source: McLain (2000) 
 
McLain further argues that political ecology analysis basically has two critical themes. One is 
scale and the other is structure and agency. With regards to scale, political ecology insists that 
locale matters in understanding human environmental interactions. Political ecology thus 
examines different ways in which socio-ecological processes and structures at a variety of 
spatial and temporal scales link together and also explores how articulations of social, 
economic, environmental and political factors affect land use management and socio- 
economic conditions (McLain, 2000). In Bulilima, political ecology analysis thus creates a 
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framework for understanding various factors at various scales that affect local management of 
natural resources. For instance, interests in commercialization of mopane worms as a 
response to global economic changes that influence national strategies (case of structural 
adjustment programs that resulted in loss of employment hence income to many people), has 
an effect on the institutions that control mopane worm use in the local communities.  
 
Political ecology is also relevant in analyzing social structures and human agency. Structure 
and agency exist in a two-way relationship that is critical to the understanding of 
environmental and social change (ibid). In this study, there is evidence of agency being 
constrained or constraining social structures. For instance, political structures were found to 
play a significant role in determining the set of rights some locals can have with regards to 
mopane worm and woodland access. Evidence on the field revealed for example, that 
alignment to ZANU PF usually improved one’s access to local resources, whether they were 
male or female. 
 
Political ecology has however, until recently contained limited politics; meaning there was no 
serious treatment of the means of resource control and access, nor of their deﬁnition, 
negotiation and contestation within political arenas (Peet and Watts, 1996; Billon, 2001). The 
politics of colonial intervention in the Third World is crucial in understanding contemporary 
patterns of the human-environment interaction and associated power relations. As discussed 
in Chapter 1 of this study, the BSACo installed Ndebele chiefs to preside over Kalanga 
communities, a practice that strained relations between the Ndebele and the Kalanga speaking 
communities. In some of the interviews conducted with elderly Kalanga-speaking people, the 
Ndebele-speaking people were constantly referred to in derogatory terms as Mapotoho 
(meaning foreigners). Walker (2005) noted that environmental actions of rural land users in 
developing countries are shaped by economic, ecological and political marginalization. Some 
of the reasons for limited success of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe for example are attributed to 
its failure to engage historical and political realities surrounding natural resource governance 
(ibid). 
 
a) Critique of political ecology literature 
 
Political ecology literature has been criticized for paying inadequate attention given to power 
relations and environmental use and management (McLain, 2000). Another criticism is 
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directed towards political ecology’s treatment of politics. Several scholars argue that political 
ecology has very little politics in it (see Moore, 1993; Peet and Watts 1996; Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997). Peet and Watts (1996) in particular, observe that there is no serious attempt at 
treating the means by which control and access of resources or property rights are defined, 
negotiated and contested within the political arenas of the household, the workplace and the 
state (Peet and Watts, 1996). From other quarters, there have been some arguments that there 
is less attention put on the ‘ecology’ part. Perhaps the issue has been a semantic one. For 
instance, ecology is often used interchangeably with ‘environment’ and ‘nature’ hence it 
becomes primarily a question of power, struggle and representation, while the connections of 
these struggles to the biophysical environment remain unexamined. Vayda (1999) for 
example, notes that political ecology is mostly about natural resource politics where most 
political ecologists do an inadequate job of considering non-political and economic factors in 
their analysis of environmental change. 
 
In this study, political ecology is used to understand the intertwined nature of politics and 
ecology. In a study of CAMPFIRE in Nkayi and Lupane for example, Logan and Moseley 
(2002) note that the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) has since independence, failed to 
address the issue of tenure laws meaning that the CAMPFIRE programme operates in a legal 
limbo that places limitations on its objectives. One key objective of the CAMPFIRE project 
is to enable local users to have complete access and use of resources within their 
communities. In this legal limbo, political and economic elites accumulate wealth and power 
based on tenure arrangements and management practices bequeathed to them by the departing 
colonial authorities (Bryant et al., 1993). Political ecology would thus posit that unequal 
relations of power tend to undermine land users’ keen localized environmental knowledge 
and histories of successful adaptation  leading to a ‘situational rationality’ that results in land 
users degrading their environments in acts of ‘desperate ecocide’ (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987 in Walker, 2005). 
 
In order to minimize weaknesses in the political ecology theory and power theory according 
to Foucault, this study combines the two theories because they complement each other. This 
study adopts McLain’s (2000) list of areas of overlap between political ecology and power 
theories in its conceptualization of power configurations in the study area (see box 2 below). 
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Box 2. List of areas of overlap between political ecology and power theories 
 
 
Source: McLain (2000) 
 
Combining Foucault`s conception of power with the political ecology frame work provides a 
platform for clarifying the nexus between discourse and knowledge and how this linkage can 
become effective in enhancing state control of management regimes over natural resources 
(ibid). One of the themes in this study involves the significance of local environmental 
knowledge in mopane worms and woodlands management. The effect of local knowledge is 
thus analyzed in comparison to the influence of other forms of knowledge, particularly 
scientific knowledge. Political ecology thus provides the framework for understanding the 
link between politics, power, and knowledge. 
 
2.3. Frameworks for analyzing natural resource governance 
 
2.3.1. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
 
In analysing power and knowledge systems, this study adopted an Institutional Analysis and 
Development approach (IAD) adapted from earlier works of scholars such as Ostrom (1994) 
and Anderson (2002). This approach set the foundation for exploring the nature of interaction 
between diverse actors in the management of mopane worms and woodlands. Power relations 
and situated knowledge practices of different resource users such as women, men, rich and 
poor, people from different ethnic backgrounds, local political administrative structures and 
other local and national interest groups, located in specific contexts and mediated by sets of 
1. A concern for analyzing the workings of power from the bottom up, starting with studying the 
politics of everyday life; 
2. A concern for understanding the historical processes which underlie current power dynamics; 
3. A view of social actors as heterogeneous, multidimensional and culturally embedded; 
4. A view that social structure and human agency exist in an interactive two way relationship 
with each other, and 
5. The view that discourse and knowledge systems constitute an integral part of politics and thus 
need to be included in any analysis of the workings of power. 
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changing institutions and circumstances, which may lead to different outcomes, were 
analysed using the IAD approach. 
 
IAD framework focuses on the examination of how institutions affect human incentives, 
actions and outcomes (Ostrom and Cox, 2010). The specific form of this framework has 
varied over time (see for example work by Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1986; 1990; 
2005; 2007b). Building on this foundation, the Social Ecological Systems (SES) framework 
has recently enabled researchers to begin the development of a common language that crosses 
social and ecological disciplines to analyse how interactions among a variety of factors affect 
outcomes (see Anderies et al., 2004; Ostrom and Cox, 2010; McGinnis, 2011 among others). 
However, for the purposes of this study, the SES was not applied because this study did not 
focus on ecological variables.  
 
IAD introduces the context in which local actors interact to create the institutional 
arrangements that shape their collective decisions and individual actions (Anderson, 2006). It 
places actors at the centre of the natural resource management discourse, with some 
recognition that there is a diversity of actors. Ostrom (2011) considers an IAD framework as 
a multi-tier conceptual map because resource policies made at the regional, national, or 
international levels have their effects filtering through to the local context. Anderson (2006) 
further notes that the local actors—which may include resource users and their communities, 
municipal-government officials, central-government representatives who work in the locality, 
private firms, and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) representatives—will interpret 
these policy changes according to the specific institutional context as shaped by biophysical 
and socio-economic attributes. In this study, the actions of actors were analysed within a 
context shaped by history, socio-economic and political attributes in Bulilima. Figure 2.1 
shows an IAD framework which constitutes of external variables, action arena and patterns of 
interactions. 
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Figure 2.1 Basic components of the IAD Framework. Source: Ostrom (2010:646). 
 
The external variables constitute the biophysical conditions, socio-economic conditions and 
the rules-in-use. Biophysical conditions pertain to the nature of the resource under study, in 
this case mopane worms and woodlands. Socio-economic conditions relate to how actors 
interact within and between clusters of other actors. Issues considered in this study include 
historical background, culture, religion, values, beliefs, knowledge, skills, the politics and  
history of violence in Bulilima since Zimbabwe’s independence (for example post-colonial 
conflicts such as Gukurahundi, FTLRRP and other conflicts related to elections). The rules-
in-use refer to the norms that are actually respected by the actors participating in an action 
situation (Anderson, 2006; Ostrom, 2011). In this study, actors included the local people of 
different ethnic origins who live in Bulilima, traditional and local government authorities.  
The IAD framework analyses the rules and norms that individuals and groups use in making 
decisions on the utilisation of mopane worms and woodlands.   
 
Action situation is where policy choices are made. This is a social space where actors 
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight 
(Ostrom, 2011). It is important to note that an institutional analysis can take two additional 
steps after examining an action situation (ibid). One step examines factors that affect the 
structure of the situation (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982 cited in Ostrom, 2011) while the other 
Biophysical 
Conditions 
 
 
 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
 
Rules-in-Use 
Action 
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Interactions 
Outcomes 
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explores how an action situation changes over time in light of how historic outcomes affect 
perceptions and strategies over time (Ostrom and Cox, 2010). A second step that this study 
took was an analysis of how the impacts of historical events and outcomes affected power 
relations and knowledge systems in the contemporary Bulilima District. Outcomes in IAD 
framework result from the conjuncture of the outputs of a given action situation and 
exogenous influences (McGinnis, 2011). 
 
One of the complexities underlying the use of the IAD framework relates to some types of 
rules that people might make and follow in their respective environments. Ostrom (2011) for 
example, argues that humans have a capacity to use complex cognitive systems to order their 
own behaviour, making it difficult for empirical researchers to ascertain the kind of working 
rules underlying an ongoing action situation. One way of solving this problem in this study 
was to use an ethnographic approach in which the researcher spent as much time as possible 
with the people under study and developed the art of asking non-threatening and context-
specific questions. 
 
2.3.2. Analysing power using ‘Power Cube’ framework 
 
While the IAD provided a theoretical framework useful for analyzing specific mechanisms 
and processes by which various actors and institutional structures were able to influence 
mopane worms and woodlands management, it was found inadequate in explaining power 
dynamics in the study area. As such, a relevant framework for analysing power had to be 
found. The Power Cube approach developed by Gaventa (2005) was thus adopted. 
 
The Power Cube framework considers three dimensions of power: spaces of participation, 
forms of power, and levels of decision-making (see Figure 2.2). Spaces of participation 
represent three potential arenas for involvement and action – closed, invited and claimed 
spaces (Rabé and Kamazi, 2012). According to Gaventa (2005), invited spaces are 
opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, 
discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests. In this study, 
invited spaces were considered as local fora where community members met to discuss 
community issues. It is in such meetings that community members participated in social 
debates. Closed spaces on the other hand are institutions, customs, laws, places, and so on, 
that have an impact on people’s lives but which are considered off-limits for public 
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participation (Rabé and Kamazi, 2012). In closed spaces, locals are usually excluded from 
decision making on issues that affect their wellbeing. In this study, institutions such as the 
Provincial Development Committee (PDC) or the Rural District Development Committees 
(RDDC) were found to be closed spaces for the locals yet important decisions that affected 
livelihoods of local people were passed through these institutions. For instance, the RDDC 
was said to have made and supported some by-laws with regards to mopane worm harvesting 
without consulting the communities that utilised this resource. Gaventa (2005) thus noted that 
closed spaces were normally created and utilized by the ruling elite, bureaucrats, experts or 
elected representatives who decided alone and provided services to the people without the 
need for broader consultation or ordinary citizen involvement. The claimed spaces were said 
to be created and owned by people at the grassroots level who were normally relatively 
powerless (Gaventa, 2005; Rabé and Kamazi, 2012; IDS, 2009). 
 
In addition to the broad questions mentioned in Chapter 1, this study sought to find out who 
created and owned participatory spaces in mopane worms and woodlands use. How did the 
existing power relations influence the creation and ownership of participatory spaces? 
Related to this question, what were the implications of space ownership to community 
participation in natural resource management in Bulilima? 
 
 
Figure 2.2 ‘Power Cube’: Power in Spaces and Places of Participation by Gaventa 
(2005) 
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Power, as analysed in the Power Cube framework, was found to manifest itself in three 
different forms namely visible, hidden and invisible (see box 3 below). 
 
Box 3.  Forms of Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gaventa (2005) 
Visible Power: Observable Decision making  
This level includes the visible and definable aspects of political power – the formal rules, 
structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making. Strategies that 
target this level usually try to change the ‘who, how and what’ of policy-making so that 
the policy process is more democratic and accountable, and serves the needs and rights of 
people and the survival of the planet.  
Hidden Power: Setting the Political Agenda  
Certain powerful people and institutions maintain their influence by controlling who gets 
to the decision-making table and what gets on the agenda. These dynamics operate on 
many levels to exclude and devalue the concerns and representation of other less 
powerful groups. Empowering advocacy strategies that focus on strengthening 
organizations and movements of the poor can build the collective power of numbers and 
new leadership to influence the way the political agenda is shaped and increase the 
visibility and legitimacy of their issues, voice and demands. 
Invisible Power: Shaping Meaning and what is Acceptable  
Probably the most insidious of the three dimensions of power, invisible power shapes the 
psychological and ideological boundaries of participation. Significant problems and 
issues are not only kept from the decision-making table, but also from the minds and 
consciousness of the different players involved, even those directly affected by the 
problem. By influencing how  individuals think about their place in the world, this level 
of power shapes people’ s beliefs, sense  of self, and acceptance of the status quo – even 
their own superiority or inferiority. Processes of socialization, culture and ideology 
perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, acceptable and safe. 
Change strategies in this area target social and political culture as well as individual 
consciousness to transform the way people perceive themselves and those around them, 
and how they envision future possibilities and alternatives. 
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The Power Cube analysis frame work further contends that different levels of decision-
making exist and they involve the contestation between local, national and global arenas as 
locations of power. In this study, the spotlight was on national government level and sub-
national level as arenas that significantly influence decision-making with regards to Mopane 
worms and woodlands management. The sub-national level for example, was found to be an 
arena where local communities accessed services and political representation which affected 
power configurations and consequently decisions on natural resource use. It is important to 
note that the three dimensions of power are intertwined and in most cases will affect the 
complex dynamics of citizen engagement in any given context. This allowed for a 
comprehensive and holistic analysis of power in mopane worms and woodlands management 
in Bulilima. 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the theoretical and analytical frameworks guiding this study. Hardin’s 
(1968) ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ theory set the tone for theoretical discussions on natural 
resource management. For deeper analysis of power dynamics and significance of LEK, the 
chapter identified and explored other relevant approaches. These are the Common Property 
Resources (CPRs) theory, the New Institutionalism (NI) theory, Social Power and Political 
Ecology. All these approaches were found relevant to this study as they help explain the 
concept of power and how it affects natural resource management.  The chapter went on to 
discuss analytical frameworks that were used in the analysis of power and knowledge in 
common pool resource management. The next chapter discusses the methodological 
framework used for this study and also describes the study area, Bulilima District. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
AREA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the methodological framework that guided data collection, 
codification, synthesis and analysis. It starts by giving an in-depth explanation of the research 
approach, design and process, sampling procedure, methods of data collection, data analysis 
and background of the study area. It concludes with a detailed outline of the research phases 
taken. The choice of the methodology used was guided by the theoretical underpinnings of 
the study, the major aim and objectives, the nature of the research problem, and how data was 
analysed, interpreted and presented. The study is qualitative. A description is given of the 
research strategies adopted, methods of data collection and analysis, field procedures, 
experiences and the challenges faced during fieldwork. Academic literature and other 
relevant sources guided the method choice and design. The second part of the chapter 
provides a general background to the study site. 
 
3.2. Research methodology 
 
The two major questions that this study sought to answer were: 1) What is the significance of 
local environmental knowledge in mopane worms and woodland management?  2) How is 
power configured in mopane worms and woodlands management in Bulilima District situated 
in South-western Matabeleland, Zimbabwe? By answering these questions, the study hoped 
to contribute to the debates on the power/knowledge nexus and the role these two concepts 
play in natural resource management at a local level. This contribution is expected to broaden 
knowledge on theories that explain the management of common pool resources in developing 
states. 
 
3.2.1. The study design 
 
Qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus (Flick, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000). The use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question (Nemarundwe, 2003). Objective reality can 
never be captured; we can know something only through its representations (Denzin and 
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Lincoln, 2000:5). Qualitative methods also allow the researcher to avoid the subliminal 
inception of ideas through confronting study participants with a pre-defined problem.  Selge 
et al. (2011) argue that subliminal inception does not allow the researcher to see if the 
participant sees the problem in the first place. Besides avoiding inception, qualitative 
methods allow the researcher’s conceptualization of the topic to stay in the background 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Schüttler et al., 2011).  
 
In this study, the methodology rested significantly on participant observation, interviews, 
focus group discussions and ‘narratives’ – actions and events.  The researcher had the 
opportunity of spending more than two months at Chief Makhulela’s homestead and 
indirectly participated in the institutional arrangements under study. This made it easier for 
community members to accept him. There was an opportunity to observe the workings of 
institutions from within – as an ‘embedded researcher’ rather than the ‘eternal outsider’, 
which has been the historic fate of most social scientists (Lantham, 2005). This provided a 
unique and close association with the communities researched. It must be stated however that 
residing at the chief`s homestead had an undesirable effect of being accorded too much 
respect that bordered on fear. As such that might have compromised some of the data 
collected. Nevertheless, the researcher’s close association with traditional authorities seemed 
to open many doors in the communities visited in the district. While the study was 
significantly ethnographic, the researcher used a questionnaire to collect data that gave a 
general descriptive nature of the villages under study. For instance, the researcher wanted and 
collected general demographic data to ascertain the characteristics of the population in terms 
of sex, marriage status, education etc. Other data collected through questionnaire survey 
included the tenure areas where mopane worms and woodlands were clustered in the district. 
This data provided a platform to conduct in-depth discussions on the reasons and effects of 
accessing mopane resources from different tenure areas.  
 
3.2.2. Data requirements 
 
Analyzing power and knowledge as institutions in natural resource management is one of the 
most effective ways of understanding the state of common pool resources. This however has 
to be understood through a historical context as history plays a key role in power dynamics 
surrounding common pool resource management. The colonial system gave some political 
power to traditional leaders as part of the overall aim of propping the colonial state through 
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the oppression of the masses (Chanock, 1991; Mamdani, 1996). An extensive interrogation of 
literature on the history of natural resource management in Zimbabwe was thus critical in 
understanding the basis of contemporary management practices. This was augmented by 
archival data from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). Understanding the role of 
power and knowledge on natural resources management also entailed the understanding and 
appreciation of the characteristics of the actors that utilized the resources at the time. The 
study subjects included various actors such as women, men, youths, the rich, the poor, local 
government authorities, traditional authorities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and some representatives from the central government. These actors interacted in diverse 
ways according to their power relations. Their actions were interrogated in the context of 
their history, economic activities, ethnicity, age and gender. This idea was derived from Long 
(1977 in Nemarundwe, 2003) who noted that action observed at a particular time at the local 
level was a product of and had some effect on the wider political, economic and social 
systems.  
 
Institutions responsible for natural resource management in Bulilima were analyzed using 
qualitative methods. The terms ‘institutional framework’ and formal/informal were defined 
and explained to the respondents before the interview commenced. In assembling the method 
for this section, the study made use of some ideas drawn from Nyagumbo and Rurinda (2012) 
who appraised the policies and institutional frameworks affecting smallholder agricultural 
water management in Zimbabwe. The study considered environmental management 
frameworks currently operating. Whereas Nyagumbo and Rurinda (2012) did not interrogate 
the frameworks from the perspectives of the communities in question, this study did precisely 
that. 
 
3.2.3. Research strategy 
 
The study adopted a case study approach in order to produce detailed analysis of power 
configurations and local knowledge significance in natural resource governance in Bulilima. 
The idea of selecting a case study was borrowed from scholars such as Yin (1994; 2003) and 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) who note that a case study research explores and depicts a setting 
with a view to advance an understanding of the subject at hand. It is an appropriate way of 
capturing context specific detail. This approach was very critical for this study because it 
allowed for intensive study of the subjects/actors. Analyzing power configurations requires 
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that one be at the study site for a long time because power issues tend to be context specific. 
There is thus a need for sustained observation of how people live and how they relate to each 
other. Local knowledge also tends to be context specific and differs from one case to another. 
While the bulk of the data generated from a case study approach is usually qualitative (Carr, 
1986; Roe, 1995; Fortmann, 1995; Scott, 1985), a survey was done in this study to solicit data 
on the nature and depth of knowledge held by respondents of varying livelihood pursuits, 
gender, class and age. The survey also provided complementary data on how power is 
devolved or configured across gender, class, generational divides and institutions. The survey 
also yielded data on how local environmental knowledge varies with gender, class and 
generational divides. 
 
The researcher conducted extensive consultative meetings with local authorities prior to the 
commencement of the study. In order to ensure feasibility of the entire study, a pilot study 
was carried out soon after the consultative meetings. Respondents came from all the wards 
under study. A total of 25 respondents were surveyed and 5 key informant interviews were 
done with selected community members. Interviews were conducted in IsiNdebele, one of the 
two local vernacular languages spoken in the area, and a language which is the researcher’s 
mother-tongue. The researcher made sure that any emerging issues from the interviews as 
part of the pilot study were noted. The pilot study, carried out over a period of two months, 
revealed vital weaknesses on the researcher’s assumptions about the study. For instance there 
was a need to find a research assistant who could speak the Kalanga language. The researcher 
had taken it for granted that everyone in Bulilima understood Ndebele. Some people, 
especially the elderly, only speak and understand the Kalanga language. As such, a Kalanga-
speaking research assistant became critical in this study. 
 
The pilot study also revealed that a structured questionnaire was inadequate for this study. It 
was evident that the topic would be better studied through a detailed combination of 
ethnographic techniques. More precisely, participatory techniques proved to be the most 
efficient. Spending time with the respondents in their own settings, creating rapport and 
networks with ‘actors ‘and ‘brokers’ in natural resource management, proved pivotal for 
successful completion of this study. 
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3.2.4. Population and sampling 
 
The sampling frame for this study was the rural population of Bulilima District. A case study 
of three wards (Dombolefu, Bambadzi, and Makhulela) was used to draw a sample of 
respondents. The study used multistage sampling, using both probability and non-probability 
techniques. The district under study has 19 wards. Dombolefu, Bambadzi, and Makhulela 
were purposively sampled because they were reported to have large outbreaks of mopane 
worms compared to the other wards.
16
 The selected wards had 6 villages each, of which 2 
were randomly selected from each ward. The researcher decided to settle for 2 villages per 
ward for feasibility purposes. Studying all villages was likely to be cumbersome and yet yield 
the same results. Selection of households for the purposes of the survey was stratified in the 
sense that questionnaires were administered alternately, meaning that the researcher skipped 
every second household. A total of 90 households were surveyed using this technique. 
Selection of respondents for group discussion and individual interviews was a combination of 
purposive and convenience sampling (see section on Focus Group Discussion in this chapter). 
This form of sampling covered a cross-section of locals from a wide range of backgrounds 
thereby giving rich data on power dynamics and local environmental knowledge (this idea 
was derived from scholars such as Fischer and Young, 2007; Garcia-Llorente et al., 2008; 
Selge et al., 2011).  
 
Key informants who provided the bulk of the data were purposively sampled based on their 
expert knowledge of the subject under study. According to Verschuren and Doorewaard 
(1999), the popularity of adopting this technique by researchers is that it is time and cost 
effective. This is also done when the primary interest of the researcher is to understand both 
qualitative and quantitative problems pertaining to how, how often or to what degree a 
particular attribute or characteristic is distributed. To understand power and knowledge 
dynamics in the management of mopane worms and woodlands, specific key informants were 
thus required. These included traditional leaders in the form of village heads, local 
government representatives, WADCO and VIDCO representatives, ward councilors, and 
various community leaders. 
 
                                                 
16
 Information on Mopane outbreaks was supplied by the Natural Resourses Management officer in the Bulilima 
Rural District Council. 
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3.2.5. Research methods 
 
The selection of a particular method or approach to collect data is influenced by variables 
such as the problem at hand, the theoretical framework/s anchoring the study, the purpose of 
the study, the resources available and the skills of the researcher. Moreover, the socio-
demographic nature of the population under study can influence the success or failure of the 
entire process of data collection. Grady (1998) thus notes that in making a decision on the 
type of data collection method, the researcher must keep in mind the type of people he is 
dealing with, the nature of the social situation, the mood of the social environment and the 
psychology of the people.  
 
In this study, the researcher made use of the triangulation method so as to verify data 
collected and thus improve on its reliability and validity. Data was thus mainly collected 
using participatory techniques such as focus group discussions, key informant interviews 
(KII), participatory rural appraisal exercises, historical narratives, case histories, participant 
observation, gender analysis, and secondary data review. While staying with the 
communities, the researcher managed to build rapport and networked with ‘actors’ and 
‘brokers’ through attending various functions such as funerals, community courts, community 
meetings and church services. Data collection was conducted in the respondent’s language of 
choice (predominantly in isiNdebele, TjiKalanga and English), with the help of local research 
assistants. 
 
a) Key informant interviews 
 
Key informants are individuals with special knowledge, status or communication skills, and 
are willing to share what they know with the researcher (Gilchrist, 1992). The Education 
Development Center (2004) goes further to define key informant interviews as a loosely 
structured conversation with people who have specialized knowledge about subjects one 
wishes to understand. Through purposive sampling, the key informants in this study were 
identified, based on their expert knowledge about the history of the study area, gender, 
wealth, ethnicity, age and leadership position. Through in-depth interviews, using key 
informant guide, the key informants provided valuable information on a variety of issues that 
included local environmental knowledge available in the management of mopane resources, 
importance of Mopane resources to local communities, and issues of ownership and access to 
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natural resources within the district. The specific informants interviewed comprised of the 
Bulilima Chief Executive Officer (CEO) whose main duty was to oversee development in the 
entire district through implementation of policies formulated by the council board. The CEO 
was important to this study because the decisions made in his office had an impact on how 
the communities accessed, used and controlled natural resources in the district. This study 
also sought to understand the power relations that existed between the office of the CEO, 
central government departments, local government, traditional institutions and communities. 
Key informants from the local government were represented by the District Administrator 
(DA) responsible for the welfare of chiefs, the VIDCO and the WADCO chairpersons, local 
chiefs, village heads (also known as oSobhuku in isiNdebele), councilors from each of the 
three wards, officials from government departments such as Forestry Commission (FC), 
officials from Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in the district (the two 
NGOs that were found relevant to this study were Amalima and SNV Netherlands 
Development Organisation, which had programmes aimed at improving the value chain of 
Mopane worms in the district) and community members selected because of their knowledge 
of the area, their position in the community and their status in terms of wealth. The key 
informant guide was designed and administered to 15 key informants. The researcher had to 
do several visits to interview the respondents especially the aged community members as the 
sessions tended to be long at any given time. 
 
b) Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
 
Group discussions allow for shared views to be obtained (Berg, 2009) while also allowing the 
researcher to remain focused on the most important issues rather than individual personal 
aspects (Bless et al., 2006). In this study, FGDs generated rich data on various issues such as 
access to natural resources, decisions on the use of the resources at home and within 
communities, conflicts that sometimes arise as community members utilize natural resources 
and women’s involvement in decision-making within the communities. Nemarundwe (2003) 
in her PhD thesis on Natural Resource Access in the Romwe catchment area in Zimbabwe, 
commended FGDs for allowing access to research participants who find one-on-one, face-to-
face interviews intimidating. FDGs therefore have the advantage of creating multiple lines of 
communication, offering participants a comfortable and conducive environment in which 
they can relatively share ideas easily (Madriz, 2000). 
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A total of 12 FGDs were conducted, that is, four in each ward under study. Each group was 
composed of between eight and twelve respondents. Groups were streamlined mainly 
according to gender, meaning that men and women were put in separate groups. The groups 
comprised of men and women in leadership positions, men and women who were in the 
natural resources committees, ordinary members of the communities, a group of traditional 
leaders (village heads and headmen) and a group of local government representatives 
(WADCOs and VIDCOs). Separating men from women ensured that women aired their 
views without being intimidated by the presence of men. The patriarchal nature of most 
African societies quite often results in men dominating public discussions. In the presence of 
men, women often agree with what men decide even if it is to their disadvantage (Limb and 
Dwyer, 2001; Helmore and Singh, 2002). It is important to note however that women`s 
silence in public fora where there are men is not a sign of weakness. It is argued in Chapter 5 
of this study that at times women do not need to argue and challenge men in public because 
what men say in such public fora would have already been discussed at home.  Nevertheless, 
the researcher separated the two sexes because there was a need to hear from women directly. 
FGD guides and visual aids (pictures, maps and other diagrams) were used to facilitate the 
FGDs. 
 
It is important to note that while FGDs have been developed to occupy a well-respected 
position among the various data collection methods (Marvasti, 2004), they can also be arenas 
for contestation and may be biased by power relations in the group (Mosse, 1994; Goebel, 
1998), with views of powerful members of the group being the dominant ones (Mikkelsen, 
1995; Nemarundwe, 2003). To counter these challenges, measures that included separation of 
groups by sex and also being actively involved in the facilitation to minimize the influence of 
powerful members, were taken. Participation by all members was ensured through 
encouraging everyone to at least say their views. This needed the expert interviewing skills of 
the researcher. 
 
c) Participant observation 
 
Observation as a research technique, is appropriate for studying processes, relationships 
among people and events, the organisation of people and events, continuities over time and 
patterns as well as the immediate socio-cultural contexts in which human existence unfolds 
(Jorgensen, 1989). It gives access to the meanings which participants assign to social 
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situations (Burgess, 1984). Moreover, it is also a desirable technique when the problem 
concerns human interactions and the phenomenon of investigation is observable in an 
everyday life situation or setting. This was particularly true in this study because the problem 
under study involved the day-to-day interaction of people as they accessed and used natural 
resources within their communities.  This method was thus found to be very useful. It yielded 
important insights into how relationships between different actors influenced resource 
management in Bulilima and patterns of access to mopane worms and woodlands by women 
and men. Other methods (surveys, FGDs and Interviews) could not provide much information 
on various contestations between diverse actors utilizing mopane resources. This assertion is 
supported by Nemarundwe (2003) who argues that power relations of actors are embedded in 
contested and contrasting discourses. In a similar vein, Jorgensen (1989) notes that 
participant observation is appropriate when the phenomenon is somehow hidden or invisible 
from view and there are important differences between the views of outsiders and insiders. 
Becker and Geer (1957:133) summarise the importance of participant observation by arguing 
that participant observation  ‘can … provide us with a yardstick  against  which to  measure 
the  completeness  of  data  gathered  in  other  ways,  a model  which can  serve  to let us  
know  what  orders  of  information  escape us  when  we  use  other  methods’. 
 
Sustained observations were used to observe contested terrains (Moore, 1996) between and 
among various actors – as groups or individuals, communities versus state, women versus 
men and rich versus poor in Bulilima district. Analysing power dynamics amongst and 
between people requires that a researcher spends some time with them in order to understand 
how they live and socialise. Accordingly, the researcher spent at least three months in 
Bulilima District, socialising with communities on a daily basis and attending their social 
functions such as local meetings, bereavements, weddings and other functions so as to gain 
trust of the people and understand their structures better. Occasions such as community 
meetings and functions offer opportunities to observe interactions and relationships and may 
expose nuances which cannot be discovered through face to face questioning (Devereux and 
Hoddinott, 1992).  
 
It is worth noting however that participant observation is not without its own problems and 
certainly the researcher experienced some of them in the field. It took time for the researcher 
to negotiate access and be familiar with all the goings-on in the communities. Residence at 
the Chief`s homestead was initially met with suspicion, fear and disapproval by some 
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members of the community. They were aware that they were being observed and this posed a 
threat to the validity of data collected (as noted by Daymon and Holloway, 2002). However, 
with the passage of time, community members warmed up to the researcher. It must be noted 
though, that the ‘social distance’ based on class, race, education, culture, language and power 
is never really closed (Cheater, 1986:22). This social differentiation makes total participation 
impossible, creating challenges to a researcher’s ultimate objective of comprehensively 
understanding a particular society as a whole (Nemarundwe, 2003: 64). Another disadvantage 
with the participant observation technique is that the researcher could only see and observe 
what was in front of him yet events were also happening in other parts of the community 
under study. This problem was resolved by using other methods such as in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions in other areas that could not be observed. This idea was 
borrowed from Nemarundwe’s (2003) study where upon realizing that participating in 
community activities by itself did not yield much usable information, it was necessary to ask 
questions in addition to observing the various activities. 
 
By the end of the fieldwork, the researcher had made many friends, some of whom expected 
the researcher to do or lend them something in order to make their lives better. It was very 
difficult for the researcher to explain and convince these new friends that the study was for 
academic purposes only. This experience is consistent with observations made by Daymon 
and Holloway (2002: 215) that no matter how carefully one tries not to disturb the setting, 
one will always make an impact, even if minimal, on those with whom one comes into 
contact. 
 
d) Historical narratives 
 
The historical conceptualization and understanding of natural resource management was 
pivotal to this study because it made sense to incorporate it for a nuanced understanding of 
the contemporary dynamics in local environmental knowledge and power relations in 
Bulilima District. Historical narratives were garnered from key informants such as traditional 
leaders and older members of the communities under study. Snowballing was used to identify 
the older members of these communities. 
 
Narratives are generally understood as stories that include a temporal ordering of events in a 
chronological sequential manner (Stone, 1979; Abbott 1990; Griffin 1992). Narrators are 
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usually socially positioned to tell stories at given biographical and historical moments 
(Nemarundwe, 2003) and it is for this reason that the narrators chosen in this study were 
senior citizens who had settled in the study area as long back as the 1950s and were thus 
socially positioned to chronicle the history of the area.  The historical narratives analysed in 
this study represent various arrangements and relations that existed between different groups 
as they accessed and utilised mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima District. The 
narratives trace different management systems and how these influenced the sustainable use 
of these resources. They are thus critical in understanding contemporary management 
systems and how they have been legitimized by the current actors. 
 
e) Questionnaire Survey 
 
A total of ninety questionnaires were administered using a stratified random sampling method 
in the sampled villages to acquire relevant quantitative data. The survey was conducted over 
a period of twelve months, targeting the seasons during which mopane worms are in 
abundance on the mopane trees namely March to April, and December to January. The 
household survey solicited data on diverse issues that included demographics of respondents, 
geographic areas where most of the mopane worms and woodlands are clustered, 
respondents’ perceptions on rights available to different kinds of people in the district and 
knowledge on certain local practices related to Mopane worm and woodland management. 
Questionnaires also helped capture data on the nature of local environmental knowledge held 
by respondents of varying livelihood priorities, gender, class and age. Questionnaires were 
translated into the two most common local languages (isiNdebele and TjiKalanga) so as to 
cater for those respondents who did not understand the English language. It is important to 
note that while questionnaires were not the main data gathering tools, they were vital in that 
they provided basic descriptive data which presented a clear map on some basic but important 
characteristics of the society of Bulilima. For instance, demographic data provided important 
variables such as sex and age which were later used in discussing power dynamics in the 
area. To a certain extent, the questionnaire data gave credibility and specificity to some 
generalizations made in this study. 
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f) Documents and archives 
 
Historical data was also collected from official documents and archival material from the 
National Archives of Zimbabwe. The bulk of the data gathered through this technique 
included that on colonial management of forests in Zimbabwe as well as the interactions 
between the colonial government and traditional leaders. While this data was not specific on 
mopane resources, it however shed light on power relations that existed between the colonial 
government and the local communities with regards to natural resource governance. The 
treatment of traditional leaders like chiefs, which is well documented in the archives 
documents, is quite intriguing in the sense that it does not differ much from the contemporary 
treatment of chiefs by the post-colonial government (see discussions in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis). As such, understanding the establishment of colonial institutions, as well as the 
relationship between the colonial central government and the local governments (districts and 
administrative posts) was pivotal in this study because it aided in comprehending the 
contemporary relations between the post-colonial government and various local institutions in 
the study area. It must however be stated that besides works by Ranger (1967; 1999) and 
recently Msindo (2012), there is a paucity of scholarly work in the archives and various 
libraries on the pre-colonial and colonial history of natural resources management in Bulilima 
District and its surrounds. The researcher had to rely on not so credible documents like 
national newspapers (The Chronicle and The Herald). It is therefore likely that serious errors 
could be made when using archival data (Berg, 2001) or newspapers. This however, was 
countered by use of other different research techniques such as historical narratives and case 
histories that either confirmed or refuted some of the assertions made in the archival 
documents. Some of the documents reviewed were obtained from Bulilima Rural District 
Council, the office of the District Administrator, CAMPFIRE office and some of the 
documents in the possession of traditional leaders like chiefs 
 
3.3. Data analysis and interpretation 
 
The study used narratives from elderly respondents to bring out historical dimensions not 
captured in the archives and documents. Eastmond (2007) however, argues that narratives are 
not transparent renditions of reality. The stories that people tell researchers and one another 
have to be related to the social and political contexts that have shaped and continue shaping 
the circumstances of their lives and which engage their commitments. The researcher 
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followed the selected participants to the places around which their lives revolved and where 
various activities took place. These included meetings they attended, political interests, their 
places of residence and the resources they used for their daily livelihoods.  
 
The study also involved document analysis of key government policy documents such as the 
Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that segregated land on racial lines, the Land Husbandry 
Act in the early 1950s, the Communal Land Act of 1982 which transferred all powers for the 
allocation of land to the Rural District Councils (RDCs), the Traditional Leadership Act of 
1998 which placed land administration powers in a traditional system of chiefs and headman 
overseeing ‘traditional’ villages. Also considered were many other post-colonial Acts and 
policies that have a bearing on natural resource management. CAMPFIRE is one of the post-
colonial policy attempts to involve local people in natural resource governance. These 
documents revealed ideologies towards natural resource management and the role played by 
different users of the resources. An analysis of these documents therefore provided the 
necessary backdrop on the role played by different resource users in this region.   
 
Content analysis was done on data generated through interviews and FGDs. Berg (2001) 
defines content analysis as a technique for making inferences through systematic and 
objective identification of special characteristics of messages. Messages from selected 
respondents were systematically developed into different themes which were relevant to the 
objectives of the study. One of the debates among users of content analysis is whether 
analysis should be quantitative or qualitative (ibid). Some scholars (see for example Berelson, 
1952; Selltiz et al., 1959; Edmundson, et al., 1993) argue that content analysis is objective, 
systematic, and quantitative. However, Abrahamson (1983) and Berg (2001) believe content 
analysis can be fruitfully employed to examine virtually any type of communication. In this 
study, content analysis was employed in analysing data generated from questionnaire 
interviews, in-depth interviews and FGDs. 
 
3.4. Description of the study site 
 
Bulilima District is located in the Matabeleland South province of Zimbabwe (see Maps 3.1 
and 3.2). 
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Map 3.1: Bulilima ward map and Map of Zimbabwe showing Matabeleland South 
Province (insert) Source: Matsa and Simphiwe (2010) 
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Map 3.2 Bulilima district wards and their names. 
Source: Forestry Commission, Bulilima District (Unpublished) 
 
The district is largely rural with Plumtree town the only notable urban settlement. It has 
nineteen wards characterized by multiple livelihood strategies that include small businesses, 
communal farms, small-scale mines and irrigation schemes, amongst others (ZIMSTATS, 
2012).  
 
3.4.1. Climate  
 
The entire district lies within Agro-ecological zones IV and V
17
, which are characterised by 
short, variable rainfall seasons averaging generally below 400 mm per year and long dry 
winter periods and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the 
rainy season (Vincent and Tomas, 1960; Magadza, 2006; Mahati et al., 2008).  Rainfall is 
usually associated with thunderstorms, producing rainfall of short duration and high intensity.  
                                                 
17
 Zimbabwe is divided into 5 Agro-ecological zones based on rainfall received and thus the 
type of agriculture practiced. Zone 1 receives an average of 1000m rainfall.  Specialized and 
diversified farming is practiced (tea, coffee, plantation farming, macadamia, fruits, intensive 
livestock production. Zone 2 receives average annual rainfall of between 750-100mm. 
Intensive crop and livestock production is practiced. Zone 4 receives an average of 650-
800mm of rainfall. There are severe mid-summer droughts but maize, tobacco, cotton and 
other cash crops are grown (Vincent and Tomas, 1960; Chikodzi et al., 2013).   
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Temperatures are as high as 40 degrees Celsius during the summer months and on average 13 
degrees Celsius during winter (Magadza, 2006; Mahati et al., 2008). Matabeleland South 
Province’s semi-arid conditions are well suited to livestock production as the drier conditions 
reduce the susceptibility of the animals to disease and the costs associated with animal health 
management (Vincent and Tomas, 1960; Masocha, 2010). Notwithstanding this advantage, 
Bulilima is prone to disasters ranging from perennial droughts, floods, land degradation, road 
carnage and loss of livestock. These have contributed to the high levels of poverty in the 
district and the province as a whole (ZIMSTATS, 2013). 
 
3.4.2. Vegetation 
 
Vegetation is patchy savannah woodlands with sparse herbs and grasses (Clastworthy, 1987). 
The predominant tree species is Colophospermum Mopane (Dye and Walker, 1980; Dube, 
2008). Soils in this region are also predominantly poor sodic soils (Dye and Walker, 1980). 
Grazing potential is low and intra-seasonal variation can have a considerable effect on the 
amount of dry matter produced. The patchy nature of vegetation renders the district very 
vulnerable to environmental hazards such as flooding, soil erosions, gusty winds and general 
environmental deterioration (ibid). 
 
3.4.3. Agricultural potential and other economic issues 
 
Bulilima District lies at the border of Zimbabwe and Botswana, bounded by Tsholotsho 
district to the North-West and Mangwe District to the South-East. The major land use pattern 
and tenure system is communal lands and small scale resettlement farms (Mahati et al., 
2008). It is considered to be one of the poorest and most marginalized regions in Zimbabwe 
and faces challenges of starvation, poverty, HIV and AIDS and unemployment (Magadza, 
2006; Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 2008; Mahati et al., 2008). Poverty is 
however, typical of the entire province. ZIMSTATS (2013) estimate a poverty prevalence 
rate of 44% in 2013 in the Matabeleland province where Bulilima District is located (see 
Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Household poverty prevalence by province in Zimbabwe  
 
Province Prevalence of poverty Prevalence of Extreme 
poverty 
Bulawayo 34.5 3.4 
Manicaland 43.6 5.5 
Mashonaland Central 50.3 9.2 
Mashonaland East 43.5 5.5 
Mashonaland West 50.1 7.1 
Matabeleland North 49.7 6.4 
Matabeleland South 44.0 1.7 
Midlands 37.7 3.0 
Masvingo 21.4 0.6 
Harare 35.7 3.3 
 
Source: ZIMSTATS (2013). 
 
Agriculture, in the form of livestock rearing and limited crop production especially in areas 
with irrigation, still remains the main source of livelihoods (Mahati et al., 2008). The 
common livestock are cattle, sheep, goats and poultry. These provide among other things, 
manure, meat, milk, and draught power (ibid). However, because of recurrent droughts in the 
area under study, game ranches and natural resource harvesting also play a significant role in 
providing livelihoods to the people (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1996). Remittances from 
relatives working in neighboring countries such as South Africa and Botswana and those 
working in neighboring towns such as Plumtree and Bulawayo, supplement residents’ 
incomes (ZESN, 2008). 
 
Harvesting of mopane worms in Bulilima takes place during the periods November to 
January and also in April or May, following good rains (Ghazoul, 2006). Some scholars 
argue that harvesting is mostly done by women and children (SAFIRE, 2002; Stack et al., 
2003) though this study proved that this depended on the prevailing economic situation (see 
discussions on harvesting patterns in Chapter 5). Following harvesting, the caterpillars are 
eviscerated, boiled and dried in the sun, after which they can be stored for almost a year 
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(Ghazoul, 2006). Thus, the consumption of Mopane worms can occur over a considerably 
longer period than the harvest, provided processing and storage procedures are adequate to 
avoid spoiling.  
 
3.4.4. The socio-cultural context 
 
The population of Bulilima is composed of the Kalanga (also referred to as TjiKalanga) and 
the Ndebele as the predominant ethnic groups while the Venda, Tswana, Tonga and San 
constitute a smaller group (Msindo, 2012). The history of Bulilima indicates that the original 
ethnic groups to inhabit the area were the Rozvi, the Kalanga and scattered groups of San 
people (see works by Ranger, 1999; Msindo, 2012; and Dube, 2012). The Ndebele later 
invaded the area in the 1830s, displacing the Rozvi and pushing the Kalanga into the frontiers 
of Bulilima. The invasion of the Ndebele resulted in what Msindo (2012) and Dube (2012) 
call the creation of Kalanga ethnicity. Kalanga ethnicity was the mobilization of Kalanga-
speaking communities on the basis of common language, common culture and geographical 
proximity so as to deal with Ndebele threat (Msindo, 2012). In Bulilima, a system of 
traditional authority exists with the Chief as the highest authority supported by the headman 
and village heads. The role played by traditional institutions in decision-making in Bulilima 
and indeed in other districts of Zimbabwe is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
The entire population of the district is approximately 90 757, having gone down from 94 361 
recorded in the 2002 census (Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, 2002; 2012). The 
average household size is 4.6 while there are approximately 19 761 households (Zimbabwe 
National Statistical Agency, 2012). The population is youthful; only 6% are beyond the age 
of 65 with a predominance of females (48 844) over males (41 913), (Mahati et al., 2008; 
Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, 2012). This could be due to the high rate of out-
migration to urban centers like Bulawayo or to South Africa and Botswana (Munyati et al., 
2006; Mahati et al., 2008; Magadza, 2006; Zimbabwe Election Support Network Report, 
2008). It is important to note that labor migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa dates back 
to the 19th century when gold and diamond mines were established in South Africa (Crush, 
2003; Kok et al., 2006). Most of the labor migrants, especially illegal migrants came from 
districts in Matabeleland South such as Bulilima, Mangwe, Gwanda, Beitbridge and Matobo. 
These districts share borders with Botswana and South Africa (Maphosa, 2005). What has 
always made these migrations easier for the people of Matabeleland South is that many of 
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them share historical, kinship and linguistic ties with some communities in South Africa and 
Botswana. For example, languages such as Venda, Sotho and Ndebele are spoken on both the 
Zimbabwean and South African sides of the Limpopo River. Tswana and Kalanga are also 
two languages that are spoken on both sides of the Zimbabwe-Botswana border (ibid). 
 
3.5. Validity and reliability 
 
Validity refers to the dependability, and reliability refers to trustworthiness of the study 
(Creswell and Miller, 2000). Testing for validity and reliability is critical in qualitative 
research (Patton, 2002). To ensure validity and reliability of the data, triangulation of various 
data sources was carried out to check for consistency. Moreover, questionnaires were filled in 
and interviews recorded in real time. End of interview summaries were used to verify 
accuracy of data collected in the presence of the respondents and the results were made 
available to participants for comments on the reliability of the findings.  
 
3.6. Summary 
 
The methodology upon which this thesis is founded is one of qualitative research. It 
emphasises on the local level but is also cognizant of the importance of scale and plurality. 
Particular emphasis was placed on analysing the governance of daily life within the context 
of local perceptions. By studying total resource use and by viewing resource management 
through the lens of these values, a more realistic interpretation of resource management was 
reached. The choice of the methodology was influenced by the manner in which the major 
research question was conceptualized in Chapter 2. The theories analyzed in Chapter 2, 
which form the bases of this study, call for a methodology that seeks to understand the world 
and its meanings from the respondent’s point of view. Hence an ethnographic approach was 
taken. Data was collected from the respondents through interviews, group discussions, 
participant observations and historical narratives. Relevant documents were reviewed and a 
survey conducted to augment collected data and to triangulate the findings.  
 
The chapter also detailed important and relevant information about the study area which 
contextualised the importance of natural resources such as mopane worms and woodlands in 
Bulilima. Chronicling the historical events helped in understanding the contemporary power 
relations and the importance of local environmental knowledge in natural resource 
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management. Archival data revealed that there was a systematic attempt to trivialize local 
environmental knowledge in favour of knowledge from colonial masters which was used to 
dominate natural resource management discourse. There was therefore a need to understand 
the significance of local environmental knowledge in the contemporary resource management 
discourse. Various data collection techniques which include narratives, focus group 
discussions and even a survey were thus used to gather data that would show the significance 
or lack thereof of local environmental knowledge in natural resource governance in Bulilima 
District. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE’S NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT IN HISTORY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the history of Zimbabwe’s natural resource management. It uses 
evidence from archival material, literature and historical narratives acquired from interviews 
with some elderly members of Bulilima District. Understanding the history of natural 
resource management in Zimbabwe is vital as it provides a platform for analysing the 
dynamics of natural resource management in contemporary Zimbabwe in general, and 
Bulilima District in particular. It provides a basis for understanding the contemporary 
patterns of local people’s access to, control and use of natural resources (Berry, 1989; Moore, 
1993, McGregor, 1995).  Matabeleland South region, where Bulilima District is located, has a 
unique post-colonial history owing to political disturbances that occurred soon after 
independence in 1980. These political disturbances resulted in the birth of administrative 
structures that have since influenced local development and power dynamics in the region. 
These structures are discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs in this chapter.  
 
Zimbabwe was colonised from 1890 to 1980 resulting in the appropriation of critical natural 
resources such as land (see Mandondo, 2000a; Msindo, 2012 and many others) by white 
colonialists. Much of the fertile productive land was appropriated for the ruling class while 
the indigenous people were pushed into the dry lands known as Tribal Trust Lands.
18
 Laws 
passed by the colonial government were meant to protect the minority settlers who enjoyed 
easy access to the colony’s natural resources at the expense of the local black people. It is no 
wonder that this resulted in a war of liberation as Zimbabweans fought to reclaim their lost 
resources. The majority of Zimbabweans hoped that the coming of independence would 
introduce policies that were more egalitarian, especially given the fact that ruling party – 
ZANU PF – had been espousing Marxist-Leninist socialist ideologies during and after the 
armed struggle. But this hope has remained a fantasy (Mashinya, 2007).  
                                                 
18
 Tribal Trust Land was land created for the natives during the colonial era. The Tribal Trust 
Land Act of 1965 as devised to change the name of the Native Reserves and create trustees 
for the land. The act thus devolved the allocation of land use rights to the ‘tribal land 
authority’ (see Cleghorn, 1966; Latham, 2005 and others) 
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4.2. Zimbabwe’s natural resource management in history 
 
In order to comprehend the dynamics of the Zimbabwean natural resource management 
framework, it is important to trace it from the pre-colonial era, through the colonial and to 
post-independent Zimbabwe. This chapter analyses the natural resource and environmental 
management frameworks that characterised the three above-mentioned eras. It also draws 
attention to the local development that occurred in Bulilima District during the three eras and 
how this affected mopane worms and woodlands management. 
 
4.2.1. The pre-colonial age  
 
Information on pre-colonial natural resource management in the sub-Saharan region is 
generally scarce (Murombedzi, 2003). Nevertheless, some aspects of pre-colonial resource 
management have been understood through some elements of pre-colonial ethnography 
which survived into the colonial period (Matowanyika, 1991). Literature which came out 
championing European discourses naturally portrayed African societies as simplistic and 
possessing an unsophisticated and generally ‘uncivilised’ approach to natural resource 
management. This discourse portrayed pre-colonial practices such as sacred areas and 
allocation of totems as undesirable because they reflected the exercise of power over people 
and resources by dominant clans or classes (Murombedzi, 2003).  
 
In contrast to Eurocentric discourses, evidence coming out of contemporary African literature 
powerfully proves the existence of traditional African societies that had effective mechanisms 
to regulate resource use (Murombedzi, 2003; Mapedza, 2007; Kwashirai, 2009; 2012). In 
fact, African traditional methods of resource management imposed little stress on the natural 
environment. Wildlife, for instance, was well protected through the totem system, religious 
beliefs, traditional leaders and superstitious fears (Mandondo, 2000a; Hulme and Murphree 
2001; Mapedza, 2007). The ritual management of the ecosystem meant that what the 
ecosystem produced was considered to be part of the spiritual realm. The use of natural 
resources was based on the unity of humanity and nature, contrary to Eurocentric beliefs that 
saw nature as separate from humans, hence the desire to dominate it (Murombedzi, 2003; 
Kwashirai, 2009).  
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Though land in Africa was communally owned in general, land rights were vested in 
traditional leadership. The traditional leader had to give consent for the harvesting of natural 
resources and provided a sanction mechanism (superstition, penalties and custom) for 
violators of custom and tradition (Wilson, 1989; Mapedza, 2007). Usufruct rights were 
allowed for individual families who displayed loyalty to the traditional leaders, did not 
migrate or commit a legal offence or violate conservation laws (Kwashirai, 2012). Power was 
generally centred on the rulers who were also believed to be the custodians of knowledge at 
the time. Traditional rulers were also responsible for distribution and allocation of land to 
individuals for homesteads and plots. The chiefs and village heads still retain this authority in 
the post-colonial governance system albeit in the distribution of small pieces of land. The 
traditional system operated within a system of communal resource ownership. All natural 
resources were de-facto communally owned and chiefs acted within this framework (see 
Mapedza, 2007; Kwashirai, 2012). Communal ownership of natural resources meant that 
there was less commoditisation as resources were mainly exploited to fulfil immediate 
consumption needs leading to limited ecological damage (Murombedzi, 2003). It is also 
highly likely that population numbers were very low during those times. 
 
Indigenous knowledge was central to the management of natural resources in the pre-colonial 
era. Studies conducted by Matowanyika (1989) and Murombedzi (2003) revealed that local 
people developed intimate knowledge of the ecosystem that they used to manage the 
resources. Traditional leaders and healers were heavily involved in promoting myths and 
religions that generated indigenous knowledge deployed to regulate the use of resources. A 
good example is the development of regulations around the harvesting of medicinal plants 
(Murombedzi, 2003). 
 
It is important to note though, that there are some researchers who have criticized this 
‘romanticisation’ of communal ownership of natural resources in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.19 
They argue that there is over-emphasis on African traditional religion which tends to be 
                                                 
19
 See Mandondo, A. (2000a).  Situating Zimbabwe’s Natural Resource Governance Systems 
in History. Center for International Forestry Research Occasional Paper No. 32. CIFOR. 
Bogor; Mukamuri, B. (1995) Local environmental conservation strategies: Karanga religion, 
policies and environmental control. Environment and History 1:297-311; Taringa, N. (2006). 
How environmental is African traditional religion. Exchange, 35(2), 191-214. 
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portrayed as intrinsically environment-friendly. Taringa (2006) for example argues that some 
traditions like traditional Shona beliefs and practices did not necessarily support religious 
environmentalism, as assumed in modern environmental discourses. In fact these beliefs and 
practices have always been both ecologically responsible and destructive at the same time.  
Taringa uses an example of beliefs in sacred alien spirits which gave the perception that some 
aspects of nature were not so important and could be duly overexploited. It could be argued 
therefore, that the sacred respect accorded some aspects of nature was a religious attitude 
developed around political aspects of life that were controlled by traditional leaders. In 
essence, this arrangement privileged the traditional leaders’ access to natural resources, a 
point also noted by Murombedzi (2003). Taringa’s (2006) analysis is very critical to this 
study. The system of natural resource management in pre-colonial Zimbabwe was generally 
similar across different ethnic groups with traditional leadership key to gaining access to, and 
using, natural resources.  
 
The narrative on the pre-colonial history of Bulilima, the study area, can be traced back to the 
known original inhabitants of the land, the Rozvi (Msindo, 2012). The Rozvi state was 
formed from several Shona and Kalanga states. It, however, collapsed in the late 1830s as a 
result of conquest by the Ndebele who later settled in the area. The traditional system of the 
Ndebele was very much similar to that of the Shona, with emphasis placed on sacred belief in 
alien spirits and shrines. Parts of Bulilima were occupied by the San people (Madzudzo and 
Hawkes, 1995). While the Ndebele/Kalanga economies relied on sedentary agriculture and 
livestock rearing, the San survived on hunting and gathering of edible fruits, roots and insects 
(ibid). This point is very important to this study because it reveals that mopane worms might 
not have been so significant to the Ndebele/Kalanga communities at the time. Indeed this 
resource is not mentioned anywhere in literature or archives that explain the economic or 
livelihood activities of the Ndebele/Kalanga communities. This however does not mean that 
mopane worms were not harvested by these ethnic groups, only that they might not have been 
so significant. On the other hand, it is highly likely that the worms constituted a significant 
livelihood option for the San who were hunter-gatherers. Not much has been written on how 
mopane worms were accessed by the San themselves or any other tribe for that matter. In 
spite of such missing information, it can be deduced that that the worms were part of the 
forest resources mainly exploited to fulfil immediate consumption needs (Murombedzi, 
2003). The pattern of natural resource access however, changed with colonisation as a new 
power system in the form of the colonial government introduced new laws that altered 
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settlement patterns of the natives. The following section discusses the events that took place 
during the colonial era and how they affected natural resource management in the Bulilima 
area. 
 
4.2.2. The colonial era 
 
The land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo was claimed by the British crown through 
the British South Africa Company (BSACo) and named Rhodesia after Cecil John Rhodes 
who founded the territory. Occupation was triggered by the speculation of vast gold reserves 
which, however, proved to be limited and difficult to extract (Lebert, 2003). This 
disappointment led the BSACo to pursue agriculture in a bid to make the venture profitable. 
Thus, native populations had to make way for European settlers with farming interests and in 
most cases ending up laboring on European owned farms (Palmer, 1990; Moyo, 2006; 
Nnoma, 2008). Various laws that effectively dictated environmental governance activities 
were enacted during this period. To begin with, the 1894 Land Commission decrees, along 
with the later 1918 Privy Council decision, the Morris-Carter Commission resolutions of 
1925 and the 1930 Land Apportionment Act were enacted (Nnoma, 2008). These officially 
divided the country into two separate societies along racial lines, European areas and Native 
Reserves (Nziramasanga and Lee, 2002; Lebert, 2003).  
 
During the early years of colonisation, environmental degradation was rampant in most of 
Rhodesia and increasingly became a major concern for the colonial government (Mapedza, 
2007). This realisation led the government to initiate the Simms Commission of Enquiry in 
1910 which recommended, amongst other things, the establishment of exotic plantations such 
as pines in the Eastern Highlands and the appointment of a Forest Officer ultimately resulting 
in the Department of Forestry within the Ministry of Agriculture in 1925 and the formation of 
the Forestry Commission in 1954 (ibid). Fees were also levied on the commercial extraction 
of timber found around mining areas. This turned commercial attention towards the poorly 
managed African reserves, further depleting them and compromising the fragile environment 
(McGregor, 1995). In response, the Rhodesian government introduced the Native Reserves 
Forest Produce Act of 1928. Provisions of the Native Reserves Forest Produce Act were 
further consolidated in the Forest and Herbage Preservation Act of 1936, the Natural 
Resources Act of 1941, the Forest Act of 1948, the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1952 and 
the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 (ibid). The Parks and Wildlife Act provided for the 
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establishment of the Natural Resources Board, a national conservation watchdog, destocking, 
conservation of biological diversity, protection of certain plant species, watershed 
management and commercial hardwood extraction management (Mandondo, 2000a, 
Mapedza, 2007). It is significant to note that during this entire process of enacting these 
pieces of legislation, there was very little if any consultation of the local people. Their 
knowledge was considered inferior to the new scientific knowledge of the colonialists. The 
Rhodesian government failed to recognize the value of indigenous knowledge which had 
been in existence for hundreds of years (Mapedza, 2007).  
 
In 1965, the Rhodesian Front government unilaterally declared independence from Britain 
resulting in international isolation. During this period, the Tribal Trust Lands Act of 1967 and 
the 1969 Land Tenure Act were enacted together with a community development approach 
for the African reserves (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1985). This was an attempt by the colonial 
government to win the support of traditional leaders, particularly the chiefs who were given 
authority to allocate land and govern natural resources in the newly formed tribal trust lands. 
Despite these institutional frameworks, native reserves remained financially crippled and 
their management was vested in the state through a top down approach (Mandondo, 2000a; 
Mlambo, 2005). In table 4.1 Matose (2003) summarizes the changes and trends in tenure 
system since the onset of colonial forestry in the 1920s (see also McGregor, 1991; Matose, 
2002). 
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Table 4.1 Changes and trends in tenure systems 
 
Year   Change Impact 
1929 Land Apportionment Act Creation of “native reserves”, 
formal dispossession of local 
people to provide land to 
private owners. 
 Land ownership switched 
from communal to private 
and State control.  
1951 Land Husbandry Act Further dispossessions of 
land and separation of 
communal grazing from 
arable fields and settlement 
lines. Large swathes of 
communal woodlands. 
1969 Land Tenure Act Privatization of white-owned 
commercial farmlands led to 
removal of black tenants to 
already congested communal 
areas. More than 50 percent 
of tree resources under 
private tenure; about 35 
percent under communal 
tenure. 
2000 FTLRRP The 31 percent of woodlands 
and forests remaining in 
private ownership converted 
to State property. 
Usufruct rights−albeit 
insecure−granted to the 
people resettled on these 
lands. 
2005 Constitutional Amendment 
No. 
17 
Formal proclamation that all 
land belongs to the 
State; all formerly privately 
owned forest resources 
turned into State property. 
From October 2006, 
State grants long-term leases 
to the occupiers of formerly 
private lands, starting the 
process to secure their tenure 
over resources on land they 
were issued or have occupied 
since 2000. 
 
Source: Matose (2003) 
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The underlying basis of colonialism was the expropriation of power and resources (land, 
labour, cattle, and taxes) from customary systems to capital forms (Wekwete, 1990). The 
indigenous population endured one of the most extensive land alienation policies (Hill, 1996; 
Gore et al., 1992; Hulme & Murphree, 2001b; Munro, 1998). Most of these policies came 
through the various Acts discussed above.  In his perceptive analysis, Matose (2008) argues 
that the era between 1920 and 1969 witnessed the legitimisation of various means of 
dispossessing local populations of their forest resources, which were annexed by the state and 
private owners. Protected forests and national parks established during this period constitute 
about 15 percent of the country’s total land area (ibid). 
 
In order to exert total control on the local people, colonial rule inserted itself in many 
dimensions of people’s lives creating a more centralised state which was accountable only to 
itself (Mandondo, 2000a). Paradoxically, some of these characteristics were inherited by the 
post-colonial government at the expense of the local people it purports to serve. This has 
resulted in serious disempowerment of the local people as explained in ensuing chapters. 
 
a) Role of traditional leadership during the colonial era 
 
An analysis of the functions of traditional authorities during the colonial era is significant in 
this study as their colonial role contributed significantly to the way they are treated by the 
ZANU PF government in contemporary Zimbabwe. The status of traditional leadership can 
best be explained as having been fluid since the colonial era, having shifted more than once 
since that time. Chiefs in particular have been susceptible to abuse by successive 
governments. They have been constantly empowered and disempowered in accordance with 
the interests of the government of the time (Holleman, 1968; Weinrich 1971; Mutizwa-
Mangiza, 1985; Scoones and Matose, 1993).  
 
At the height of the colonial period, chiefs became rather unpopular to many local people as 
they were seen as instruments of the colonial government’s control of local communities 
(Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1985; Scoones and Matose, 1993). The colonial government needed 
popular local authorities to control the local people hence the co-option of chiefs through 
favours such as bribes and powers to control local resources (Holleman, 1968; Weinrich, 
1971; Mandondo, 2000a). In return, the chiefs were expected to be loyal by supporting the 
colonial government policies even though these oppressed the local people. Government 
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documents from the archives also confirm this point as the following remark by the Secretary 
of Internal Affairs (1970:34) reveals: ‘Chiefs and headmen have continued to give loyal 
support to government and have begun to exercise more authority over their people than has 
been the case in the past years’. 
 
 The native commissioners almost always presided over the operations of the chiefs and 
always influenced them to act in accordance with the colonial interests and designs. Chiefs 
were mandated to collect tax on behalf of the colonial government, settle land disputes in the 
reserves and preserve local customs and tradition. This largely made them unpopular 
especially because of tax collection. Within the Matabeleland region, which is broadly the 
research area of this study, there were, however, chiefs who were powerful and thus resisted 
colonial intimidation (Berry, 1993; Mabhena, 2014). In order to deal with such chiefs, the 
colonial administrators introduced the concept of ‘headmen’20, a phenomenon that exists in 
present day Zimbabwe. The idea was to dilute the powers of chiefs and thus prevent any 
chances of secession.  Chiefs were important leaders in Matabeleland and in some cases they 
became outright rulers, especially after the fall of the Ndebele Kingdom in 1893. They played 
a key role in championing the cause of their people in Matabeleland by making development 
related demands to the colonial administrators (Mabhena, 2014). As much as that was the 
case with some chiefs, it is because of their power and influence that they were generally 
used by colonial administrators to control their own people for much of the colonial period. 
 
The colonial era presents interesting dynamics on natural resource management in Bulilima 
District. The arrival of the BSACo resulted in the movement of the Ndebele/Kalanga 
speaking people from their original areas. For instance implementation of the provision of the 
1930 Land Apportionment Act led to the relocation of the isiNdebele and tjiKalanga speaking 
people from their land into areas occupied by the San people (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995).  
The isiNdebele and TjiKalanga speaking people were removed from prime agriculture and 
pasture land and settled in remote areas not good enough for farming and with poor pastures. 
Additionally, under the new colonial administration headed by the District Commissioner, 
access to resources fell under new strict regulations. For instance, the building of Maitengwe 
Dam in the mid-1960s on an Ndebele/Kalanga grazing area meant that the Ndebele/Kalanga 
                                                 
20
 The “concept” of headmen and kraal heads was an invented tradition in Matabeleland as an 
endeavor to exact control by the colonial administrators who felt some chiefs were disloyal 
and still harbored the idea to create a Matabeleland homeland (Mabhena, 2014, p 140). 
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had to find alternative grazing land in poor areas (ibid). The senior village head from Mbimba 
village further reported that the new administration criminalised the cutting down of trees 
while harvesting of grass required permission from the Commissioner. Through the Forest 
Policy, which was introduced on the Tribal Trust Land forests by the colonial government in 
late 1960s (see Secretary for Internal Affairs report of 1970), new regulations on the use of 
communal forests were introduced. Some of the main policy regulations relevant to this study 
are listed below: 
 
1. Proper provision should be made for the management, regeneration and protection of 
forests in Tribal Trust Lands. 
2. Schemes should be established and operated as necessary to provide local forest 
produce requirements. 
3. Such schemes including those involving maintenance of existing forest resources, 
should be based on the principles of sustained yield management and wherever 
possible, multiple resource use of land concerned, on which forestry interest would be 
of paramount in the interests of tribesman. 
4. Local initiatives should be encouraged to manage and control forestry schemes under 
the guidance of the staff of the Forestry Commission. 
5. Forestry Commission should assume responsibility in the collaboration with Tribal 
Trust Land Board for the management, protection and exploitation of more extensive 
areas of forest (Source: Secretary for Internal Affairs report, 1970). 
 
The post-colonial government has perpetuated the practice of placing tribal forestry under the 
auspicies of the Forestry Commission. The activities of the Forestry Commission are 
discussed at length in Chapter 5 as they influence power dynamics on mopane woodland use. 
The Commission was found to use scientific knowledge to determine use patterns of Mopane 
woodlands, just as it did during the colonial government (see discussions in Chapter 6). 
 
Colonial government reports accessed from the National Archives further revealed that some 
parts of the forests in the then Bulilimamangwe District were converted into government 
protected native reserve known as Somnene Native Purchase area in order to supply timber 
and firewood to the mines and farms in the area (ibid). Local people were not allowed to 
utilize resources in this area and trespassers were usually prosecuted in a court of law. 
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While government records are silent on the management of mopane worms, interviews 
conducted with some villagers revealed that there was less control on mopane worm 
harvesting as locals were allowed to access the worms even in colonial farms: 
 
I was a boy when we were moved from our original area, white people cordoned our 
original area into big farms and I remember our fathers were forbidden from cutting 
down trees in those farms. However, I remember my mother and other women going 
to those farms to collect mopane worms (senior village head from Mbimba Village, 
Bambadzi Ward, 15 March, 2014). 
 
It is not clear why the colonial administration put less controls on mopane worms than they 
did on woodlands. However, it can be assumed that the worms were not of much value to 
them. While government records and literature portrayed the Ndebele/Kalanga people’s 
livelihoods as largely dependent on farming and livestock rearing, interviews conducted with 
some elderly men and women from Makhulela revealed that the displacement of the 
isiNdebele and TjiKalanga speaking people from their original areas of settlement to remote 
areas might have contributed to their appreciation of mopane worms as an alternative source 
of food. There was no way of verifying this claim as there were no records to be consulted.  
 
The war of independence paralysed the local government in the area, resulting in the 
weakening of the District Commissioner and subsequent falling away of regulations on 
access to resources (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995). The traditional system, which derived its 
powers from the colonial administration as it was used to suppress the locals, could also not 
control access to resources as it was unpopular with the locals (Mabhena, 2014). Madzudzo 
and Hawkes (1995) thus argue that most of the areas of Bulilima, particularly those that were 
strictly controlled by the government, such as grazing areas, became open access. 
 
4.2.3. Post-colonial era  
 
Discussion of Zimbabwe’s post-independence period is divided into various sections. The 
first section looks at the developments that took place immediately after independence as the 
new government tried to redress the injustices of colonial rule. This part of the discussion 
basically centres on decentralization efforts proposed and implemented by the government 
through various institutions. The second part of the discussion attempts to review the post-
colonial role of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe. The third part zeroes in on the local 
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government reforms and their impact on development in the Matabeleland region where 
Bulilima District is located. This last section also discusses the framework of land 
distribution and the associated political conflicts that ensued in the region between late 1981 
and late 1985. It is important to discuss these political conflicts because they provide the 
context for understanding contemporary natural resource management practices in 
Matabeleland in general, and Bulilima in particular. The fact that land, as a resource, was at 
the heart of the political conflicts that affected the region at that time, made this piece of 
history very pertinent in the study of natural resource management. Access to land basically 
implies access to natural resources.  
 
In April 1980, the newly independent state of Zimbabwe was formed. The new government 
inherited a dualistic state characterised by segregation even within the environmental 
management realm. Various amendments were made to inherited laws that resulted in their 
de-racialisation and theoretical democratisation (Murombedzi, 1994). The enactment of 
Communal Lands Act and the Rural District Councils Act of 1988 eliminated the colonial 
dualism in local government structures, effectively combining the dualistic system of rural 
local governance into a single system that managed natural resources within its boundaries. 
The underlying drive for the new government was to decentralize government institutions 
through reforming local government structures and creating an enabling environment for 
improving service delivery and ensuring that it reached the peasant communities. 
 
In 1984, a Prime Ministerial directive re-arranged institutional structures in communal areas 
by transferring power from the traditional institutions to locally elected representatives 
(Mandondo, 2000a; Nemarundwe, 2001; Matose, 2008). This resulted in the creation of 
council structures such as the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward 
Development Committees (WADCOs), purportedly to give a democratic orientation to the 
process of planning for local development. The two units are premised on popular 
representation (Mandondo, 2000a). The VIDCO is the lowest unit of government 
administration, which is expected to identify the needs of the village and articulate them 
through the development of a village plan that is forwarded to the WADCO. The WADCO 
draws its membership from the chairpersons of the VIDCOs and it is presided over by an 
elected councillor. The elected councillor represents the ward at district level. A WADCO 
receives the plans of its constituent VIDCOs and consolidates them into a ward development 
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plan.
21
  Councillors then forward these plans to the district council where they are submitted 
to the Rural District Development Committee
22
 (RDDC), the district’s supreme planning 
body that bears the responsibility of consolidating the various ward plans into the district 
annual and five year plans. The RDDC is chaired by the District Administrator (DA) who is a 
government employee representing the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban 
Development (MLGRUD). This committee includes heads of sectoral ministries, 
chairpersons of the Rural District Council (RDC), various subcommittees, and district heads 
of national security organs such as the police (Makumbe, 1998). Membership of the RDDC is 
predominantly made up of bureaucrats and technocrats at the expense of ‘popular’ 
representatives of grassroots structures (Mandondo, 2000a: 11). The two institutional 
structures of VIDCO and WADCO, while affording local communities some representation 
at a local level, suffered from too much political influence. The committees always reserved 
two positions for representatives of the ruling party’s women and youth leagues. It is evident 
that the government’s idea was to influence decisions at the lowest levels of development. 
Furthermore, village and ward development committees existed side by side with the 
traditional institutions of chief, headman and kraal head often causing tension and duplication 
of roles (ibid). The creation of VIDCOs and WADCOs was in fact a way of disempowering 
traditional institutions because of their pre-independence role as organs of colonial 
oppression (Makumbe, 1998).  
 
It is important to note that in contemporary Zimbabwe, WADCOs and VIDCOs are no longer 
as effective as they used to be.  During one of the researcher’s visits to the study area, 
villagers in Bambadzi could not recall who the members of VIDCO were, let alone the 
WADCO. That knowledge seemed to lie only with the councillors. In resettlement areas, the 
two institutions emerge as Village Committees institutionalised through the Fast Track Land 
Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRRP) (Cliffe et al., 2011; Matondi and Dekker, 
2011; Mujere, 2011, Scoones et al., 2010). Village committees are improvised structures set 
to seal the vacuum created by the defunct WADCOs and VIDCOs in land administration in 
                                                 
21
 Information on the structure of the Council was provided by the Bulilima CEO through an 
interview conducted on the 16
th
 of November 2013. This was one of the first interviews 
conducted by the researcher as he sought permission to conduct the study in Bullima district. 
22
 The Rural District Development Committee (RDDC) is chaired by the District 
Administrator who is a government employee representing the Minister of Local Government 
and National Housing. Members of the RDDC include district heads of sectoral ministries, 
chairmen of the Rural District Councilors various subcommittees, and district heads of 
national security (Thomas, 1991; Makumbe, 1998). 
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rural areas (Dekker and Kinsey, 2011). Moreover, village committees are informal political 
structures even though they remain accountable to formally institutionalized RDCs as their 
roles insinuate those of traditional leaders in terms of land allocation and dispute resolution
23
. 
Land administration and natural resource management at the local level is coordinated by 
various institutions and authorities (see Figure 4.1 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Structure of land administration in Zimbabwe. 
Source: Munyuki-Hungwe and Dirwai (2010:8) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the multiplicity of different institutions responsible for land administration 
from the lowest level of development. In some cases, these institutions operate side-by side, 
often duplicating duties as indicated in the diagram. A number of researchers in Zimbabwe 
have commented on this complexity, lamenting the fact that these institutions often contradict 
and conflict with each other instead of working together (Anderson, 1999; Mushamba, 2010; 
Munyuki-Hungwe and Dirwayi, 2010). There are many overlaps in resource units, 
memberships and jurisdictions, user-defined interests and uses, and varying degrees of 
association and affection within and among them (Sithole, 1997; Frost and Mandondo, 1999). 
 
                                                 
23
 See Matondi and Dekker (2011); Mujere (2011); Scoones et al., (2010) 
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The Communal Lands Act of 1982, meanwhile, had divested the chiefs of the land allocation 
powers vested in them in the 1960s (Moyo, 1996). However, after research and investigations 
by the Land Tenure Commission (LTC) in the early 1990s, villages were formally recognized 
as the smallest unit of social organisation and the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 was 
enacted (Mandondo, 2000a). Under this law, chiefs were appointed by the president and 
charged with the responsibility of promoting cultural values, collection of Rural District 
Council (RDC) levies, taxes and natural resources management (Sithole, 1997). This 
framework of governance was criticized for, purportedly, centralising power in the state and 
resulted in the collection of fines imposed in a top-down approach amongst other things 
(Vermeulen, 1994; Mandondo, 2000a; Nemarundwe, 2003; Mapedza, 2007).  
 
a) Traditional institutions in the post-colonial era 
 
The status of traditional leaders in communal areas has shifted more than once during the 
post-colonial era. After independence, chiefs were discredited through the Communal Lands 
Act of 1982 which divested the chiefs of the land allocation powers vested in them in the 
1960s (Mandondo, 2000a). The Communal Lands Act vested control over land in the 
president and devolved its administration to Rural District Councils (RDCs) and district 
administrators under the then Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development. 
RDCs were ordered to have “regard to customary law and grant land only to those people 
who have customary rights” (Cousins, 1990: 15). According to Hungwe (2014), the 
Communal Lands Act ensured a system of perpetual subordination of traditional elements to 
the state, a practice not dissimilar to the colonial treatment of the traditional leadership. The 
post-colonial government centralised control of communal land and resources through a 
District Councils system. 
 
No sooner had they been stripped of their powers than traditional leaders were re-empowered 
through the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 1998. The TLA recognised the traditional 
village as the lowest unit of social organisation. Mandondo (2000a) notes that the TLA 
provided for the granting of registration titles to a village presided over by a village head 
appointed by the chief. The village assembly, or its headman, shares some of the following 
roles: custodianship and adjudication with respect to cultural matters and peoples’ interests; 
management of local resources and their use; an electoral role in choosing members of the 
village development committee, and supervision with respect to consideration and approval 
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of plans from the village development committee before incorporation into ward plans
24
 (also 
see Mandondo, 2000a; Matyszak, 2010). 
 
 Above the village assembly is the ward assembly consisting of all village heads of its 
constituent village assemblies, a cohort of headmen nominated by chiefs and endorsed by the 
relevant minister, and the councilor of the ward. The ward assembly is presided over by a 
headman elected by members of the assembly from among themselves. Ward assemblies 
oversee all the roles and activities of their constituent village assemblies. In addition to 
nominating village heads for appointment by the chief and supervising them, headmen are 
also charged with the enforcement of all environmental planning and conservation by-laws on 
behalf of the chief, the Rural District Council and the state.
25
  
 
The TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 recognizes traditional leaders (TLs) as a cultural institution 
(Hungwe, 2014). However, it is a cultural institution without autonomous powers of 
allocating land. The ultimate decision on land allocation falls on the RDCs as they are the 
local authorities mandated to control the use and allocation of all the communal land and 
natural resources on it. Hungwe (2014) further notes that under the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 
2001, the TLs retain their cultural position as custodians of communal land and customary 
tenure. TLs are thus effectively integrated into a conventional system of governing communal 
areas, where their powers are related to the management of their tribesman (ibid). Chiefs, in 
particular, are on government payroll. Their fate is in the state President’s hands as they risk 
being removed if they become disobedient, just as they used to be treated in the pre-colonial 
era (Ranger, 1983; Alexander, 2006; Munzwa and Jonga, 2010; Mabhena, 2014).  
 
The traditional institution is composed of the chief, the headmen and the kraal head. The 
headman (umlisa) reports to the chief (induna), and is viewed as a representative of 
traditional authority in the absence of a chief (Scoones, 1996; Moore 2005). Below the 
headman, is the village head (usobhuku). Traditional leaders, being presidential appointees 
are tasked primarily with regulating the way of life of a particular society by ensuring land 
and natural resources are used in accordance with national legislation, especially that 
                                                 
24
 See the Rural District Councils Act, Chapter 29:13 
25
 See the Traditional Leaders Act Chapter 29:17 of 2001; Matyszak, D. (2010). Formal 
structures of power in rural Zimbabwe. Research and Advocacy. 
 
92 
 
prohibiting over-cultivation, over-grazing and deforestation (Mandondo, 2000a; Mabhena, 
2014). 
 
b) The politics of land redistribution in Matabeleland, 1980-1990 
 
This section discusses the problem of access to land and its distribution in the Matabeleland 
region where Bulilima District is located. It is relevant to this study because it interrogates the 
dynamics of land reform and natural resource management which were unique to the 
Matabeleland region and thus helped shape the contemporary management structures.  
 
Alexander (1991) provides a detailed discussion of land redistribution in the Matabeleland 
region. She argues that three features distinguished Matabeleland’s experience of land 
redistribution from other areas of Zimbabwe. First, the land distribution method of squatter 
occupation was resisted in the region because local people believed that they needed more 
land for grazing than settlement. It is significant to note that livelihoods in Matabeleland 
region are centred on livestock rearing. Land allocation that emphasised on providing more 
pastures for grazing was likely to be ideal for them than land for farming (see Mabhena 
2010). With the state adopting a one size fits all approach to resettlements, conflict with the 
local people was inevitable, resulting in cases where the state had to bring people from 
outside Matabeleland to settle in state appropriated farms in the region. 
 
The second feature was the drought that afflicted the Matabeleland region in the early 1980s. 
It meant that people had to rely on the government for survival. This resulted in acute 
dependency on the government. Finally, political conflict meant that development issues 
were pushed aside in place of military endeavours. The era of conflict was characterised by 
mistrust between the government which was predominantly dominated by a Shona-speaking 
leadership and the local people who were predominantly Ndebele (see Alexander, 1991; 
Mabhena 2014).  
 
Political conflict between the Zimbabwe African People`s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) culminated in the government formally announcing that 
there were dissident activities in Matabeleland. Certainly, dissidents did exist and caused 
havoc especially on white-owned commercial farms. This resulted in the deployment of a 
military brigade known as the Fifth Brigade. The Fifth Brigade went on to commit untold 
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atrocities on civilians, activities infamously known as Gukurahundi today. Alexander et al. 
(2000), in their fieldwork in northern Matabeleland, revealed that the Fifth Brigade also 
directed its energies to political mobilization over and above the massacre of civilians, what  
Ranger and Bhebhe (1996:19) aptly described as “politicization without politics”. 
Contextualising historical political conflicts in Matabeleland is pivotal to understanding the 
contemporary state’s influence in the political lives of the people in this region. Mabhena 
(2014) notes that in conducting Gukurahundi, the state’s aim was political domination not 
exploitation of economic resources. The state’s idea was to limit the power of locals who 
were seemingly resistant to its policies. This resistance is shown by the state’s resort to the 
politics of patronage in the allocation of resettlement land. For instance, resistance by people 
in southern Matabeleland to move to resettlement areas such as Nyandeni in 1984 resulted in 
the state literally transporting people from other provinces to occupy these schemes, an 
endeavour that has seen conflicts between these people and the locals (ibid). The control of 
district and local authorities by people aligned to the ruling party was viewed as necessary by 
the state in an effort to assert power and authority in a region that had been dominated by PF-
ZAPU. When the PF-ZAPU dominated District Councils began to be perceived as a threat, 
the state responded by introducing new cadres at the District Administrator’s office, the Local 
Government Promotion Officers (LGPOs) mainly drawn from Ex-ZANLA soldiers. Their 
mandate was to promote the establishment of VIDCOs and WADCOs as discussed in the 
sections above. Noteworthy is that the two institutions of VIDCO and WADCO were never 
warmly received especially in Matabeleland South region. In some circles they were regarded 
as a ZANU PF mechanism for controlling Matabeleland (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989). It is 
not surprising that VIDCO members were targets of dissidents who regarded them as sell-
outs. Mabhena (2014) reveals that the state succeeded in marginalising PF-ZAPU councillors 
and local traditional leaders while promoting VIDCOs and WADCOs as a way of ensuring 
total control of the local communities. Furthermore, drought relief was used to force local 
people into accepting state policies. Mabhena (2014) calls it a “carrot and stick” affair.  
 
c) Post-Unity period 
 
The use of a coercive apparatus to force people in Matabeleland to submit to state hegemony 
finally subsided late in 1985 as the two parties, PF-ZAPU and ZANU PF began negotiations 
for a unity agreement. On 22 December 1987, the agreement was signed by Joshua Nkomo 
representing ZAPU and Robert Mugabe for ZANU PF. This brought an end to harassment of 
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rural people by state agents and dissidents at the communal level. Local PF- ZAPU cadres 
retained their positions as District Councillors (Mabhena, 2014). Nonetheless, unity did not 
translate into significant participation of local people in decision-making in their 
communities. The central government continued with its top–down approach in development 
projects (Mabhena, 2014). Plans made by the Rural District Development Committees 
(RDDC) and Provincial Development Committees (PDC) continued to be neglected by the 
central government in favour of its own national plans (ibid). 
 
Communal people in Matabeleland have largely remained unhappy about the Unity Accord 
because of its failure to acknowledge the atrocities committed by the Fifth Brigade and its 
total disregard of a resettlement model that caters for their livestock without necessarily 
moving them from their present location (Robins, 1994:103-4). The introduction of the 
FTLRRP is another resettlement model that has been foisted on Matabeleland resulting in 
conflicts between communal residents and those resettled (Mabhena, 2014). The FTLRRP 
has since failed to address problems of grazing land for livestock.  
 
4.3. Political and economic crisis since 2000 
 
The political and economic crisis which began in the early 1980s in the Matabeleland region 
and later intensified in the early 1990s in the entire country played a key role in determining 
the contemporary governance systems in natural resource management. This crisis has a 
complex history, shaped by links among residual effects of colonial rule (Mashinya, 2007; 
Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). There is abundant literature which describes colonial 
inequalities that characterised the country in its ninety years of colonial rule, especially 
pertaining to the land question
26
 that made an armed liberation struggle necessary. 
                                                 
26
 Literature of land appropriation by the colonial government is in abundance. See, for 
example, H. Moyana, The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 
1984); S. Moyo, The Land Question in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES, 1995); J. Alexander, The 
Unsettled Land: State-Making & the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003 (Harare: 
Weaver Press, 2006); A. S. Mlambo, “Land Grab or Taking Back Stolen Land: The Fast 
Track Land Reform Process in Zimbabwe in Historical Perspective”, Compass, (July 2005); 
R. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London: Heinemann, 1977); R. 
Riddell, “Zimbabwe's land problem: The central issue” in From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: 
Behind and Beyond Lancaster House, ed. W. H. Morris-Jones (New Jersey: Frank Cass, 
1980), 1-13; Rukuni, M. et al., Report of the Commission of Enquiry into appropriate 
Agricultural Land Tenure Systems (Harare: Government Printer, 1994).  
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The early 1990s witnessed a general deterioration of the once vibrant economy as the 
government introduced unpopular policies. The World Bank/IMF-inspired Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) fuelled the decline as it led to rapid de-
industrialization, growing unemployment and the lowering of living standards of the 
majority.
27
 This weakened the support for ZANU PF while strengthening opposition. The 
situation came to a head in early 2000 when the government lost the February referendum for 
a new national constitution – the first time that ZANU PF had been defeated in 20 years28.  
The defeat coincided with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 
1999. The existence of MDC pushed panic buttons in ZANU PF which resulted in ruthless 
efforts to destroy the opposition, including widespread use of violence. Fearing for its loss of 
power, ZANU PF responded by wild and wide scale appropriation of white-owned 
commercial farms with the belief among ZANU PF echelons that the MDC was just a front 
for white people seeking a regime change (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). White farmers 
were generally believed to be the funders of the MDC. The process was chaotic and violent, 
targeting mainly white-owned farms and ranches, and even state-owned national parks and 
other protected areas (Chaumba et al., 2003; Wolmer et al., 2004). Though the government 
claims the process ended in 2002, this is debatable because there were still reports of the 
remaining white farmers losing their farms in 2015. The farm invasions significantly reduced 
agricultural output and exports, worsening the fiscal pressures on the government and 
threatening the very existence of many industries which depended on the agricultural sector 
(Mapedza, 2007; Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). Foreign capital dried as the World Bank 
and the IMF withdrew their support to the government while the United States and Europe 
imposed selective sanctions on ZANU PF individuals. The consequences of this violent land 
reform programme have been far reaching.  
 
                                                 
27
 There is abundant literature on the impact of ESAP on Zimbabwean Economy. See for 
instance, A. S. Mlambo, The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme; Mlambo, A., & 
Pangeti, E. (2001). Globalization, Structural Adjustment and the Social Dimensions Dilemma 
in Zimbabwe, 1990–1999. Globalization, Democracy, and Development in Africa: 
Challenges and Prospects, 163-77. 
28
 For further explanation on Zimbabwe`s referendum in year 2000, see Alois Mlambo & 
Brian Raftopoulos. The Regional dimensions of Zimbabwe’s multi-layered crisis: an 
Analysis. Election processes, Liberation movements and Democratic change in Africa 
Conference. Maputo 8-11 April 2010 CMI and IESE; John Makumbe, The impact of 
democracy in Zimbabwe Assessing political, social and economic  developments since the 
dawn of democracy. Zimbabwe Country Report Research Report 119. Centre for Policy 
Studies, 2009. 
96 
 
The formation of the MDC put enormous pressure on the ruling government.  Violation of 
citizen’s rights through intimidation and violence by state agents and supporters of the ruling 
party increased significantly. The violation of individual constitutional rights was 
accompanied by the systematic militarization of the state,
29
 the subversion of the judiciary 
and undermining of the country’s courts,30 as well as the total disregard of the rule of law and 
blatant abuse of individual human rights. By 2007-2008, the economy had almost collapsed 
(see Coltart, 2008; Munangagwa, 2009 among others). The government`s policies had 
worsened the situation by imposing price controls on basic commodities. This resulted in 
complete disappearance of most commodities from the shelves while inflation rose to new 
records. Unemployment at 2008 stood at 90%, and once the breadbasket of the entire region, 
Zimbabwe was now importing basic foodstuffs to feed its population.
31
 In a nutshell, ZANU 
PF rule had become more authoritarian.  
 
The period immediately after Zimbabwe`s independence, stretching up to the early 2000s is 
very critical to Bulilima’s natural resource management. The 1984 Prime Minister’s directive 
entrusted power on the District Councils which saw the establishment of a Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in the area. Emphasis was 
put on the CAMPFIRE programme as the most important Community Based Natural 
Resource Management Programme (CBNRM). As such, the programme received a lot of 
donor funds (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995). However, though touted as a management 
programme for all indigenous resources, the programme tended to focus more on wildlife 
with Safari hunting as the key activity under the strict management of the RDC.  Other 
resources such as Mopane worms, Mopane woodlands and grasses, which also existed in 
abundance in the area, were left to be managed under a multiple management system which 
included the RDC, government and quasi government departments as well as traditional 
leadership. The establishment of the CAMPFIRE programme gave birth to conflicts between 
owners of large herds of cattle who wanted the range occupied by the CAMPFIRE 
                                                 
29
Muzondidya, J (17 July, 2007). The Politico-military Business Complex and the Transition 
in Zimbabwe. Paper presented to the Roundtable on The Death of Quiet diplomacy and A 
New Chance for Zimbabwe, organised by the Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria. 
30
 Brian Raftopoulos & Alois Mlambo (Eds.) (2009). Becoming Zimbabwe: A History of 
Zimbabwe from the pre-colonial period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press, & South Africa: 
Jacana Media; Robert Martin, (2006). The rule of law in Zimbabwe. The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 95, 384.  
31
 Reuters, “FACTBOX – Zimbabwe’s meltdown in figures” 30 March, 2008, at 
http://www.reuters.com  
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programme for their cattle to graze and the rest of the Bulilima community who viewed 
CAMPFIRE as key to the development of their communities (Dzingirai and Madzudzo, 
1999). These conflicts, as discussed in the ensuing chapters, have persisted and there does not 
seem to be any solution in sight. 
 
The Gukurahundi period leading to the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 between PF-
ZAPU and ZANU PF is also important in this study as it affected people of Matabeleland 
South, particularly areas around Matobo, Gwanda, Mangwe and Bulilima districts, more than 
any other areas in Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2012; Mabhena, 2014). The full scale of the impact is 
not known but Moyo (2012) argues that one of the major impacts, related to the themes of 
this study, is that Gukurahundi resulted in the political disempowerment of the local people 
which has been responsible for their failure to freely access their resources and economic 
opportunities. Real power has continued to be monopolized by the ruling government. This 
background information is important in the discussions that come in the ensuing chapters 
because it provides the context for understanding the unpopularity of government structures 
such as VIDCOs and WADCOs among the local people (Mabhena, 2014). 
 
Absence of government records on natural resource management during the Gukurahundi era 
in Matabeleland region prompted the researcher to rely on interviews conducted with some 
elderly persons from the study area. According to one elderly village head from Bambadzi 
who requested anonymity, access to mopane worms during the Gukurahundi era was limited 
to collecting those worms that were close to one’s homestead: 
 
I remember people could not go into the forest for months for fear of soldiers. We 
could not even farm our fields. We harvested worms close to our homes. The 
advantage is that there were still a lot of Mopane trees close to our homesteads hence 
we could harvest large quantities just close to home. There are some families that 
survived on those worms for some time because they could not get food from 
anywhere as the shops were closed (Interview, elderly village head from Bambadzi, 
20 October, 2013). 
 
Some people who were asked about Gukurahundi flatly refused to talk about it because they 
feared that they could be victimised by government security agents.  
 
The formation of MDC, the only party to strongly challenge ZANU PF since the signing of 
the Unity Accord in 1987, was very significant to this study because it contributed to ZANU 
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PF’s heavy handedness in the treatment of people in the local communities. For instance, the 
formation of the MDC party prompted the ruling ZANU PF government to introduce the 
National Youth Service, with youths being trained and used to preserve ZANU PF policies. 
In Bulilima, the study found out that there was a deliberate effort by the ruling party to ensure 
that opposition parties did not have any representation at local level. In Chapter 5, there are 
discussions on how some institutional structures such as the war veterans, women and youth 
leagues openly disregard local leaders who do not belong to or sympathise with the ruling 
party.  
 
4.4.  Summary 
 
This chapter narrated natural resource management systems, from the pre-colonial to post-
colonial eras in Zimbabwe. The discussion revealed that natural resources were managed by 
various institutions in varrying ways for different agendas. In the pre-colonial era, traditional 
institutions were the key players determining how resources were used in the communities. 
Chiefs and religious leaders used their influential positions to make decisions on use and 
access to resources. Power was vested in them even though natural resources belonged  to 
everyone in the community. Traditional and religious institutions possessed knowledge that 
was used to manage the resources in a sustainable manner. During the colonial era, powerful 
European settlers used their scientifc knowledge to influence decisions on natural resource 
management. Traditional authorities were either undermined or used to preserve and promote 
colonial ideology. Discussions on the post-colonial era centred on developments that took 
place immediately after independence as the new government tried to redress the inequalities 
brought by colonial rule.  The discussion also touched on the post-colonial role of traditional 
authorities before zeroing in on land distribution and the associated political conflicts that 
ensued in the Matabeleland region between 1980 and 1987. The chapter also discussed the 
period after 2000 which saw the MDC entering Zimbabwe’s political arena. The birth of the 
MDC resulted in increased abuse of power by the ruling ZANU PF, leading to violence and 
intimidation of citizens across the country. 
 
 In the case of Matabeleland South – the focus of this study – discussions revealed that the 
state deliberately embarked on politics of domination. As such, it influenced local decisions 
through its various agents positioned in key areas within the council and local government. 
Development programmes came with decisions from the top, some of which were irrelevant 
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to the needs of the local people. For instance the issue of resettlement remains unaddressed 
for many locals because the state continues to ignore the need for more grazing land. 
Discussions in this chapter set the tone and provide the context for data analysis in the 
ensuing chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: POWER DYNAMICS AND GENDERED TENURE 
SYSTEMS OF MOPANE WORMS AND WOODLANDS IN BULILIMA. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 laid a foundation for the analysis of power dynamics and the gendered tenure of 
natural resource management in Bulilima. It chronicled, in general terms, the history of 
natural resource management in Zimbabwe focusing on critical political events that 
influenced the dynamics of power in the Matabeleland region where Bulilima District is 
located. It further introduced various actors and institutions that are pivotal in natural 
resource management in Zimbabwe. This chapter specifically explores power dynamics in 
gendered resource tenure systems where various actors compete to access, control and use 
mopane worms and woodlands in the district. The chapter contends that natural resource 
utilisation is influenced by the interaction between diverse actors that include men, women, 
the youth, local as well as non-local authorities; institutions and institutional structures 
derived from both customary practices and government legislations. All these shape the 
dynamics of power and thus consequent access, use and control of mopane worms and 
woodlands. 
 
5.2. Findings from the fieldwork 
 
Fieldwork to unearth dynamics of power in mopane worms and woodlands management 
followed a mixed approach in data collection. The initial stage was to conduct a questionnaire 
survey to solicit data on characteristics of the population under study. Understanding 
variables such as the demographics of the population under study was very important in this 
thesis because demographics were a factor in determining power dynamics and local 
environmental knowledge use. The survey captured data on how power and local knowledge 
varied with class, gender, sex and generational divides among respondents in the study area. 
The second stage was to carry out detailed ethnographic studies, which included 
observations, narratives and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) studies such as in-depth 
interviews, narratives and wealth ranking techniques. 
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5.3. Analysis of demographic information 
 
Data analysis began at the household level because power dynamics, knowledge and gender 
aspects can be determined at those lowest levels of organisationof social structures.  A survey 
tool was used to get a descriptive map of demographic characteristics of the population in the 
three wards (Dombolefu, Makhulela and Bambadzi). Data that included sex, age, marital 
status and employment was captured as key variables in analysing gender dynamics, power 
dynamics and variation in local environmental knowledge depth. 
 
5.3.1. Sex of household heads  
 
From 90 questionnaires that were administered randomly in the three wards, women 
constituted 60% of the household heads. This was found consistent with the Zimbabwe 
Census report of 2012 as shown in table 5.1, where a total of 11 380 were female-headed 
households (FHH) while 8 306 were male-headed households (MHH). 
 
Table 5.1 Household heads by sex in Bulilima District 
 
Household Size Number of Households Headed by: 
Male Percent Female Percent 
1 1511 18.2 779 6.8 
2 940 11.3 1386 12.2 
3 999 12.0 1971 17.3 
4 1056 12.7 2061 18.1 
5 1002 12.1 1780 15.6 
6 881 10.6 1247 11.0 
7 634 7.6 884 7.8 
8+ 1283 15.4 1272 11.2 
Total 8306 100 11380 100 
 
 Sources: Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (2012) 
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The population of women in Bulilima District was found to be higher than that of men 
(Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, 2012). This has been attributed to the ‘look south 
policy’ (Maphosa, 2007; Matsa and Simphiwe, 2010) whereby most males generally emigrate 
to South Africa and Botswana in search of employment. 
 
5.3.2. Age of household heads  
 
The age distribution of household heads (HHs) varied between age groups of 10-20 and 51 
years and above. Of these respondents the majority, which was above 40%, fell above the 
ages of 60+ (see Figure 5.1). Households headed by youths and middle-aged people were 
few, a phenomenon that could be attributed to outward migration (see Maphosa, 2007; Matsa 
and Simphiwe, 2010). Youths in particular tend to be mobile. Dombolefu Ward in particular 
(see Figure 5.1) had fewer young people compared to the other wards. This was attributed to 
the fact that this ward is closest to Plumtree town (approximately 10km away) hence it was 
much easier for youths and other able-bodied people to move to the town as a first destination 
before proceeding to Bulawayo, South Africa or Botswana. Movement of young people from 
rural Matabeleland areas is not a new phenomenon as this date dates back to the late 1890s 
(see Yoshikuni, 1999). Ndebele migrants in Bulawayo created dense networks of self- help 
institutions and associations that made it easy for young people from Matabeleland to move 
into the city unlike the situation that was obtained between Salisbury and Mashonaland rural 
communities (ibid). While migrants still moved to Bulawayo in search of jobs and better 
living conditions, Botswana and South Africa presented better destinations. Indeed Maphosa 
(2007) notes that migrating to the two named countries was at some point a priority for most 
young people from Matabeleland region in general and Bulilima in particular. Those who did 
not follow the trend were usually despised and perceived as ibhare (or unsophisticated) 
(ibid). 
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Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.1 Age of household heads  
 (n)=90 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts that most of the survey responses came from household heads who were 40 
years old and above. There were few households headed by youths in all the wards, perhaps a 
confirmation that most of the youths had migrated for greener pastures.
32
  Those that 
remained seemed to lack agency to influence decisions on general development issues. This 
is also noted by Rasmussen (2003) who argues that in most cases, youths hardly participate in 
development issues chiefly because adults frequently make decisions on their behalf without 
seeking input from the very audience that they purport to represent.  
 
5.3.3. Marital status of household heads  
 
The majority of the household heads were married (more than 50%) while a great percentage 
was widowed (more than 30% in all the wards) (see Figure 5.2). It needs to be noted that the 
                                                 
32
 The researcher found it very difficult to define the concept of youth and children. While the 
UN refer to these two concepts in terms of fixed age terms (10-15 as children and 16-35 as 
youths), a definition also used by Zimbabwe, reality on the ground is very complex (Mufune, 
2000). The two concepts are very fluid depending on how society wants to use them. For 
instance the study revealed that some of those between ages of 15 and 35 had families of their 
own and society referred to them as adults. On the other hand there was the issue of politics 
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majority of married household heads surveyed were women. Most of them had their husbands 
working in South Africa, Botswana or in towns and cities within Zimbabwe. Such dynamics 
were significant in that they influenced gender roles and power configurations in the 
communities under study. 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.2 Marital statuses of household heads. 
 (n)=90 
 
5.3.4. Employment status of household heads  
 
The study further discovered that the majority of household heads were unemployed (see 
Figure 5.3). This was consistent in all the wards. Besides the fact that these were rural 
communities where securing formal employment was not easy, the majority of the 
respondents were over 50 years old (see Figure 5.1 on age distribution), meaning that they 
had either reached retirement age or they were not seeking formal employment at all. 
Employment was found to be a variable that influenced the dynamics of power. With 
employment comes remuneration, money and thus capability to make decisions. For instance 
the study revealed that those who were employed in the communities under study, for 
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example teachers and other government officials, commanded more respect which bordered 
on fear, from community members. Even though they rarely participated in local community 
meetings, they seemed to be above normal community institutions. In Bambadzi for instance, 
the study found out that local school teachers could hire local men to chop firewood for them 
even from fresh mopane trees. Their status was enough for them to circumvent some local 
regulations. Michel Foucault, in ‘The Subject and Power’ argues that power analysis must 
examine the ‘systems of differentiations which permit one to act upon others’.33 These 
differentiations could be due to one’s economic status resulting from formal employment. 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.3 Employment categories of household heads.  
(n)=90  
 
5.3.5. Educational levels of household heads  
 
The majority of household heads only ended at primary level (about 45%) while an 
insignificant number reached tertiary education (see Table 5.2) below. There was a high 
                                                 
33
See Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power.Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 777-
795; Dreyfus, H., & Rabinow, P. (1982). The subject and power. Michel Foucault: beyond 
structuralism and hermeneutics, 208-226 
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number of household heads in Makhulela who had never attended school. This was not 
surprising because Makhulela had a San community which did not prioritise education at all. 
The overall picture in all the wards was that the population under study was lowly educated. 
This had implications in their interaction and understanding of modern institutions and 
institutional structures. For instance, the study found that the majority of villagers did not 
understand the regulatory laws enforced by the RDC and the Forestry Commission with 
regards to the use of natural resources. The common sentiment from most of the respondents 
from the three wards was that they were being unfairly denied their rights to use their 
resources in ways they deemed appropriate to them.  
 
Table 5.2 Education levels in the study areas of the district 
 
  Education Total 
Never 
went 
to 
school 
Primary 
School 
Secondary 
School 
Vocational 
Training 
Tertiary 
Education 
Ward 
Name 
BAMBADZI 1.8% 15.8% 12.7%   .9% 31.1% 
DOMBOLEFU 3.5% 11.4% 6.1%   1.3% 22.4% 
MAKHULELA 19.7% 18.0% 7.9% .9%   46.5% 
Total 25.0% 45.2% 26.8% .9% 2.2% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
5.4. Power dynamics analysis 
 
Conceptualisation of power in this chapter and indeed in the entire thesis draws significantly 
from the Foucauldian notion of power. Foucault posits that power is imbedded in social life 
so much that it is impossible to conceive of any society devoid of power relations (Foucault, 
1982). This makes analysing power one of the most difficult endeavors of social science. 
Power is complicated since it is fluid, dynamic, and difficult to measure yet every aspect of 
development and natural resource management is shaped by relations of power and authority, 
as well as resistance to them (see Scott, 1994; Few, 2002) . When we analyse power we are 
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actually examining how certain actions modify actions of others. As actors (individuals and 
organizations) interact in a social space where they access or fail to access natural resources, 
they generate actions mutually impact others, thus creating relationships that benefit some 
while curtailing others’ freedom to enjoy the same resources.  
 
Following Foucault`s (1982) theorisation of power, this study did not understand power as a 
confrontation between two adversaries but as a way in which actions of individuals or groups, 
structure the actions of others, directing them to a particular outcome. It was also not seen as 
a sole province of the ostensibly ‘powerful’ but also excised by the weak through various 
tactics of resistance (Sharp et al., 2000). While Foucault’s understanding of power provided a 
theoretical approach that anchored this study, analysis of power was done using various 
frameworks that enabled interpretation of power dynamics in the study area. The Power Cube 
framework, for instance, was operationalised to explore various aspects of power and how 
they interact with each other by focusing on actors, relationships, forces, arena and 
possibilities for change (Rabe and Kamazi, 2012). Power dynamics existed at household and 
community levels influencing access to, and use of, mopane worms and woodlands. Various 
institutions and actors operating at different levels and varying capacities and scales within 
and outside the study area (customary rights, social norms, beliefs, statutory instruments, 
legal regulations and women, men, wives, husbands, boys, girls, respectively) interacted in 
invited, claimed and hidden spaces to influence the management of mopane worms and 
woodlands. 
 
The Power Cube was, however, found not to be an ideal tool for analysis to explain the 
gendered nature of natural resource management. To shed light on this critical aspect, the 
study integrated social relational approaches articulated by Kabeer (1999), who defines 
gender relations as based on power, with Rocheleau and Edmunds’(1997) approach to the 
complexity and dynamism of gendered resource tenure regimes. Kabeer’s social relational 
approach was used to understand the institutionalized nature of gender inequalities and the 
consequent power relations generated (Nnoko-Mewanu et al., 2015). It also focused on the 
relations of power within and between institutional structures. Several institutional structures 
(see Tables 5.3 and 5.4) were found to be pivotal in mopane worms and woodlands 
management in the study area. Rocheleau and Edmunds’ (1997) approach to gendered spaces 
and places complemented the Power Cube framework in that it went beyond simply power 
relations by analysing the complex and fluid nature of rights regarding land ownership, 
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spaces and places for using mopane trees and their resources such as mopane worms, and 
access to these resources through nested gendered spaces. 
 
Understanding how natural resources arrived at home and were utilised began at the 
household level. It was therefore important that dynamics of natural resource access at the 
household level be analysed to determine how various roles were played by different actors. 
Through a questionnaire survey, a random sample of ninety households in the three wards 
was done and ninety household heads were  interviewed to solicit data on issues that ranged 
from demographic characteristics, livelihood techniques, knowledge on natural resource 
management institutions available in their communities, decision-making on mopane worms 
and woodlands harvesting and general ability to participate in community projects and 
membership to any organisations that dealt with natural resource management. It must be 
emphasised that with regards to the mopane woodlands, the questionnaire concentrated more 
on firewood as it was the resource widely used by local communities on a day to day basis. 
The survey data augmented ethnographic data collected through interviews, group 
discussions and observations. Spending time in some homesteads also helped in observing 
dynamics at household and village levels. 
 
Matose (2002) notes that household labor and task allocation systems are central to the way 
natural resources are collected by household members. In rural communities, home is of 
primary economic, political and social importance so much that any analysis of power 
relations between actors should start from there (Rogers, 1975). Women’s focus is 
traditionally domestic or home while men tend to occupy themselves with what happens in 
the village at large. As such, the dynamics of mopane worms and woodlands collection and 
how they were utilised at home helped to expose decision-making processes and power 
domains at home. While customary institutions such as marriage were found to greatly 
influence general patterns of household residence, with men being household heads and 
women their subordinates, there was also evidence of a significant number of households 
headed by women (see Table 5.1 adapted from the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency, 
2012). One major reason for such a pattern was said to be a high number of men migrating to 
neighboring towns and countries (see Sweetman, 1998; Zimbabwe National Statistical 
Agency, 2012). As mentioned earlier, migration from Matabeleland regions is not a recent 
phenomenon, having begun in the late 1890s when European settlers began seizing land from 
the ruling Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups, forcing young Ndebele and Kalanga men to 
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move to Bulawayo in search of employment (Yoshikuni, 1999; Msindo, 2012). It peaked in 
the 1980s as more people started fleeing Gukurahundi and in early 2000 as socio-economic 
conditions began to deteriorate (Mark and Winniefridah, 2011; Maphosa, 2007). As such 
migration has contributed to multiple family residence patterns with the most dominant being 
female-headed households. 
 
The following sections describe Mopane worms and woodlands collection patterns. These 
patterns are influenced by generic household chores borne out of the perceived roles of 
household members. They also help expose decision making processes and power dynamics 
with regards to who collects what and why. 
 
5.4.1. Mopane worms and woodlands collection 
 
Power dynamics that relate to the use of non-timber forest products such as mopane worms 
and firewood at a household level were analysed by noting the pattern of roles of different 
actors within a household. The study ascertained that almost every household and generally 
anyone old and strong enough participated in the collection of mopane worms. Furthermore, 
collectors generally made their own decisions on how they used their harvested worms, save 
for young children. There were however, some households that did not partake in mopane 
worm harvesting activity because of religious reasons. For instance those that belonged to the 
Seventh Day Adventist church (SDA) neither gathered nor consumed mopane worms. Other 
studies on mopane worms and livelihoods in the Matopo District of Matabeleland South 
came up with similar findings on religion and Mopane worm consumption
34
 (also see Gondo 
and Frost, 2002; Zhou, 2003). Customarily, the collection and harvesting patterns of natural 
resources used to be closely related to the task and activities of different members of a 
household, with women tending to collect more food products and firewood in forests near 
their homes.
35
 In most low-income households, “women’s work” includes not only 
reproductive work (the childbearing and rearing responsibilities) required to guarantee the 
maintenance and reproduction of the labor force, but also productive work, often as 
                                                 
34
Gondo and Frost (2002) noted that households which are not engaged in Mopane worm 
activities in Matopo district are from the SDA church while Zhou (2003) observed that the 
Zionist Church also forbids its members from engaging in any Mopane worm activities. 
35
Information derived from focus group discussions with various groups of men and women 
in the study areas. Same information was also gathered from 5 elderly interviewees from 
Makhulela and Bambadzi. 
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secondary income earners (Moser, 1989). This was found to be true in this study as women 
harvested mopane worms for home consumption and income generation. As such mopane 
worms afforded women an opportunity to be productive and autonomous, thus relying less on 
their male counterparts. It was observed that mopane worm activities (production and trade 
system) reflected a defined division of labor based on indigenous production and labor 
practices as noted by Neumann and Hirsch (2000). The study ascertained that women and 
girls were mainly responsible for collecting mopane worms (see Figure 5.4 where 70% of 
women are noted as main mopane worm collectors). These findings are consistent with those 
of Kozanayi and Frost (2002) and Mufandaedza et al. (2015) who reported that more than 
70% of Mopane worm harvesting and processing was done by women and children while 
more than 80% of harvesters in Gonarezhou National Park were women, respectively. 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.4 Household members who collect mopane worms (Responses were collated for 
all the three wards) 
(n)=90 
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Women were also found to be the main actors in processing the collected worms because of 
their knowledge while men became significant in selling (see Table 5.3). Most local men 
interviewed pointed out that they preferred women to process the worms because they did 
that very well. Most collected worms were processed at home where women had significant 
input about decisions regarding how the worms were to be used. In her insightful article, 
Rogers (1975) notes that in rural areas, households are domains of women where they have 
control over allocation of family resources.  While men remain the heads of their respective 
families, women still retain decision-making powers at home. In situations where men got 
involved in the marketing of mopane worms in urban markets further away from Bulilima, 
the study established that they (men) carried out this mandate with the blessings of the family 
because men were perceived to be tough negotiators for good prices. 
 
Table 5.3 Proportion of members involved in Mopane worm activities by gender and 
age composition in the three Bulilima wards under study, Zimbabwe, 2013/2014 
  
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
It is however intriguing to note from Table 5.3 that the percentage of men who did the selling 
of worms was quite high (55%) compared to other activities. This was nevertheless consistent 
with literature where men were identified as a group that tended to involve itself towards the 
end of a resource value chain (see Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 1984; Chimedza, 1988; Rocheleau 
Mopane Worm 
activity 
Adults Over 
40yrs 
Adults 18-
39yrs 
Youth 12-
17yrs 
Children 5-
11yrs 
M 
N=15 
 
F 
N=30 
M 
N=10 
F 
N=21 
M 
N=15 
F 
N=28 
M 
N=12 
F 
N=26 
Collection only 40 5.1 5.6 4.5 86.7 5.6 33.2 2.1 
Collection & 
processing 
3.2 95 45 86.5 58.7 88.4 21.3 45.4 
Selling 55 76.5 31.2 85.9 66.6 73.5 0 0 
Buying 3.2 33 5.8 33.3 0 8.3 0 0 
Consuming 96 98 95 85 100 100 100 100 
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and Edmunds, 1997). Even though women have substantial labour and management 
responsibilities for particular resources, men tend to control the marketing of the resource. 
Letsie (1996) and Moruakgomo (1996) further add that traditionally, men are said to prefer 
trading in mopane worms in areas further away from their villages compared to women who 
prefer traders to come to them. 
 
In a group discussion with women from Makhulela, the following sentiments in support of 
men were raised: ‘Men are the ones who market the worms in town because they are able to 
negotiate better prices. Women can easily get cheated’ (FGD for women in Makhulela, 16 
March 2014). While it seemed that men chose to involve themselves at the final stage of the 
value chain, it is also clear that women gave them this space because of their social belief that 
men would negotiate for better prices. Women did not trust themselves that much. Perhaps 
this explains why they tended to concentrate on the local market, which was within their 
villages. Moreover, the bulk of their trade involved barter exchange while men generally 
traded in hard cash. The researcher had the opportunity of following some men to urban areas 
where they sold the worms. After selling the worms the men took the money back to their 
wives where they were given their share. It could therefore be argued that ‘some’ women 
maintained their dominance over men with regards to family resources. This pattern should 
not lead to overgeneralisation as it is based on a few incidences that the researcher observed 
within the time scale of the study. It is possible that some men did not give their wives the 
money after selling the worms in urban areas. Such cases could have been few though as 
group discussions with women from Dombolefu revealed: ‘they can’t afford to eat our hard 
earned money…otherwise there will be hell at home’ (Group discussions with women from 
Dombolefu, 22 May 2014). Further interrogation by the researcher on the meaning of ‘hell at 
home’ resulted in giggles and whisperings, while some women looked down. The researcher 
later learnt that some of the ‘hell’ revolved around withholding of sex. Thus, women used 
this strategy to be heard by their men. These findings are consistent with Nemarundwe’s 
(2005) findings on women from Romwe catchment in Chivi District, Zimbabwe. 
 
Literature search revealed that involvement of men in significant harvesting of mopane 
worms began in the 1960s when an outbreak of a cattle disease (probably Foot and Mouth) 
resulted in the culling of diseased cattle and confiscation of healthy cattle in the Matabeleland 
region (Ghazoul, 2006). Many people turned to other resources such as mopane worms which 
provided safety nets. The realization that significant income could be generated from the sale 
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of mopane worms encouraged more men to get involved in collecting the product. By 1970 a 
bucket (20 litres) of Mopane worms was sold for between 1 and 3 Rhodesian dollars
36
 in 
urban markets (ibid). Interviews conducted with most male household heads pointed to the 
fact that while the focus was on cattle, mopane worms provided an opportunity to make easy 
income. They, however, made it clear that this was an activity they did in times of crisis such 
as drought. Indeed, observations revealed that fewer men collected the worms compared to 
women. The activity seemed embarrassing to local men: ‘collecting worms is a woman’s job. 
I can’t be seen moving around mopane trees picking those things. It’s degrading to a man’ 
(Interview with a village head from Mbimba village, Bambadzi Ward, 12 April 2014). By 
referring to mopane worms as ‘things’, the village head showed that the worms were 
probably too inferior for men to spend time on. However, the village head could have been 
making a false conclusion that the process of picking worms was demeaning to all men as the 
study revealed that some men, especially those coming from other areas, saw the worms as a 
valuable resource for domestic and commercial purposes. For instance, a certain Mr. Dube 
(not his real name to maintain confidentiality) from Mbimba village commented: 
 
Naturally I would not bother with collecting or harvesting mopane worms because 
that activity is for old women. However, the fact that we have lost most of our cattle 
over the years due to Gukurahundi and frequent droughts, I have also joined those 
who harvest because I can sell them and get some income. However, I am only doing 
this because my cattle are now few so I cannot sell them now and again (Interview 
with Mr. Dube from Mbimba Village, Bambadzi, 20 April, 2014). 
 
In another interview with a non-local harvester
37
 who was a man, the sentiment was that there 
was profit in mopane worms: ‘Mopane worms are good business. I have to harvest as much 
as possible before they disappear’ (Interview with Mr Mabika (not his real name) Makhulela, 
20 April, 2014). The researcher had the opportunity of observing these men at work and they 
did not show signs of embarrassment compared to some Bulilima men. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
One Rhodesian dollar was approximately 0.67 United States dollar in the late 1970s 
(Department Of The Treasury, Fiscal Service, Bureau of Government Financial Operations, 
1980) 
37
 Non –local harvesters were men and women who came from other areas to harvest mopane 
worms in Bulilima District 
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Box 4: Processing of Mopane worms 
 
However, Bulilima men only shunned mopane worm harvesting when the rains were good 
and the fields were productive. During periods of drought (which are now very frequent) the 
same men were observed picking and trading in mopane worms. The need for survival 
necessitated pragmatism and a temporary abandonment of patriarchal considerations. 
Moreover, these dynamics revealed the geographic situatedness of some of the beliefs and 
practices. For instance, local men were embarrassed of harvesting worms as they perceived 
the activity as demeaning. Non-local men on the other hand were not affected by such social 
stigma. Furthermore, the claim that Mopane worms harvesting was a woman’s chore did not 
hold anymore. With men also partaking in the activity, it could be concluded that this role 
was clearly culturally constructed rather than embedded in any economic rationality. 
 
Women also dominated in the collection of mopane firewood, with wives and boys said to 
constitute more than 20% of the collectors while husbands constituted just above 16% (see 
Figure 5.5). While traditionally firewood collection was a woman`s responsibility (see 
Dianzinga & Yambo, 1992; van Dijk, 1999; Dkamela, 2001; Tiani, 2001; Timko et al., 2010; 
Tobith and Cuny, 2006), the study found out that a significant number of men were also 
getting involved. This could be explained by various dynamics that were observed in some 
households in the study area. For example, issues such as distance to the nearest forest where 
firewood was collected and presence of technologies such as axes, wheel barrows, and scotch 
carts seemed to have played a pivotal role in transforming the traditional roles in firewood 
Once collected or picked from the ground or mopane trees, the undigested insides in the gut 
are removed by squeezing the worm between the thumb and fingers. Fully grown larvae 
usually have less amounts of gut content compared to younger larvae hence the former are 
preferred (Akpalu et al., 2009). After removing the gut content the larvae are then charcoal 
roasted (known in Shona language as kungora) or boiled and then dried to enable 
preservation (a process common in Bulilima) (Kozanayi and Frost, 2002). Once processed 
and dried, mopane worms can be stored for over a year hence can be found on sale in rural 
and urban markets and shops (Ghazoul, 2006; Stack et al., 2003; Akpalu et al., 2009). The 
ease in processing and the fact that worms can be stored for a long time makes them a vital 
alternative source of food in dry-land areas such as Bulilima. They are also in demand in 
urban areas as they provide low cost protein especially to the urban poor (Stack et al., 2003). 
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collection.  These observations are similar to those made by Frank Matose in a study on 
‘How institutions mediate values placed on different forest resources by forest users in 
Zimbabwe’ (Matose, 2002). 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.5 Household members who collect mopane firewood (Responses were collated 
for all the three wards) 
 (n)=90 
 
Matose (2002) observes that distances play a key role in women’s access to firewood. In 
relatively well-to-do families in this study, boys took the responsibility of fetching firewood 
as they used scotch carts, which made the activity a lot easier than for women to carry the 
firewood on their heads. In some female-headed households where husbands worked outside 
the country, women used remittances to hire labor for services that included firewood and 
water collection among other things.  Some households were observed to have alternative 
technologies and sources of energy such as solar panels, gas and primus stoves hence they 
had less need for firewood. While remittances are not a recent phenomenon in rural 
communities of Zimbabwe, their significance and impact on the Bulilima rural economy has 
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grown steadily post- 2000, as the country’s economy deteriorated rapidly.38 Recipients of 
these remittances have mostly been women whose husbands and sons have migrated. The 
effect therefore has been the empowering of these women in a largely patriarchal society. 
This is evidenced by the hiring of male labor to do chores that men would normally not do. 
Kandiyoti (1984) notes that money can bring economic power that destroys the patriarchal 
system. In this case, women with husbands, sons or daughters working elsewhere and sending 
remittances used the money to exert power on those who did not have it, including some men 
in the community. Correspondingly, the study found that in very poor households where men 
did not have much property of their own, their authority tended to be low and in some cases 
non-existent. In such households influence and authority belonged to anyone who brought 
food home. As such, anyone who brought mopane worms in large quantities or young men 
who got hired by other people and then brought money at home were respected by almost 
everyone and were observed to have authority to make decisions in their homes. 
 
5.4.2. Gendered spaces and places associated with access to mopane 
worms and mopane woodland  
 
Having established the dynamics of mopane worms and woodlands access and analysed 
complex decision patterns on their use at home, this section examines the complexity and 
dynamism of the gendered nature of the two resource tenure regimes by highlighting spaces 
and places where men and women used and exerted control over the management of Mopane 
worms and woodlands. Several scholars (Fortmann and Bruce, 1988; Rocheleau, 1988; 
Leach, 1992 among others) have argued that women’s spaces are difficult to find because 
they are ‘in between spaces’ that are not so useful to men but yet useful to women because 
they use them for their survival.  Identification of such spaces and places can help illuminate 
the type of rights that women enjoy and whether such rights afford them decision-making 
powers with regards to mopane worms and woodland use. Kabeer’s (1999) ‘gender relations-
based on power approach’ and Rocheleau and Edmunds’ (1997) approach to the complexity 
and dynamism of gendered resource tenure regimes are used to analyse access, use and 
control of Mopane worms and woodlands within gendered spaces and places in the study 
area. 
 
                                                 
38
Interview with Bulilima CEO and observations made by villagers during group discussions 
in all the wards under study. 
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The study found out that the main tenure categories where mopane worms and woodland are 
collected were areas around homesteads, communal grazing areas and areas in and around the 
CAMPFIRE project. It is crucial to note that access to natural resources in most rural 
communities in sub-Saharan Africa is closely linked to land tenure systems. Communal land 
titling is dually governed by informal and formal institutions in Zimbabwe. Informally, there 
is customary law which is enforced by traditional rulers such as chiefs, headman and the 
village heads. Under this law, men and women seldom have identical claims to land. In most 
cases, men assume control of land and its associated resources meaning that women have to 
negotiate access through spaces not deeply coveted by men. This study found out that men 
generally enjoyed more de-facto control of all the land in the area while women generally 
used usufruct rights to access the resources found on the land. Their access to Mopane worms 
and other resources was found to be as a result of complex negotiations and renegotiations 
over spaces that were not so significant to men. Although formally restored by the Traditional 
Leaders Act of 1999, after being removed by the Communal Land Act of 1982, the Rural 
District Council (RDC) continues to disregard traditional leaders when it suits them (Profile, 
USAID Country, 2005). Formally, communal land is governed through the Communal Land 
Act which has transformed through the following Acts: Acts 20/1982, 8/1985, 21/1985, 
8/1988, 18/1989 (s. 32), 3/1992, 25/1998, 22/2001, 13/2002.
39
Under the Communal Land 
Act, the ultimate control of the land is vested in the country’s President while the RDC , with 
the approval of the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, may 
authorize any person or class of persons to occupy and use, any portion of Communal Land 
within the area of such rural district council.
40
 
 
The study established that while collection of mopane worms and woodlands was done in 
more than one tenure category, there were prominent areas where the bulk of these worms 
were collected. More than 60% of household heads noted that mopane worms were mostly 
collected from grazing areas while about 29% noted areas around homesteads as source areas 
(see Figure 5.6 below). The CAMPFIRE area, because of its long distance from most 
communities (approximately 30km from the last homesteads), is not a major mopane worm 
collection source particularly for women. Women tended to concentrate on areas around 
homesteads and grazing areas while men could be found in the areas in and around the 
CAMPFIRE project where they herd their cattle and also collect resources. Discussions with 
                                                 
39
Communal Land Act, Chapter 20:04 
40
Communal Land Act, r Chapter 20:04 
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men in all the wards revealed that such preferences were influenced by societal perceptions 
on manhood.  Being seen around homesteads was perceived as a sign of weakness and 
timidity. Such beliefs are consistent with studies done by scholars such as Dianzinga and 
Yambo (1992); van Dijk (1999); Dkamela (2001); Tiani (2001); Timko et al. (2010), and 
Tobith and Cuny (2006) who argue that women prefer using resources from areas close to 
home while men prefer areas further from home. Such preferences could be influenced by the 
fact that women have other roles that confine them to their homes, such as taking care of 
children and other home chores. The ‘Other’ part in Figure 5.6 was said to be areas within 
communities such as farming fields and neighboring commercial farms. Farming fields, like 
areas around homesteads, were also found to be controlled by respective households and de-
facto owned by men through inheritance. Commercial farms were quite far from the 
communal areas hence less accessible for most communal members. As such, fewer 
resources were collected from there.  
 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.6 Land tenure arrangements where Mopane worms are collected (Responses 
were collated for all the three wards) 
 (n)=90 
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Just as was the case with mopane worm collection, firewood was also collected in all land 
tenure areas available to the communities (see Figure 5.7 which shows collated responses 
from all the wards). More than 60% of the households pointed out that the bulk of firewood 
was collected from communal grazing areas while about 30% highlighted the area around the 
homestead as another major source. The grazing areas were situated further away from 
homesteads, an average distance of more than 6 km and 8 km according to the ward councilor 
of Bambadzi and Makhulela councilors respectively. The ward councilor of Dombolefu could 
not tell the specific average distance but estimated that it was also some distance away from 
homesteads. Firewood is bulky, hence difficult to carry over long distances for many women. 
As such, boys also contributed in the collection of firewood as noted in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.7 Land tenure arrangements where mopane firewood is collected (Responses 
were collated for all the three wards) 
(n)=90 
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It is important to note that while communal grazing areas were said to be far for women to 
collect firewood, the same group had no challenge accessing mopane worms from those 
faraway places. This could be explained by the fact that mopane worms are a more valuable 
and easy to gather source of income and livelihood for women than firewood. Women were 
thus prepared to walk long distances in search of the worms. 
 
While Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicate places where Mopane worms and woodlands are clustered, 
they however do not reveal the gendered nature of these places. The fact that customary law 
and other social prescriptions influenced by community norms, beliefs and institutions put 
more control of communal land and its associated resources under the control of men, albeit 
in a de-facto scenario, meant that women had to negotiate their access to resources. Part of 
this negotiation included identification of those landscapes considered undesirable by men. 
For instance, areas around homesteads were found to constitute such landscapes. While 
women did not have exclusive rights in these areas, they however had established user rights 
to access resources found there including mopane worms and firewood. Decisions on access, 
use and control of live mopane trees remained the preserve of men. The trees provided men 
with poles for various uses that included fencing, building and construction of cattle kraals. 
Women were found to have rights to collect resources such as mopane worms and dry 
branches for firewood from ‘men’s trees’. They gained these rights through social norms and 
institutions such as marriage or some other male relationship. Their general lack of customary 
rights meant that they could not be allocated land in their own right. Areas around 
homesteads are examples of in-between spaces that are not deeply coveted by men as noted 
from a discussion with local men from Mbimba village, Bambadzi Ward: 
 
It is embarrassing for a man to be seen loitering around homesteads, worse if he is 
seen amongst women collecting mopane worms close to homesteads. In our society 
that is unmanly. Areas around homesteads are reserved for women and children (FGD 
with local men at Mbimba village, Bambadzi ward. 22 April, 2014). 
 
While social beliefs and practices around ‘manhood’ ensured that men utilised resources from 
grazing areas or other areas further away from their homesteads, they still retained control 
over decisions on all key resources whether close or further away from home. For instance, 
the study found out that households had a tendency of privatising land around their 
homesteads as a management technique and such decisions were generally made more by 
men than women. In a focus group discussion with men from Dombolefu Ward, Village 29, it 
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was revealed that one way of ensuring sustainability of Mopane woodlands within the 
community was to privatise areas around individual homesteads through fencing. Similarly, 
another voice from Bambadzi Ward confirmed this: ‘every homestead needs a man to protect 
its trees otherwise people will cut them’ (FGD for men in Mbimba Village, Bambadzi, 20 
December, 2013). A similar view was expressed at Makhulela: ‘people tend to respect a 
home with a man or husband that’s why they would not dare cut trees around such homes or 
even pick firewood. However households headed by women at times face challenges of 
people not respecting boundaries’ (FGD with women, Makhulela 1 Village, 2 January 2015). 
 
The quotations above are very critical in that they demonstrate entrenched culturally-
constructed belief systems in society. Most communal areas in sub-Saharan Africa have 
fundamental beliefs regarding leadership structure, patriarchal and power relations. As 
Nnoko-Mewanu et al. (2015) point out, there is a coherent and unified belief about the nature 
of power and who wields it within rural communities. These belief systems result in the 
general exclusion of women from decision-making processes. Consequently, some women 
may not believe that questioning their own exclusion is a viable option (ibid).The quotations 
thus demonstrate forms of internalised disempowerment embedded in norms and beliefs 
which play on women’s sense of self-confidence and are oblivious to their right to influence 
decision-making. 
 
Privatisation of land around homesteads, nevertheless, ensured exclusion of other people 
from accessing mopane worms and woodland resources near homesteads that did not belong 
to them. This benefitted women in that it helped protect big mopane trees that are good hosts 
to mopane worms ensuring a constant supply of this livelihood resource around their 
homesteads. In the words of one woman: ‘trees around our homesteads are safe because we 
monitor them. At least we are assured of Mopane worms almost every year because of those 
trees’ (FGD with women from Makhulela 1 Village, Makhulela Ward, 27 July, 2014). These 
findings were consistent with other studies done in Zimbabwe. For instance Katerere et al., 
(1999), in a study of forest resource management in Chihota and Seke communal areas in 
Zimbabwe, concluded that communities were active agents in monitoring their woodland and 
forest resources in the absence of clearly defined rights over forest use and control. 
 
While privatisation of land around homesteads was a common practice in all the wards under 
study, it should be pointed out that boundaries were decided arbitrarily and those who had 
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influence could privatise large areas around their homesteads. Conflicts were therefore 
inevitable: 
 
Each household controls areas around it but it is very difficult to draw boundaries for 
each and every household. We have had numerous cases of conflicts as people 
unknowingly either cut trees; collect firewood or mopane worms in areas that are 
beyond their boundaries. They are not really serious conflicts but the fact that these 
boundaries are not defined means that we will forever have these misunderstandings 
(Chief village head, Village 29, Dombolefu Ward, 10 February, 2014). 
 
Most conflicts related to extraction of resources from someone’s ‘private land’ were easily 
resolved by the village heads through dialogue. However, some biases in passing judgements 
were observed in some cases. For instance in two conflict resolution meetings attended by the 
researcher in Bambadzi and Makhulela, it was observed that one’s political affiliation played 
a key role in winning or losing the dispute. From the two meetings, judgments favoured 
ZANU PF sympathizers despite both having been caught cutting wood in other people`s 
‘private’ land. It was argued in Makhulela for example, that land belonged to the state hence 
every Zimbabwean was entitled to it. Such an argument had the effect of paralyzing the 
opposition because a counter argument was usually treated as a challenge to the ZANU PF 
party and the consequences were always dire. The extent of ZANU PF’s power was therefore 
reflected in these two meetings. Furthermore, conflict resolutions tended to exclude women 
from participating: 
 
Whenever there are boundary conflicts between households, the chief village head 
calls for a meeting that involves other village heads and local villagers. In such 
meetings it is usually men who talk and decide on how the boundaries should be like. 
It is difficult for us women to have a say in such matters because we are considered 
people who came to marry hence cannot argue with those who were originally there 
(referring to men) (FGD with women from Mbimba Village, Bambadzi Ward, 23 
May, 2014).  
 
Customary practices and beliefs were used to exclude women from actively participating in 
conflict resolutions yet decisions passed impacted on them directly. For instance, the fact that 
women coveted areas around homesteads more than any other group meant that any conflict 
resolution decisions passed on such areas had a direct effect on their access to resources in 
those areas. For instance, resolutions passed in Makhulela and Bambadzi, that all resources 
belonged to every Zimbabwean, was not favorable to women because it meant increased 
competition for resources such as mopane worms. 
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Institutions inhibiting privatisation of areas around homesteads were either weak or non-
existent. Wealthy households tended to privatise large pieces of land around their homesteads 
compared to other households. Perhaps their wealth gave them agency to grab as much land 
as they could. This however is not to claim that the poor had no agency at all. For instance, 
the study discovered that in Dombolefu Ward, the poor played a key role in the collection of 
mopane wood from the grazing area. The long distances from homesteads to grazing areas 
where most of the wood was collected created positive agency for the poor who were usually 
hired to collect wood from those areas. One villager commented: ‘good firewood can be 
accessed from a grazing area which is very far. We often hire some other villagers but at 
times they refuse hence one has to pay them more to convince them to go’ (Interview with 
maNcube (not her real name), a woman from Dombolefu Ward, 22 March, 2014). Grazing 
areas were also said to be frequented by elephants making them dangerous places. As such, 
hired labor was at times very expensive. In Makhulela, wealthy cattle owners often had to 
pay more in order to secure services of cattle herders.  
 
The point stands that privatisation of land around homesteads was an informal tenure system 
based on acceptable social norms and beliefs. Customary law around land ownership and 
distribution still applied when, for instance, there was a need to create space for a new 
homestead.
41
 The councillor for Makhulela stressed this point when he highlighted that local 
authorities such as chiefs and the RDC still reserved the right to use land because it belonged 
to the community. The councillor’s understanding of community as a homogenous group 
living in harmony was superficial in that some community members seemed to be more equal 
than others. For instance, women’s access, use and control of resources in privatised spaces 
were at the mercy of men and community institutions. Men decided whether to privatise or 
not. Moreover, women had access to resources in such places provided local institutions 
allowed them to. Their user rights could be usurped at a moment’s notice.   
 
Nevertheless, while men made decisions on the control of woodlands around homesteads, 
decisions on how Mopane worms should be used at home revealed that men had less 
influence compared to women or any other person who harvested worms (see Figure 5.8 
below). 
 
                                                 
41
Customary law in this case includes parcelling out of land by village heads, headman and in 
some cases chiefs, for construction of homesteads.  
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Source: Primary Field Data 
Figure 5.8 Decision-making on how Mopane worms should be used at home 
(n)=90 
 
Mopane worm activities at home could therefore be said to be claimed spaces for women 
where they exercised their influence in decision-making. The following comment 
demonstrates women’s perception of their ability to make their own decisions about mopane 
worm activities: 
 
When it comes to Mopane worms, nobody tells us what to do with them at home. If 
the harvest is good we sell some and keep some for family consumption. The money 
we realise from these sales is used for purchasing foodstuffs or subscriptions to our 
social clubs. We make all these decisions by ourselves and this makes us feel 
important at home (FGD for women from Mbimba Village in Bambadzi Ward 23 
May, 2014). 
 
While households and places around homesteads were found to be predominantly women`s 
spaces, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, communal grazing areas were found to be 
places dominated mostly by men and boys. This is where boys herded cattle while men used 
the area to harvest mopane poles and in some cases mopane worms: ‘grazing areas are places 
125 
 
where men can harvest worms, meet other men and discuss issues pertaining to cattle politics 
and other community issues away from women’ (FGD for men from Dombolefu, 30 May 
2014). It was evident from the group discussions that a man earned respect from other man 
by getting his resources (mopane worms, woodlands, medicine, etc.) in areas further away 
from home and one regarded as homosocial. In all the three wards, the grazing areas were 
found to be further from the homesteads and characterised by thick forests.  Distance and the 
thickness of the forest in the grazing areas were highlighted by men as deterrents for most 
women except during times when mopane worms were in abundance. During such times, 
women invaded the grazing areas in groups (observations made by the researcher during the 
course of the study period). 
 
Distinct men and women’s spaces were identified in the grazing areas. Men were found to 
hold primary rights on resources found in this area through customary laws which vested 
powers of decision-making and control of grazing lands on them. Bulilima is generally a 
cattle district with most of them owned by men. Cattle are a symbol of wealth and power 
hence the importance of grazing areas. This therefore meant that men had absolute decision-
making powers when it came to the use of grazing lands. They had the power to exclude or 
include users depending on the nature of the resources being exploited or used. Those women 
who owned cattle were found not to have much influence on grazing issues. Men were 
however prepared to let women access mopane worms and firewood as long as they did not 
interfere with grazing issues.  
 
In Bambadzi ward, the ward councilor confirmed that the communal grazing area known as 
Esidakeni
42
 was exclusively meant for cattle from Bambadzi area (Interview with Bambadzi 
Ward councilor, 23 May 2014). Conflicts however, often arose as cattle from other wards 
were said to frequent this grazing area. The perception among local leaders from Bambadzi 
(village heads and the councilor) was that villagers from other wards deliberately let their 
cattle onto their grazing land because of the good pastures they had. Solving grazing conflicts 
was found to be very complicated because it depended on the status of the owner of the cattle 
found grazing. For instance, the study established that being a member of the War Veterans 
Association (WVA) provided immunity to one’s cattle. They could graze anywhere in the 
district. The councilor for Bambadzi even commented that, ‘it will be bad to remove cattle of 
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 Esidakeni is an area set aside for grazing in Bambadzi. The local vernacular name is 
Ndebele and refers to areas with lot mud (Bambandzi councillor, 23 May, 2014). 
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those comrades who fought to liberate the same grazing areas that we enjoy today’. The 
situation was found to be the same in Makhulela where local villagers, mostly men, 
complained that their grazing areas were being ravaged by cattle from other wards yet there 
was nothing they could do because those people were connected to the ruling elite. 
 
There were, however, few complaints from men with regards to outsiders collecting mopane 
worms in the same grazing areas. In fact, community institutions (both traditional and 
modern) were found to be weak in monitoring access to mopane worms and firewood in the 
grazing area. Mopane worms, for example, were harvested by people coming from all corners 
of the country. The researcher had an opportunity of observing these harvesters who 
deliberately set up camps in the forest. Further enquiries by the researcher confirmed that 
monitoring of natural resources depended on the will of men in the communities: ‘anyone can 
harvest mopane worms Esidakeni, it’s a free area. There are no rules preventing anyone from 
doing that’ (FGD ordinary men from Bambadzi Ward, 23 May 2014). Yet the same men had 
pointed out that there were restrictions in grazing of cattle at Esidakeni. Local village heads 
had a different view, arguing that all resources were managed and protected by a traditional 
system through customary law that prevented outsiders from exploiting local resources.  
 
These contrasting views underscore the inequalities perpetuated by local institutions in the 
study area. Village heads, who were mostly men, believed that by excluding outsiders from 
grazing their cattle in the local grazing land, they would have protected all resources found in 
the grazing area. However, they only applied the customary law to suit the interest of men 
while those resources vital to women (mopane worms and firewood) were left as open access. 
Local women had to compete with outsiders for these resources. Grazing areas therefore, 
assumed multiple tenure arrangement systems that included open access and common 
property. The customary law, for instance, was operationalised to exclude outsiders from 
grazing their cattle in the community grazing areas but was relaxed when it came to the 
access of other resources such as mopane worms and firewood. What emerges from this 
analysis therefore is that institutions such as customary law and marriage tend to influence 
the exclusion of women from participating in key decision-making forums. Their lack of 
primary rights with regards to resources in the grazing areas compromised their decision-
making abilities. 
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The CAMPFIRE project area was also identified as a place where access to natural resources 
was gendered. Various actors contested and negotiated for spaces to access and control the 
resources. The CAMPFIRE itself was run by the RDC through its conservation committee 
which had sub-CAMPFIRE committees in all wards that benefited from the project. As a 
community based natural resource management programme (CBNRM), CAMPFIRE sought 
to demonstrate that communities that exist with or live close to wildlife can benefit through 
everyday management of use and access to wildlife resources (see for example DNPWLM, 
1984; Madzudzo, 1997). This implied that those communities had equal access to wildlife 
and other resources found in the CAMPFIRE project area. The study, however, established 
that not only were there inequalities in benefits from CAMPFIRE outputs but also that there 
diverse claims and power dynamics that affected access and use of resources. For instance, 
the project area was found to be contested and claimed by various groups for various reasons. 
The Kalanga/Ndebele communities claimed the area as part of their traditional grazing place. 
Group discussions with men from Bambadzi and Makhulela established that 
Kalanga/Ndebele communities had grazed their cattle in the area since the pre-colonial era. 
This is where they sent their cattle for lagisa.
43
 The area had also been occupied by the San 
people who claimed to have been the indigenous dwellers. Indeed, literature revealed that 
they were moved from the area during the inception of the CAMPFIRE project in the late 
1980s (see Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995).  
 
These contestations over the ownership of the area point to the fact that it has undergone 
various management systems under different groups (the original Rozvi, the San, the 
Kalanga/Ndebele, the colonial government and the post-colonial government) (ibid). It was 
inevitable that conflicts would emerge because of the value attached to that area. The most 
prominent conflict that has persisted into the post-colonial period is that of cattle owners and 
the Bulilima RDC over access to the CAMPFIRE area. Interviews with selected cattle owners 
revealed feelings of animosity towards the CAMPFIRE project itself. Cattle owners saw the 
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 “Lagisa is a form of transhumance practised by people in the communal areas of 
Matabeleland. It involves the seasonal movement of cattle from one area to the other, in order 
to extend the grazing range. Cattle ownersor employees move into the lagisa and make a 
temporary shelter, umlaga, which they abandon at the end of the season. In the 
Bulilimamangwe lagisa area, some of these shelters are almost permanent. Owners return to 
these shelters each year. In conversation, people refer to these shelters by the name of the 
owner. However, in the ideal model, no individual owns any part of the lagisa area which 
belongs to the community as a whole” (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1996: p 6). 
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project as a violation of their rights to a grazing area they considered to be traditionally theirs. 
In contrast, the RDC saw CAMPFIRE project as a significant development initiative in the 
district. The CEO argued: 
 
People who have large herds of cattle are very selfish because they are not 
considering other poor villagers who are benefiting from that CAMPFIRE project. 
They are thinking about themselves and they have convinced some politicians that 
their cattle are better than the CAMPFIRE programme. Now the project is slowly 
dying. But as council we have made a decision to evict them because the law is clear 
they must leave. We will go there with the police (Interview with Bulilima CEO at 
Plumtree, 15 May, 2014). 
 
While men claimed the CAMPFIRE area mainly for grazing, women claimed the same place 
for mopane worms and thatch grass. Thatch grass harvesting was found to be an old activity 
for women in Bulilima, dating back to the colonial era (Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1996; 
Dzingirai and Madzudzo, 1999). The activity continued under the CAMPFIRE project where 
women were allowed to harvest mopane worms and thatch grass. There were no restrictions 
on the amount they could collect. However, conflict between cattle owners and the RDC has 
compromised women’s access to thatch grass. As a way of fighting the RDC, for instance, 
cattle owners now allow their cattle to graze in the area all year round thus finishing all the 
grass. According to Madzudzo and Hawkes (1996), before the establishment of the 
CAMPFIRE project, grazing in the lagisa area used to follow a known pattern that allowed 
for women to also have access to the grass. The pattern was that between November and 
April, cattle would normally graze locally and around homesteads especially when the rains 
were good. Between May and July, the cattle were turned into the fields after the harvest to 
eat crop residue. They were only taken to the lagisa grazing area between August and 
October. Grass would have dried and nearly grazed off around homesteads.   
 
Significant to note as well, is that women’s access to resources in and around the CAMPFIRE 
area depended on the values attached to particular resources. A good example is that women 
easily accessed Mopane worms because men and the RDC did not attach much importance in 
the resource. However, it was different with thatch grass because it constituted part of 
pastures. Men assumed control of the resource and allowed their cattle to graze all year 
round. They drew legitimacy from customary law which gave them decision-making powers 
over the grazing area. Women were excluded from participating in any decision-making that 
had to do with the lagisa grazing area. The RDC, on the other hand, was found to be 
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interested more in management of wildlife, perhaps because of the economic benefits that 
accrued to the council through safari hunting. The ongoing conflict between cattle owners 
and RDC over use and control of the CAMPFIRE area thus resulted in complete disregard of 
women’s participation in the CAMPFIRE project. 
 
The San people resident in Makhulela constituted an interesting group that could not be 
ignored in the analysis of natural resource management in and around the CAMPFIRE area. 
They claimed the CAMPFIRE area as their homeland and wished to be returned there. Their 
village head summarized their sentiments this way: ‘We were better off where we were 
because we could hunt and there were plenty of resources such as mopane worms. We lived a 
good life with no one telling us what to do’ (Village head representing the San community, 
25 May 2014). They still frequented the area in search of resources such as mopane worms 
and wild fruits though they were no longer allowed to hunt any wild animals. 
 
The gendered spaces and places concept needs to be put into perspective in relation to the 
decision making and resultant power dynamics in those spaces and places.  The data gathered 
revealed distinct tenure areas where actors extracted mopane worms and wood. Women were 
found to concentrate more on areas around their homesteads while men preferred areas 
further away from their homes. Moreover, the study found that women tended to use informal 
institutions to access resources while men called upon formal ones. These dynamics can be 
more explicitly understood through the integration of Roger’s (1975) conceptualisation of 
‘Female forms of power and the myth of male dominance.’  According to Rogers, men 
occupy themselves with work that is further away from the domestic sphere
44
 while women 
centre their activities in and on their homesteads. This study has also proved this to be true. 
Rogers further postulates that men’s control of decisions outside the domestic sphere is 
problematic in that there are other powerful forces which make real decisions. For instance, 
while men were said to be in charge of the grazing areas or areas around the CAMPFIRE 
project, the study demonstrated that institutions such as the RDC and other government 
departments such as the Forestry Commission (FC) made crucial decisions on resource use 
and access. The cutting down of Mopane trees, for example, was an offence punishable by a 
fine or prosecution by the FC officers. The RDC controlled the lagisa grazing area and had 
legislative powers to prosecute cattle owners who insisted on grazing their livestock there. 
                                                 
44
Domestic sphere in this study is referred to as the homestead and areas immediately around 
the homestead where women exert some form of control. 
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The RDC rarely exercised those powers because some of the cattle owners were backed by 
powerful political actors such as war veterans. As such, conflicts between the RDC and the 
cattle owners were rarely taken to a court of law. Men’s general lack of influence at village 
level was also demonstrated by their failure to exclude outsiders from grazing their livestock 
on local grazing. Such outsiders tended to be those with links with the ruling ZANU PF. A 
case in point was the war veterans group which proved to be more powerful than most local 
institutions. In contrast, women were found to have real decision making powers within their 
households. It was also noted that areas around the homesteads were sometimes privatised at 
the instigation of women. This demonstrated women’s hidden power, their ability to convince 
their men to privatise land so that they (women) could easily access resources that they could 
also monitor. 
 
Despite their lack of real power at the village level, men still retained authority and prestige 
as heads of families. It was questionable though whether prestige and authority equated to 
actual power for decision-making. Evidence from the study revealed that decisions on the use 
of resources at home lay largely with women while areas outside home were largely 
controlled by external forces such as the RDC, organisations linked to the ruling party such as 
War Veterans Association, Women’s League, Youth League and state departments such as 
the FC. This however, did not mean that men completely lacked agency within their 
communities. Cattle owners, for example, used collective action to challenge the RDC for a 
space to graze their cattle in areas set aside for the CAMPFIRE project. Moreover, the fact 
that some cattle owners were also war veterans further strengthened their bargaining power. 
As such, the RDC could not take the matter to a court of law even though it was within its 
rights to do so. 
 
5.4.3. Key institutional structures on Mopane worms and woodlands 
management 
 
The main institutional structures identified as responsible for the management of natural 
resources in the study area can be divided into formal and informal structures. Formal 
structures included government and quasi-government organisations such as the VIDCO, the 
WADCO, the DA, the RDC and its natural resource management committees, and technical 
government departments such as the FC. Informal structures were mainly those associated 
with traditional leadership (chieftainship, headmen, village heads, and spiritual religion) and 
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various social groups such as burial societies, church groups and other women’s informal 
groups. Christianity was also found to be significant in influencing decision-making on 
natural resource management issues especially among women. The institutional structures are 
presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 below.  
 
As noted in Table 5.4, the study established a complex network of institutional structures at a 
village level that influenced access, use and control of natural resources. Analysing the role 
played by each structure was crucial to understanding how institutions shaped the outcome of 
resource management and how the structures affected men and women’s roles in natural 
resource management in the area. Decentralization policies in Zimbabwe and other sub-
Saharan countries sought to transfer decision-making powers to low level institutions such as 
the ones presented in Table 5.4 below. It was pertinent therefore that the study establishes the 
pattern in which natural resource management decision-making powers were decentralised 
and into which institutional structures. 
 
In order to understand the influence of institutional structures on mopane worms and 
woodlands management, household heads were asked to rank institutional structures in a 
scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the least visible and 10 being the most visible. The results are 
shown in Table 5.5 below. 
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Table 5.4 Village level institutional structures involved in mopane worm and woodland 
management in Bulilima District 
 
 
Idea adapted from Nemarundwe (2003). 
 
 
Category Structure Constitution Status Mandate 
Traditional 
structures 
(informal) 
Chief 
 
 
Lineage, nominee, and 
State confirmation 
 
 
Active Custodian of local 
culture, enforce 
resource use rules.  
Headman Lineage nominee by chief, 
appointed by Minister of 
Local Government and 
Urban Development 
Active  Mediate in 
disputes and 
allocate communal 
land 
Village heads 
(Sobhuku) 
Lineage nominee by 
headman, appointed by 
chief. 
Active Custodians of the 
land, Spiritual 
guidance 
Spiritual religion 
(Manyangwa) 
Spiritual 
Censure 
Active Protect people 
from disasters  
Social groups Church 
(Christianity) 
Voluntary Active Spiritual and moral 
support 
Burial 
societies 
Voluntary, 
Subscriptions 
Active Moral and material 
support  
Government & 
quasi-
government 
statutory 
structures 
(formal) 
VIDCOs  
 
Elected  
 
Active 
when 
called 
upon 
Legal mandate for 
land Allocation 
WADCOs Elected Active 
when 
called 
upon 
Spearhead 
development 
Link community to 
RDC 
District 
Administrator 
(DA) 
Appointed and statutory Active Legal mandate to 
manage traditional 
systems  
RDC 
(Councilors) 
Elected and 
Statutory 
Active at 
ward 
level 
Legal local 
authority in the 
district. 
Committees 
(Committees 
are run by the 
RDC) 
Conservation 
Committee (has a 
conservation 
department which 
oversees all 
CAMPFIRE 
activities) 
5 Elected councilors plus 
the council chair. 
Government departments 
such as EMA, Forestry, 
Agritex, Health etc. are ex- 
officious 
Active Monitor use of 
natural resources  
Village  
Conservation 
Committees  
Elected Dormant Monitor use of 
natural resources 
in the villages 
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Table 5.5 Institutional structures ranked according to their visibility in the study area 
(total possible score is 10) 
 
Institutional structures Ranking 
Traditional structures, mostly village heads 5.6 
Councilors 5.5 
Social Groups 5.47 
Forestry Commission 2.75 
Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX)  2.23 
RDC committees (conservation committee, village committees, CAMPFIRE 
committees) 2.3 
VIDCO 1.1 
WADCO 1.1 
 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Local traditional structures, councilors and social groups were mentioned as being more 
visible and active (see Table 5.5). State organisations such as the FC and AGRITEX and 
other quasi-government institutional structures such as the RDC and its conservation 
committees were said to be less visible and active and thus ranked lower (see Table 5.5).  
Being visible or active in the communities, however, did not imply power in decision-making 
processes. For instance, the study revealed that some lowly-ranked structures had more 
decision-making powers compared to those that were ranked highly. The most significant 
institutional structures are discussed below showing how they influenced management of 
natural resources in Bulilima. 
 
a) Traditional institutional structures 
 
The study affirmed that the traditional institutional structure played a significant role in 
controlling access and use of natural resources. However, the structure did not have 
autonomous natural resource management decision-making powers. It made use of delegated 
powers mainly from the RDC and other government departments such as the FC. 
Nevertheless, village heads were the most visible structures and were perceived by locals as 
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influential in natural resource governance in communities. They were deemed to be the first 
level of authority in the villages. For instance, the researcher was strongly advised by the 
Bulilima CEO of the importance of village heads because they were the eyes and ears in their 
villages. 
 
Ordinary villagers also pointed out that village heads were very active in the dissemination of 
information and organising villagers for development related programmes. They were also 
said to play a significant role in mediating conflicts related to livestock and grazing. 
However, village heads did not have power to sanction use of natural resources in the study 
area. A case in point is that village heads interviewed argued that the best they could do was 
to encourage people to use resources sustainably. They did not have decision-making powers 
to either include or exclude people from accessing mopane worms or woodlands. One of the 
village heads from Makhulela Ward lamented this lack of influence:  ‘If people break local 
rules related to use of natural resources we just talk to them and advise them against that. We 
have not been given any powers to punish such people’ (Interview village head, Makhulela 
Ward, 25 November 2014). He further noted that most village heads operated through 
directives from the RDC or FC. This was quite intriguing because under the Traditional 
Leaders Act, there is a clear structure of reporting with village heads getting their orders from 
the headman. In this case, instructions were said to come from multiple authorities indicating 
complexities in resource management in the area. Moreover, the utterance by the chief village 
head of Makhulela demonstrates the powerlessness of village heads as they expect to receive 
powers from other institutional structures in order to effectively monitor resources in their 
villages. 
 
The ineffectiveness of village heads in sanctioning and controlling use of natural resources 
was acknowledged by the locals in all the wards. Councillors were singled out as the most 
powerful local leaders in monitoring natural resource use. They had the capacity to exclude 
or include people in natural resource access: ‘In our village, our councillor has been in the 
forefront in ensuring that people who come to harvest Mopane worms in our village get 
permits before doing so. Our village heads only talk but rarely do anything about these 
people’ (FGD with women from Mbimba Village, 10 January, 2015).  
 
The researcher had an opportunity to attend some of the meetings where village heads 
interacted with councillors. Councillors often dominated decision-making processes and 
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generally influenced the flow of discussions. There are several explanations for this scenario. 
First, most traditional authorities did not have much education, with the most educated 
having done a Zimbabwe Junior Certificate (ZJC). Councillors on the other hand were more 
literate, having completed Ordinary Levels (O’level). As such councillors tended to dominate 
public discussions. The chairman of council, who represented all councillors in Bulilima, 
explained this situation in the following words: ‘Most traditional leaders are not educated to 
be able to interpret by-laws in the Traditional Leaders Act. Chiefs, for example, abuse their 
powers because of this ignorance prompting councilors to intervene so that villagers can get 
correct information and leadership’ (Chairman of council, 22 December 2013). 
 
The quotation above demonstrates entrenched conflicts between traditional and council 
leadership. Furthermore, the chairman of council made it clear that effective leadership could 
only come about if directed by councillors who were democratically elected compared to 
traditional leaders who had inherited their positions. The fact that traditional leaders were 
uneducated was regarded by the chairman as a weakness which could only be solved by 
allowing councillors to have total authority in their rural communities. It was also revealed 
that some traditional authorities did not have the confidence to fully apply their powers 
because of the treatment they received from the colonial government and liberation 
movements (ZANU and ZAPU) during the war of liberation and from the new government 
during the Gukurahundi period. This point is fully explained by Mandondo (2000a) and is 
also discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
It is also important to note that headmen and chiefs were found to be less involved in the day 
to day management of natural resources in the area. Headmen in particular were absent in the 
three wards. In Makhulela the headmen was said to have died and the community was still 
waiting for the Minister to appoint someone else. In Bambadzi the headman did not reside 
within the community. He was said to be employed somewhere in Plumtree town and there 
was someone acting on his behalf. In Dombolefu, the headman was non-existent because the 
Minister had not appointed one since the death of the one in the early 2000s. The absence of 
headmen in the study area created a leadership vacuum allowing councillors to take 
advantage. Commenting on this issue, the councillor of Bambadzi argued that ‘headman 
Mbimba is always absent and that creates administrative problems as village heads do not 
know where to report hence they end up coming to me’. 
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According to the DA of Bulilima, there were five chiefs in the district (Masendu, 
Madlambudzi, Mphini, Kandana and Sithole). Discussions with the CEO revealed that while 
chiefs were custodians of all natural resources in areas they presided over, they were not 
actively involved in management of the resources. They delegated most of the duties to non-
existent headmen and to the village heads. Their influence on access, use and control of 
resources was said to be minimal, being reduced to mere custodianship of the resources.
45
 
Their decision-making autonomy was curtailed by the fact that they were made a subsidiary 
of the council where they were said to be ex-officio members who did not vote. The 
implications are that decisions made by traditional authorities are subject to approval by other 
structures such as the council, government departments like FC or other government linked 
structures. 
 
b) Social group structures 
 
Social groups existed for both men and women. For women, the groups were said to provide 
a strong social capital and support system. While men’s groups were mostly formed along kin 
and age lines, women’s were much more diverse, involving women of different age groups 
and kinships. The study established that all men’s groups did not have any names while 
women`s groups included some associational names. In Bambadzi, the researcher was 
introduced to Masakhane (Lets build each other) group which was prominent because it was 
headed by the councillor’s wife. In Makhulela, the group visited was known as Vukuzenzele 
(Wake up and work for yourself) while in Dombolefu the researcher was introduced to a 
group known as Masiyephambili (Let us go forward). One similarity between these groups 
was that they all had monthly subscriptions which were accumulated to be shared at the end 
of the year. Subscriptions varied between 10 and 15 United States dollars.  The names given 
to the groups were instructive. They symbolised some form of activity, action or 
development. This nomenclature showed that women were not a dormant group. The names 
suggested the championing of self-development. It was revealed in one of the discussions in 
Makhulela that such groups together with other social gatherings such as churches and burial 
societies, created platforms for discussing a range of social and economic issues. Rogers 
(1975) notes that women’s informal groups often provide a strong power base from which to 
operate in society. In this study, they acted as information centre, creating new opportunities 
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See Traditional Leaders ActChapter 29:17 of 2001 
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for women. One woman remarked: ‘Last year I exchanged my two 50kgs of mopane worms 
for very durable pots and plates from a relative of one of our church members who lives in 
Bulawayo’ (Interview with a woman from Makhulela who traded in mopane worms, 22 
November, 2014).Women`s groups thus provided a strong support system and an economic 
net that helped create spaces for their autonomy. The subscription groups for example 
empowered women economically at the end of the year because they could purchase 
Christmas goodies without bothering their husbands.
46
 The above immediate points are 
supported by various scholars (see Chimedza, 1988; Rocheleau, 1991; Agarwal, 1994) who 
noted those women’s groups created new spaces where women could gain access to natural 
resources. In this study, these groups improved women’s social capital which they also 
exploited for economic gains such as new markets for mopane worms. Groups relying on 
subscriptions however, faced challenges as members did not always have funds. The majority 
of women pointed out that their major source of money was remittances which was subject to 
their husbands or relatives’ continued employment wherever they resided. Mopane worms 
were also highlighted as a source of money though this was heavily dependent on the 
seasonality of the resource. 
 
c) Spiritual religious structures   
 
Traditional religious beliefs practiced through sacred shrines were found to exist in the 
communal areas of Bulilima. The most revered of them all was the Manyangwa cult which 
historically represented the Kalangas’ spiritual beliefs. It survived the onslaught of 
colonization when Ian Smith’s party, the Rhodesian Front, attempted to control people from 
Bulilimamangwe through deposing Kalanga chiefs and imposing Ndebele ones as custodians 
of traditional beliefs (Msindo, 2012).  At the time of conducting this study, the cult 
represented different ethnic groups (Kalanga, Ndebele, San) residing in Bulilima and 
Mangwe Districts. 
 
One of the important roles of spiritual religion in Africa was to protect natural resources 
through traditional religious beliefs enforced through community norms by traditional leaders 
(Fortmann and Nhira, 1993; Matowanyika, 1991). The Manyangwa religious cult was found 
to be an example of a spiritual religion that protected natural resources and communities in 
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Discussion with women from Masiyephambili group in Dombolefu. 
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Bulilima and Mangwe areas. The shrine was visited every year by a group of villagers to 
perform religious practices closely related to rain-making. It was believed to be responsible 
for bringing good rains that ensured abundance in ecological products such as mopane worms 
and woodlands. Indeed the abundance of mopane worms was closely linked to the happiness 
of the Manyangwa cult.
47
  For instance, the poor outbreak in 2013 was attributed to the 
punishment being meted on the people of Bulilima for a number of reasons that included 
failure to honour the ‘Gods’ or failure to respect sacred days48 (also see Box 5). 
 
The general perception among villagers interviewed was that Manyangwa’s influence on 
natural resource management was waning. Indeed there have been some studies that 
concluded that the migration of people with different religious beliefs has weakened the 
power of sacred areas around Zimbabwe and other African countries (see Nemarundwe, 
2003). Similar observations were made in Bulilima where Christian influence has contributed 
to the weakening of ancestral beliefs. Among the villagers interviewed, only a few people 
still believed in Manyangwa spiritual cult. Observations revealed that going to Manyangwa 
had degenerated into a practice of fulfilling a cultural role. This was not helped by the fact 
that some traditional leaders who were custodians of spiritual beliefs were themselves 
Christians. For instance, the late headman Mbimba from Bambadzi Ward was reported to 
have once told his people that those who performed rain-making ceremonies at Manyangwa 
cult should make sure that it rained only in their fields because he himself believed in Jesus 
Christ not traditional spiritual religion. The study also established that there were notable 
tensions between spiritual religious believers, who happened to be mostly older people, and 
Christian believers who were of the younger generation. The infrequency in Mopane worm 
outbreak and recurrent droughts were being blamed on Christians who were said not to 
respect spiritual beliefs and religion. It was noted by village heads in all the wards under 
study that the sacred day of Wednesday, when everyone was not supposed to be engaged in 
any physical work was no longer respected by some people, especially Christians. Box 5 
below explains how the practice of observing the sacred day works. 
 
 
                                                 
47
Interview with traditional leaders and other elders in the study area.  Similar sentiments 
were also raised by Phathisa Nyathi, a well-known historian in Zimbabwe who has done 
extensive research on Kalanga and Ndebele ethnic groups in Matabeleland region. 
48
  Focus group discussions for village heads in Makhulela and Dombolefu, 22 and 23 
December respectively. 
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Box 5 Sacred day in Zimbabwe`s rural communities 
 
The failure to observe the designated sacred day in the week is not only causing tensions in 
Bulilima but also in other local communities around Zimbabwe. For instance the Member of 
Parliament for Chirumanzu District of Zimbabwe, the Honorable Auxilliar Mnangagwa, wife 
of one of the two Vice-presidents of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, castigated 
Apostolic and Pentecostal churches for disrespecting chief Chirumanzu and the local 
traditional culture by working on a sacred day of Chisi.
49
 While the chiefs are empowered to 
enforce customary laws in their communities through the Traditional Leaders Act, the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, which represents the supreme law of the land, has a provision that 
permits freedom of worship, meaning that Christians or any Zimbabwean for that matter can 
worship anytime they want. With an increase in the number of churches and people 
converting to Christianity compared to ancestral spiritual beliefs, evidenced by mushrooming 
of Christian churches all over Zimbabwe, it is not surprising therefore that customary 
influence is diminishing in many rural communities in Zimbabwe. The CEO of Bulilima 
further argued that spiritual religion and spiritual shrines also faced challenges from the state 
which disregards local knowledge on the management of spiritual shrines: 
 
Religious shrines such as Manyangwa still exist though its leadership has been 
seriously weakened over the years. The problem is that people confuse traditional 
chieftaincy with knowledge of religious shrines or sacred areas. Some people believe 
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The sacred day of Chisi (in Shona tradition) has to do with a day set aside for recognizing 
the spiritual power that brings blessings to people. On this day, no member of the community 
may work in the fields (https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/09/07/mnangagwa-berates-church-
leaders/). In Ndebele/Kalanga the same day is referred to as usukulwezilo (day of rituals). 
African rural communities have a traditional day of rest. In Zimbabwe isiNdebele speaking 
people call it usukulwezilo meaning a “sacred day” while Shona speaking people call it chisi, 
meaning “holy day” (see Bakare, 1997; Bourdillon 1987; Mtapuri and Mazengwa, 2013). 
Bakare (1997) notes that this day has been observed by rural peasant farmers as part of their 
religious beliefs and as a way of showing respect to the ancestors. Such a day (akin to the 
Sabbath) was one that was sacred and violation had serious consequences ranging from being 
struck by lightning or suffering some serious misfortune emanating from the wrath of the 
ancestors. It was believed that their anger was expressed through violent misfortunes and for 
atonement; one had to pay a heavy material price. 
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the chiefs by virtue of being traditional leaders are custodians of Manyangwa. Chiefs 
know nothing about religious shrines because it was never their preserve to control 
them. There were always religious people with powers believed by the community. 
The government in its promotion of traditional leadership has failed to support 
religious leaders (Interview with Bulilima CEO, RDC offices, Plumtree, 20 January, 
2014). 
 
Phathisa Nyathi, one of the most renowned historians and cultural commentators in 
Zimbabwe lamented the disappearance of spiritual religion in Africa: 
 
The rightful people to preserve spiritual religion or spiritual shrines have either been 
pushed away by those who claim to know yet they don’t or they have converted into 
Christianity for fear of being ridiculed in society. Either way one cannot rule out the 
State’s deliberate effort to weaken the spiritual belief system because it is aware of its 
power and influence. During the liberation war, spiritual religion contributed to the 
successes of liberation fighters and the state is aware of that. It would rather control it 
than let it be controlled by other people. I am not surprised that chiefs have been made 
custodians of these shrines yet most of them know nothing about spiritual religion 
(Interview with Phathisa Nyathi, a historian and cultural commentator in Zimbabwe, 
25 November, 2015). 
 
The quotations above demonstrate a case of the state imposing its influence by purporting to 
know how spiritual religious shrines should be managed. This is also a case of disregarding 
local knowledge in favour of state knowledge which helps it achieve its goals. By making 
chiefs custodians of spiritual beliefs and shrines, the state absolves itself of any blame. For 
example, Kalanga communities in Bulilima blamed chiefs for interfering with the 
Manyangwa cult and some of them even commented that the government should look into 
that issue and perhaps restore Manyangwa cult to its rightful custodians. As demonstrated in 
the utterance by the Bulilima CEO, conflict is now between the chiefs and local people.  It 
has been demonstrated in literature (see Mandodo, 2000a; Holleman, 1968; Weinrich 1971; 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1985; Scoones and Matose, 1993) that the relationship between chiefs and 
villagers they preside over has not always been smooth owing to the way chiefs have been 
used by successive governments to oppress the locals. In Bulilima, the study revealed that 
there was friction between Ndebele speaking chiefs and Kalanga speaking villagers. For 
instance the ongoing conflict on Manyangwa leadership as noted by the CEO emanates from 
the fact that the presiding chief Madlambuzi is Ndebele while Manyangwa spiritual cult is 
said to belong to the Kalanga ethnic group. 
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d) Government and quasi-government institutional structures 
 
The VIDCO, WADCO, FC, AGRITEX, RDC and the CAMPFIRE committees were 
identified as the government or quasi government structures operating in Bulilima. The DA’s 
office, which oversaw local governance development in the district was not mentioned, yet it 
played a critical role in influencing decisions, especially those made by traditional authorities. 
The RDC and its associated technical structures, such as the VIDCOs, WADCOs, RDDC, 
assumed prominence following Zimbabwe’s post-independence policy framework on 
decentralisation of decision-making powers. They were developed following the 1984 Prime 
Minister’s directive which resulted in a restructuring of local governance institutional 
structures (see discussion in Chapter 4). Powers of traditional authorities were reduced and 
their traditional roles of resource control re-assigned. The major reasons behind this 
restructuring was to re-dress imbalances caused by colonial neglect through transferring 
decision making powers to institutional structures that operated closely to communities and 
empowered them (Helmsing, 1991; Mandondo, 2000a). 
 
Villagers commented that VIDCOs and WADCOs did not play a significant role in 
influencing mopane worms and woodland access, use and control (see the rankings in Table 
5.4). The general perception was that the committees were active in protecting the interests of 
ZANU PF than those of the locals they were supposed to serve. One interviewee was quoted 
on condition of anonymity saying, ‘please do not quote me I might get into trouble. To me, 
VIDCOs and WADCOs only represent the locals towards national elections. That is when 
you see them moving around mobilising people to vote for ZANU PF’ (Interview with a man 
from village 29 Dombolefu Ward, 24 May, 2014). Indeed there are studies that confirm such 
perceptions and sentiments by villagers from Bulilima (see for example Mabhena 2010; 
Dekker and Kinsey, 2011 among others). These scholars argue that VIDCOs and WADCOs 
were defunct structures as they had served their duty of ensuring that ZANU PF had total 
control of rural communities, particularly those in Matabeleland region. It did not come as a 
surprise to the researcher, therefore, that these structures were resurrected by ZANU PF when 
the need arose. Ironically, some local leaders (CEO and some councilors) had positive views 
about the VIDCOs and WADCOs structures, seeing them as vital to the development of 
communities in Bulilima: ‘I believe participation in decision making in the district has been 
improved by local structures such as VIDCO and WADCO because these are close to the 
people’ (CEO, Bulilima District, 22 February, 2014). Such contradictions were found to be 
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quite significant in the understanding of power dynamics in the area. The CEO and 
councillors, most of whom belonged to the ruling party, ZANU PF, could have been 
influenced by their political alignment. The researcher could not envisage a situation where 
these actors could contradict their party as the likely consequence could be one of losing their 
jobs.  
 
In addition to literature (Mabhena 2010; Dekker and Kinsey, 2011 among others) group 
discussions also revealed that VIDCOs and WADCOs were very active prior to the signing of 
Zimbabwe`s Unity Accord in 1987.
50
 They then became passive until about mid-2000s. This 
coincided with the ruling ZANU PF’s, first ever loss at the polls in a nationwide referendum 
on a new constitution. Matyszak (2012) notes that this loss forced ZANU PF to re-strategise 
by re-invigorating local government structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs so that they 
uphold and defend ZANU PF’s ideology. Mabhena (2010) further notes that the initial 
establishment of these structures in Matabeleland region was political and aimed to control 
grassroots decisions on development issues. The dissident problem in Matabeleland region in 
the early 1980s needed to be contained by the government, hence the re-orientation of the 
VIDCO structures.
51
 
 
VIDCOs and WADCOs demonstrate the invisible power of the state at a local level. While 
these structures do not seem to serve the locals on day-to-day local development issues, they 
are however present and active when they have to promote the interests of ZANU PF. Their 
direct link with the central government gives them power and makes them feared at the local 
level. The constitution of the two committees also raises critical issues. The VIDCO, for 
example, has five positions for elected village members, of which two are reserved for 
women and the youth. It is has developed into a norm that those two positions are taken by 
those linked to ZANU PF. The chair of the VIDCO is the village head, and most village 
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The Unity Accord was signed on 22 December 1987 by Cde Joshua Nkomo, leader of the 
Patriotic Front ZAPU and Cde Robert Mugabe, representing ZANU PF. It resulted in the 
cessation of hostilities that had seen thousands of people in Matabeleland and Midland 
regions being killed by a military wing known as the 5
th
 brigade (see Catholic Commission 
for Justice, Peace in Zimbabwe, & Legal Resources Foundation (Zimbabwe),(1997); 
Mashangaidze, (2005). 
51
 Governor Mark Dube who noted in the Herald of 2nd September 1983 “The menace of 
dissidents is going to be destroyed. With the introduction of the new VIDCO system we will 
know each other at village level. Strangers will be required to produce letters of introduction. 
This will help root out robbers who steal from us and kill us”. 
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heads in the study area were either sympathetic or outright card-carrying members of the 
party. As the chief village head in Bambadzi pointed out: ‘how can one become a village 
head and lead development if they are opposed to government policies? It is impossible and 
such village heads should be removed from our area’ (Interview with the chief village head 
from Bambadzi Ward, 15 May 2014). 
 
i) The RDC  
 
While the VIDCO and WADCO are bureaucratic technical structures, the RDC is supposed 
to be an autonomous organisation with democratically appointed councillors and an executive 
CEO. It is the main organisation mandated with the management of natural resources through 
its natural resources committee. The committee is composed of five elected councillors, and a 
council chair. Government departments such Environmental Management Agency (EMA), 
Forestry, Parks and Wildlife, AGRITEX, health and various security departments are ex-
officio members of the committee. This implies that central government already has influence 
on how natural resources are managed in the communities even though the departments do 
not vote at this level. The natural resources committee has a conservation department which 
manages the CAMPFIRE project and other natural resources in Bulilima. Each village in the 
district has a conservation committee which constituted members from respective villages as 
a way of ensuring participation at various levels. 
 
Though responsible for overall management of natural resources in the district, the RDC, 
through its conservation department and committees was reported to be less active (see 
rankings in Table 5.4). The study revealed that while the conservation committees existed in 
all villages under study, they were essentially ineffective in influencing access, use and 
control of mopane worms and woodlands or any natural resource for that matter. It was 
intriguing and ironic to find out during group discussions that most villagers generally did not 
know about these conservation committees. In Bambadzi, one village head had this to say: 
 
Conservation committees in our villages do not have the capacity to monitor and 
control use of resources within communities. The people who constitute these 
committees either are too scared to convene meetings to discuss issues related to 
natural resource use or they just do not see the purpose of such meetings. A case in 
point is the harvesting of mopane worms by people who come from outside our 
communities. These committees are expected to report these people either to us or the 
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councillor but they have never done that (Village head, Mbimba Village, 22 October, 
2014). 
  
In village 29 in Dombolefu Ward, members of the conservation committee alluded to the 
challenges the committee faced: 
 
The committee lacks adequate support from local leaders such as the village heads 
and councillor. When the committee was formed we were told by an RDC 
representative that we will have powers to issue permits to those who want to extract 
our resources. However, the reality is that we only issue permits to people who want 
to collect firewood for special occasions such as funerals or weddings. Those permits 
are for free. The council does not permit us to issue permits for commercial purposes 
such as selling firewood. We have lots of firewood from mopane trees that are felled 
by elephants. Council reserve the right to issue such permits and we know they charge 
a certain amount which accrues to them yet the resources are extracted from our 
communities (FGD for Village Natural Resource Management Committee, Village 29 
Dombolefu Ward, 14 December, 2013). 
 
The two utterances above reveal that conservation committees lack capacity to influence 
decisions on natural resource use in the district. The committees do not have powers to 
exclude outsiders from exploiting local resources. In Makhulela for instance, several group 
discussions with women affirmed that mopane firewood was being exploited and carried 
away in truckloads by strangers. Ironically, these people always had letters of permission 
with an RDC or DA stamp. This was enough to discourage locals from asking too many 
questions. 
 
Below is a narrative from one elderly villager from Village 29 Dombolefu Ward, which 
summarises how local resources continue to be exploited by people from other areas:  
 
Natural resources in this community belong to people who live here. However, our 
resources are being accessed by people from other areas and we feel powerless to stop 
them. People who steal our resources have the backing of powerful institutions. We 
believe these people are supported by the government and the RDC. For instance, 
there are people who come to harvest river sand and when we ask them where they 
got the permission they produce letters with council stamps. We are not sure whether 
these letters would be genuine or not. Even if we catch them without any document 
permitting them to extract resources and take them to the council or police, nothing is 
done to them because in an hour’s time you see the same people moving around and 
threatening those who would have reported to the police. At times when we report to 
the police they tell us that we have to go to the council. The council usually does 
nothing besides telling us to go back and monitor resources ourselves. Our traditional 
leaders also cannot do anything because they do not have any powers to punish those 
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caught illegally extracting natural resources (Interview with an elderly man in 
Dombolefu, 14 December, 2013).  
 
The narrative exposes the ineptitude within the conservation committees. They are mere 
nominal structures. They are not known by many local people and yet are expected to work 
amongst them. The study also manifested some confusion on the reporting structure of the 
committees. For instance, the councillor of Bambadzi argued that all village conservation 
committees had to report to their traditional leaders while conservation committee members 
from Dombolefu were under instructions to report directly to the RDC. Such contradictions 
demonstrated lack of coordination between local leadership structures and also exposed 
conflicting power dynamics. 
 
The conservation department of the RDC was found to be active in the CAMPFIRE project 
area. It was noted that the CAMPFIRE was well monitored. Hunting in the area was 
prohibited and transgressors faced a jail term. The CAMPFIRE project had rangers employed 
to protect wildlife from poachers. However, villagers of Makhulela and Bambadzi, the closest 
wards to the CAMPFIRE project area, perceived the monitoring system as anti-human in that 
wildlife welfare was promoted at the expense of people living adjacent to the project area. 
The fact that people were not allowed to kill elephants that occasionally destroyed their 
crops, was ample evidence that wildlife was made superior to ordinary villagers. 
Furthermore, an interview with a Bulilima conservation committee officer revealed that the 
council prioritised monitoring of wildlife at the expense of any other resource. This could 
have been influenced by the fact that economic returns realised through wildlife management 
in the CAMPFIRE project were much higher than those of any other resource (see Madzudzo 
and Dzingirai, 1995; Madzudzo and Hawkes, 1995). Indeed Bond and Frost (2005) reported 
that RDCs earned a total of US$ 20.29 million from wildlife-based activities between 1989 
and 2001. According to the Bulilima CEO, CAMPFIRE funds were used to develop local 
infrastructure such as roads, clinics and schools. Information on the average annual income 
generated from CAMPFIRE was difficult to obtain as it was regarded as confidential. Local 
leaders in the form of village heads and councillors were also in agreement with the need to 
keep CAMPFIRE monitoring and conservation standards high because of the benefits 
realised. This was however in contrast to ordinary villagers who argued that they did not 
enjoy any benefits from CAMPFIRE. Cattle owners in particular argued that the CAMPFIRE 
project was taking away pastures for their cattle yet it benefitted a few people. 
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ii) The Forestry Commission 
 
The FC, an ex-officio member of the RDC natural resource committee, was also found to 
play a significant role in the management of mopane woodlands in the study area. Even 
though most villagers ranked the department lowly in terms of visibility and influence, the 
study ascertained that the Commission reserved some rights to exercise decisions on mopane 
woodland use. It regulates forest use in all communal areas of Zimbabwe through the 
Communal Land Forest Produce Act of 1987.  The Act gives the Commission the power to 
arrest those who break forest exploitation rules in communal areas. It defines forest produce 
as: ‘all vegetation dead or alive, in a plantation, woodland or forest and any part whether 
alive or dead of any such vegetation including wood, bark, seed, fruit, gum, resin or sap.’ The 
Act distinguishes major from minor forest produce. Major forest produce is defined as trees, 
palms and bamboos, while minor forest produce could be flowers, leaves, fruit and seed. Both 
are subject to a strict access and control regime. For instance, the Act gives rights to 
inhabitants of any communal land to exploit forest resources for their own use. They are, 
however, not permitted to commercialize the produce or to give it to persons who are not part 
of that community. The Act, though, allows for the Minister of Environment to issue permits 
to anyone to exploit forest resources from any communal area. 
 
Under the Communal Land Forest Produce Act (1987) the FC permitted villagers to harvest 
and utilise mopane resources for domestic use. However, observations and discussions with 
villagers revealed that the FC lacked capacity to enforce the regulations of this Act. For 
instance, villagers from Dombolefu and Makhulela claimed that outsiders were frequently 
exploiting their firewood and river sand yet no arrests were being done. Furthermore, the 
entire district was serviced by one officer whose mobility was curtailed by shortage of 
vehicles. As such, the FC could only effectively monitor Dombolefu and other areas close to 
Plumtree Town where its offices are located. The study established that the Commission was 
generally more concerned with timber based forest products because that is where most of its 
revenue comes from.
52
 Mopane woodland, despite its abundance in Bulilima District, is not 
known for commercial timber. In most cases, income from Mopane woodland is generated 
through selling of firewood, an activity which is not done on large commercial scales. 
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Interview with Forestry Commission officer, Plumtree Town 16/10/2014 
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However, with increased frequency of power cuts in Zimbabwe
53
, the value of woodland is 
likely to increase significantly. 
 
5.4.4. Gender management of institutional structure 
 
Analysis of composition of membership in natural resource management structures revealed 
that representation varied from one structure to another (see table 5.6). 
 
The majority of traditional leadership positions were occupied by men with only 3 village 
heads out of a possible 24 being women. Two were found to be from Dombolefu Ward while 
1 was from Makhulela, representing the San people. While appointment of members into 
traditional positions was based on lineage which favours males to females, two village heads 
from Dombolefu were however appointed through the instigation of the Ministry of Local 
Government in 2012.
54
 It was rather suspicious that that these two were appointed prior to the 
2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. Some village heads perceived such appointments as 
politically motivated.
55
 The two women were not traditionally linked to any lineage that once 
held village head positions. As such, they commanded little respect from other village heads 
and even community members. 
 
The position of women in terms of leadership in institutional structures was different in 
Dombolefu compared to other two wards. Further research revealed that Dombolefu`s 
relatively recent establishment (1987) compared to the other two wards which have been in 
existence since the early 1950s contributed to the settlers’ liberal attitude towards women’s 
assumption of leadership positions.
56
 Additionally, the council chairman pointed out that 
families in Dombolefu were of relatively younger generation compared to the other wards 
and hence were more tolerant to the idea of women in leadership positions.  
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See reports from:  Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe power cuts to 
persist for 10 years: official, 02/12/2015; NewsDay, Power cuts no longer laughing matter, 
September 23, 2015; Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority (ZESA) raises Hwange closure alarm, November 30, 2015. 
54
 Interview with male village heads from Dombolefu, 22 May, 2014. 
55
This was an interview with male village heads from Dombolefu ward, 22 May, 2014. Their 
perception was that the ruling party wanted to ensure support from women by elevating some 
of them to leadership positions. 
56
 Information obtained from the Bulilima Council records, 23 May, 2014. 
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Table 5.6 Membership in institutional structures representing three villages under 
study 
Institutional structure Total 
members 
Number 
of men 
Number 
of 
women 
Comments 
Traditional 
leadership 
Village heads 
(Sobhukus) 
24 20 3 The three women inherited 
positions from their 
husbands 
Headman 3 3 0 This position is 
traditionally meant for men 
and is inherited 
Chiefs 2 2 0 Customary law ensures that 
chieftainship is usually 
inherited by a man unless 
the president decides to 
appoint a woman. 
VIDCO* 21 7 14 Women were found to be 
only committee members. 
WADCO* 33 20 13 WADCO constitutes of 
chairpersons and 
Secretaries of all the 
VIDCOs hence the number 
of men is higher because 
chairpersons of all 
VIDCOs are men while 
secretaries are women.  
Conservation committees in 
the villages 
15 5 10 It was very difficult to 
establish the figures of 
village natural resource 
committee members. These 
figures are based on 
estimates given by village 
heads who agreed that 
women dominated these 
committees.  
Conservation committee of 
the RDC 
5 5 0 The Conservation 
committee of the RDC is 
comprised of five 
councilors who are elected 
from councilors in the 
district. All members of 
this committee are men. 
The ex-officio government 
departments (AGRITEX, 
Forest Commission, Parks 
and Wildlife etc.,) were all 
represented by men. 
Source: Primary Field Data 
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*WADCO committees include all VIDCOs of the three wards meaning all villages in all 
wards are represented. VIDCO committees on the other hand have 7 members each hence the 
total of 21 in three villages under study. 
 
It must be noted however, that even though women occupied leadership positions, they were 
still considered weak by their male counterparts. In one of the group discussions which 
combined men and women, men accused women of being very soft and too accommodative 
to strangers who exploited their resources (FGD of combined men and women from 
Dombolefu Ward, 15 April 2014).  Such accusations were however not substantiated because 
even in communities where men were in leadership positions, resources were still exploited 
by outsiders. 
 
The combined number of women in all VIDCOs from the three wards was double that of men 
(14 to 7 see Table 5.6). At face value, it indicated significant participation of women in 
leadership positions. The reality on the ground was different. VIDCOs were found to be less 
active. In some villages, members of the VIDCO were not even aware that they were part of 
this committee. The study also revealed that the general public was not aware of who 
constituted the committee. Only VIDCO chairs
57
 were found active, carrying out decisions on 
behalf of the VIDCO committees. Decisions made by VIDCO chairs often benefitted leaders 
at the top than villagers below. For instance, VIDCO chairs were found to be involved in 
politics, constantly encouraging other villagers to promote ZANU PF policies and programs 
and shun anything from opposition parties, particularly the MDC.
58
 
 
Women’s lack of representation in leadership positions resulted in men making decisions on 
their behalf. In all the three wards, women argued that their views in local forums were rarely 
considered while those ‘in charge of the community’ always made final decisions. Societal 
norms were stacked against them. To illustrate this, one woman from Mbimba Village in 
Bambadzi said, ‘If you are a woman and you indicate intentions of challenging a man to a 
certain post, people look at you in an accusing manner as if you have suddenly turned into a 
rebellious woman’ (FGD for women from Mbimba, 10 May 2014).The study further noted 
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 A VIDCO chair is a chief village head who reports to the headmen and councillor. 
58
FGD with village heads from Makhulela and Mbimba. Village heads, some of who are war 
veterans clearly supported government policies often arguing that there was no room for 
people who supported opposition parties in their villages. 
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that women were excluded from leadership positions in some institutional structures because 
of lower educational status compared to their male counterparts. A case in point was the 
councillor of Bambadzi who was very clear that leadership positions in his ward should be 
reserved for those who had at least completed O’ Level. In a study on the Causes of Non-
Retention of Masendu Ward Girls at Secondary School, Nxumalo et al. (2010) noted that rate 
of school drop-outs  was significantly higher for girls than boys. Some of the reasons 
identified included financial constraints which forced families to choose to send boys to 
school over girls, early pregnancies which forced girls to leave school, long distances to the 
schools which discouraged a lot of girls and many other challenges. While education does not 
really translate to good leadership, the study found that it was being used as a way of 
discriminating against women. The councillor of Bambadzi was even blunt enough to say, 
‘There is nothing they can tell me with regards to leadership because they did not even finish 
primary level. I managed to complete O’ Levels hence I am more knowledgeable than them’ 
(Interview with Bambadzi Councilor, 22 April, 2014). Such comments by the councilor 
however require unpacking because of the assumption that completing O` Level studies 
equates to being knowledgeable. There are different types of knowledge which include local 
knowledge and modern scientific knowledge. Part of aim of this study was to analyse the 
significance of local environmental knowledge regarding natural resource management. 
Local environmental knowledge was conceptualized as a combination of various forms of 
knowledge and did not necessarily depend on one’s education (see Chapter 1). As such, 
women’s lack of formal education was not directly correlated to their lack of natural resource 
management knowledge. For instance, analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that women had more 
knowledge on the processing of mopane worms compared to men. They knew at which size 
mopane worms should be picked and how they should be cooked in order not to violate 
cultural beliefs and norms. The councilor’s comment could therefore be viewed as a problem 
of perception. He could have been more educated than his sisters, but not more 
knowledgeable than them. 
 
There were more men than women in the WADCOs. Moreover, all chairpersons of the 
WADCOs were found to be men while women became members of the group by virtue of 
being secretaries in their VIDCOs.
59
 As a result, women became less represented near the 
apex of the leadership structure. Most important decisions were carried out at the RDC level 
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 Ward councillors are chairpersons of WADCOs and these represent the wards at RDC 
level. 
151 
 
where most leaders were male. Resolution of conflict over use and control of resources in the 
CAMPFIRE area was found to be negotiated at the RDC level between cattle owners, who 
were predominantly male, and the council. Women’s rights to access thatch grass, for 
example, were ignored because women lacked representation at such high levels.  
 
The RDC conservation committee which constituted five elected councillors, council chair 
and sector ministries was found to be composed of men only. In contrast, conservation 
committees selected within villages had more women than men (see Table 5.6). The village 
committees were found to be generally weak in influencing decisions on natural resource 
management. Part of the weakness could be explained by the fact that these committees were 
led by women who were culturally viewed as inferior to men by their society, hence less 
likely to make decisions that could be taken seriously.
60
 
 
While there was generally a significant number of women participating in institutional 
structures, their absence from leadership positions should not be viewed literally as a sign of 
weakness. Rogers (1975) argues that women in communal areas are comfortable with men 
taking leadership positions in the public domain. Much as that is the case, this should not be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness but an index of conformation to social and cultural norms. It 
has been reported in literature that in most societies, modern or traditional, men tend to 
monopolise positions of authority and are more involved in formal political institutions 
compared to women (see for example Stephens, 1963; Rogers, 1975). Rogers further argues 
that analysis that considers the formal level of political processes as the most significant 
element misses the point because it only sees things in binary terms, that is, men as the most 
powerful and women powerless.  The reality is that women too have power which is sourced 
through informal processes as already demonstrated in some sections of this chapter. The 
question which arises therefore is: which of these two forms of power is the most influential 
in natural resource management in Bulilima? It has been demonstrated in this chapter that 
men preferred domains external to their households yet these were domains coveted by  other 
powerful forces. Women on the other hand preferred their households, small in nature but 
being domains where they exercised absolute control. Formal leadership positions held by 
men in all the wards were of significance in that they were decision making positions but 
there was general lack of autonomy among those leaders. Despite the rhetoric of 
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Information derived from an interview with the chief village head of Makhulela, 10 
February 2014. 
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decentralisation and devolution, the Zimbabwean government remains extremely centralised 
with local leaders constrained in their decision-making powers. 
 
Discussions with women in all the wards revealed an interesting common trend concerning 
their perception of leadership. Age seemed to play a critical role in their view of leadership in 
traditional structures. While the older women saw leadership positions in traditional 
structures as a preserve for men, younger women viewed that as just another way of 
institutionalising oppression of women. They argued that since most men were moving to 
Bulawayo, South Africa or Botswana, women should be allowed to occupy some leadership 
positions. They also stated that the installation of some women as village heads signified that 
culture was no longer an impediment.  Indeed in-depth literature search revealed that the 
exclusion of women from leadership positions in traditional structures had nothing to do with 
culture or tradition but rather colonial policies that sought to disempower women by 
removing them from public and political administration (see Schmidt, 1966; Makahamadze et 
al., 2013). The young women who challenged the set up in the communities were not actually 
violating any traditional norms even though it was highly unlikely that they had knowledge of 
the pre-colonial era traditional leadership set up.  
 
5.4.5. Using the power cube framework to analyse spaces of participation  
 
a) Findings on spaces of participation 
 
This section used the Power Cube framework to analyse physical spaces of participation 
available to community members. The study considered participation as an approach that 
took many forms, occurring along a continuum from active consultation to complete transfer 
of authority and responsibility to stakeholders (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996:17). It was also 
considered as an approach that could increase economic and managerial efficiency of natural 
resources in the following ways; allowing local populations who bear the cost of natural 
resource management to make decisions, rather than leave them in the hands of outsiders or 
unaccountable locals; reducing administrative and management transaction costs via the 
proximity of local participants; using local knowledge, values and aspirations in project 
design, implementation, management and evaluation (Murphree, 1999; Katerere & 
Mohamed-Katerere 1996; Matowanyika,1997; Mohamed Katerere, 1996).The study adopted 
Agarwal’s (2001) ‘typology of participation’ (see Table 1.1). The Power Cube analysis 
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framework describes three spaces of participation as closed, invited and claimed spaces 
(Rabe & Kamanzi, 2012). In the IAD framework, these spaces are found in the action 
situation where actors and institutions interact shaping the outcome of mopane worms and 
woodland management.  
 
The study identified several invited spaces of participation that influenced decision-making 
practices in natural resource access, use and control at household and village levels. 
Households, for instance, provided an action situation where various individuals, especially 
within the domain of the household (father, mother, and children) interacted as they accessed 
mopane worms and woodlands. Patterns of access varied amongst these individuals as has 
been discussed in the sections above. It was established that the institution of marriage made 
home an invited space for women (wives) who came to marry into a particular family. Both 
men and women concurred that women’s decision making abilities at home should be limited 
because they were an invited group. One man had this to say: ‘Women come to our homes 
because of marriage hence cannot make decisions when men are there. In our culture women 
are like children who stand to be guided by their husbands or male partners’ (Interview with a 
man from Mbimba Village, 22 February 2015). This line of thinking also argued that the 
cultural naming of households after men meant that ultimate decisions were to be made by 
them.  
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by a yet another man from Makhulela: 
 
In this homestead I make decisions because I am the father and husband. Land and 
cattle belong to me. My wife came here because of marriage otherwise she does not 
own these things. When there is a drought, I am the one who looks for money through 
piece jobs to buy foodstuffs. Women can’t do that (Interview with an elderly man 
from Makhulela, 22 February, 2014). 
 
While home could have been an invited space for women, as argued in the preceding 
paragraphs, it has already been noted in this study and with the support of various scholars 
(Stephens, 1963; Rogers, 1975 and others) that most decisions made within households were 
in fact influenced by women. It is perhaps understandable that men would not publicly 
declare that at home power lay with their women as that would be against social construction 
of man and his manhood. Home could indeed be an invited space for women but who 
dominates in that space is subject to serious debate. 
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At community level, ‘invited spaces’ for participation were found to be public forums such as 
village meetings. As an example, the village assembly provided an opportunity for all 
villagers to attend village meetings and influence decisions regarding development issues that 
included natural resource use and management in their villages.
61
 However, such public fora 
rarely discussed Mopane worms or woodlands yet these worms were said to be significant to 
the livelihoods of local people, especially the poor:  
 
Even though mopane worms are very important for us as women, the last meeting we 
had that discussed this resource was about 4 years ago when the Rural District 
Council and ORAP wanted to build a market center for selling the worms. Other than 
that, mopane worms are never discussed even though we have complained that people 
from outside come and harvest without our approval (FGD with women from 
Makhulela 1 Village, 20 April, 2014). 
 
During the course of the research, the researcher managed to attend at least 11 village 
meetings (4 in Mbimba village, Bambadzi Ward, 3 in Village 29, Dombolefu Ward 
and 4 in Makhulela 1 Village, Makhulela Ward).  In all of these meetings, only 3 
discussed anything close to natural resource use. Most of them discussed CAMPFIRE 
related issues, particularly the conflict between elephants and communities. While 
such gatherings created spaces for local participation, the researcher observed that 
very few villagers, mostly men, actively participated in the discussions. Further 
observation and inquiry revealed that men who tended to be vocal were those owning 
large heads of cattle. Most meetings discussing CAMPFIRE related issues often 
degenerated into verbal tirades as local leaders and cattle owners argued. Institutional 
structures such as the RDC and sometimes Parks and Wildlife often threw their 
weight behind the CAMPFIRE project. It was thus evident that most of the 
CAMPFIRE meetings were not for village engagement but for passing on information 
to the villagers regarding what to do and how to behave when faced with the problem 
of elephants. For instance, one CAMPFIRE officer said: The problem of elephants is 
caused by the villagers themselves as they let their cattle with noisy bells into the 
CAMPFIRE area thereby disturbing the elephants. Now they are complaining and 
want us to shoot the elephants. That we will not do and we will not allow anyone to 
touch those elephants. In fact CAMPFIRE is much more important than what the 
villagers gain from their fields (Bulilima CAMPFIRE officer, Bulilima RDC, 26 
April, 2014). 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the Bulilima CEO: 
 
The problem of elephants is not new and is directly caused by villagers who think 
because they have lots of cattle then they can do as they please. They send their cattle 
to the CAMPFIRE area in defiance of council regulations. However, we have since 
decided not to entertain them anymore. We are soon going to inform them to either 
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Village assembly comprises all members of a village over the age of 18 and is presided by a 
Village Head (Sub-sections 14(2) and (3) of the Traditional Leaders Act). 
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respect the council decision or risk being charged (Interview with CEO Bulilima 
District, 26 April, 2014). 
 
Meetings arranged by the FC official to discuss the state of Mopane woodlands in the study 
area were usually reduced to platforms for passing on information instead of engaging the 
villagers. In one of the meetings attended by the researcher in Makhulela, the Forestry 
Commission official threatened villagers with arrest if they were found selling firewood. 
Villagers argued that there was plenty of firewood as a result of elephants felling large 
mopane trees. The youth in particular, felt that they could exploit this resource and earn a 
livelihood through selling it. 
 
Local leaders (village heads, councilors, the CEO) disputed that passive participation of 
villagers in public fora was a sign of disempowerment. They saw these village meetings as 
decision-making forums where decisions were made after a democratic discussion. Reality 
however was that most of the decisions were reached because the public seemed scared of 
publicly challenging the status quo. Having resided in the study area for over four months, 
the researcher observed that villagers generally exhibited some form of fear towards their 
local leaders. They rarely challenged these leaders for fear of victimization. One woman 
interviewed summed the relationship between villagers and their leaders in the following 
comment: 
 
It is very dangerous not to attend ‘their’ meetings because you will be singled out and 
accused of pushing certain political agendas. Almost everything here is linked to 
politics and most of our leaders are part of ZANU PF. It is best to just go to the 
meetings and listen than to be singled out and victimised (Woman interviewee, 
Mbimba Village, Bambadzi Ward, 22 April, 2014). 
 
The above quotation is very important and deserves further analysis. ZANU PF as a political 
party was fingered as a hidden force. It acted as a source of power for many local leaders 
associated with it. It was therefore inconceivable that these local leaders could make any 
decisions that contradicted the objectives of ZANU PF. As such, some villagers indicated that 
they attended local meetings not to positively participate but to avoid victimisation. If local 
leaders were viewed as acting on behalf of the ruling party, then this gives credence to the 
point already raised in this chapter that men’s perceived power in the village could be a myth. 
Their decisions were thus subject to approval by the party. Those that did not belong to the 
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party, for example MDC councilors, found it very difficult to make decisions that were 
respected within their communities. 
 
The influence of ZANU-PF was further observed at the local level through an institutional 
structure of war veterans which had since become a de-facto custodian of party principles and 
agendas. In a group discussion with war veterans from Dombolefu, it was made plain that 
war veterans championed the ideology of nationalism where natural resources occurring 
locally could be accessed by any citizen of Zimbabwe. Such an ideology, however, had the 
tendency of disadvantaging the locals as powerful outsiders exploited local resources without 
paying for them. This was found to be the case in Dombolefu where it was reported that 
people extracted river sand and firewood without sanction because they were powerful 
individuals. 
 
While meetings were regarded as forums of decision-making where every member of the 
village could air their views, the youths were usually conspicuous by their absence. They felt 
that attending such meetings was a waste of time because their views were rarely considered. 
Youths from Dombolefu for example, argued that their wish to sell mopane firewood from 
Mopane trees felled by elephants was met with ridicule by their councilor. Youths from 
Makhulela, particularly young men out of school, felt that they were always victimised by the 
RDC rangers who accused them of hunting in the CAMPFIRE project area. As such village 
forums can be considered closed spaces because they were found to be unpopular with the 
youths. 
 
The analysis on decision-making practices in village forums showed that the quality of 
participation was generally of a low standard in Bulilima. One interesting finding was the 
contradiction between local leaders and local villagers with regards to what constitutes 
participation. Local leaders felt that being physically present in meetings was enough 
participation while villagers argued that involvement in what was being discussed was better 
participation. Decisions were thus made by a few for many. Village meetings and forums 
were also found to be closed spaces for the San community in Makhulela (See case study of 
the San community in box 6). 
 
157 
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Interview with Councillor of Bambadzi, Mr Nyathi (28 April, 2014). 
63
Interview with the Village Head representing the San people in Makhulela. Her name is 
MamareeKwenga Moyo also known as NaZangule. She does not know her age though she is 
thought to be around 90 years now. 
Box 6 Case study of the San community in Makhulela.  
An analysis of the San community as a case study was found appropriate in this study 
because the San constitute a unique community within the predominant 
Kalanga/Ndebele communities. They follow a distinct way of life and respond uniquely 
to various institutions affecting them. The San community, now presently located on 
the fringes of Makhulela originates from an area known as Mabhongane/Maitengwe, 
presently a CAMPFIRE project area. This area is bounded by Makhulela Ward, 
Bambadzi Ward, Hwange National Park boundary fence, Ward 7 in Tsholotsho across 
the Nata (Manzamnyama) River and the Botswana/Zimbabwe border. The area was 
inhabited by the San from the pre-colonial era to the early colonial period (Madzudzo 
and Hawkes, 1995). The original San were a hunting and gathering people who did not 
practice any agricultural activities. This area therefore was blessed with wildlife. The 
same area was also used as grazing land by the Ndebele/Kalanga speaking 
communities. The colonial period ushered in government control and through the 1930 
Land Apportionment Act, Maitengwe fell into the hands of the District Commissioner 
resulting in the construction of the Maitengwe Dam in the mid-1960s
62
. Part of the area 
was turned into productive agricultural land where wheat was grown under irrigation 
(ibid). Ranching and safari hunting schemes were also developed for the District 
Commissioner while remaining available land was reserved as grazing for Kalanga 
cattle. The original inhabitants of the area, the San, were never considered. The influx 
of people into the San’s habitat resulted in the disappearance of wildlife. The San had 
to adapt or die. Most of them began to supplement the little meat they were still getting 
by working for the Ndebele/Kalanga as cattle herders. 
63
 The introduction of 
CAMPFIRE in the late 1980s resulted in the complete relocation of the San people 
from Mabhongane to a small village called Sibasa in Makhulela. An organisation 
known as the Redd-Barna was responsible for the relocation of the San people to their 
present location (Interview with Makhulela Councillor, 20 December 2014). 
 
The study found that the San in Makhulela were living under extreme poverty. An 
interview with their village head revealed that their present location had made them 
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b) Quality of participation in invited spaces 
 
The quality of participation in invited spaces tended to vary between spaces created at home 
and those created in the village. While men boasted of being the overall decision-makers, 
discussions with various groups of women from the three wards revealed that women played 
crucial roles in giving valuable advice to their men. At village level, the quality of 
participation was very low. Observations by the researcher revealed that most of the villagers, 
especially women, participated passively during meetings. Those villagers that seemed to 
participate actively had a unique characteristic that empowered them. For instance, villagers 
who owned large herds of cattle were usually vocal and tended to argue in unison. There 
more vulnerable to food insecurity compared to where they used to live before 
relocation: ‘Since arrival in this area, we have gotten poorer and poorer. We do not 
have money or livestock. We now depend on work we get from the Kalangas’ (Village 
head representing the San, gogo Mamaree Kwenga Moyoat, Makhulela, 19 June 2014). 
Relocation was meant to assimilate them to the Kalanga and Ndebele/Kalanaga 
communities so as to improve their lives. Even though most of the San now speak 
Kalanga and a bit of Ndebele, they are still regarded as outsiders. They have very 
limited spaces for participation hence decisions are often made for them. They rarely 
attend any local meetings nor do they hold their own meetings. There is therefore a 
serious lack of agency among the San which is exploited by other people, especially the 
neighbouring Ndebele/Kalanga groups.  
 
In a group discussion with the San people, it was revealed that while the San would like 
to participate in local meetings convened by local leaders, they found it difficult 
because of the treatment they received from Kalangas or Ndebeles. Of the four local 
meetings I attended in Makhulela during fieldwork, I only met a group of four San men 
who attended one meeting after the councilor had sent people to fetch them. It was said 
that the women flatly refused to attend. It is thus significant to note that while local 
leaders in Makhulela (Councilor and other village heads, besides the one representing 
the San) felt that village forums were open to the San people, the San themselves felt 
that these forums discriminated against them. According to the San, it was impossible 
for them to influence any decision even those that directly affect them. 
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were also those villagers who were active ZANU PF members and believed that they had the 
right to make decisions for others. Noteworthy, and in relation to the topic of this study, very 
few of the village meetings really discussed mopane worms or woodlands management. The 
only resources that were ever discussed in all the meetings I attended related to the 
CAMPFIRE programme, with a focus on wildlife management. This is very central to this 
study as it shows the lack of importance that the authorities attached to mopane worms and 
woodlands, yet such resources were found to be vital for local people’s livelihoods.  
 
In two separate group discussions with village heads in Bambadzi and Makhulela, it was 
revealed that the reason why mopane worm management issues were rarely on the agenda in 
village meetings was that the outbreak of mopane worms was infrequent hence not worth 
discussing. This however was in contradiction to what different groups of women in different 
villages thought: 
 
In CAMPFIRE meetings we have raised the issue of people coming from outside our 
district to harvest mopane worms but we are always told that those issues will be dealt 
with in the next outbreak. When the outbreak comes nothing happens and we see the 
same people from as far as Bulawayo coming to camp here harvesting and finishing 
worms while we are in the fields…maybe the problem is that men do not see the 
importance of Mopane worms as much as women do (FGD with women from 
Mbimba Village, 23 July, 2014). 
 
Yet another group remarked: ‘We heard there was a marketing area that the council was 
building so we can sell our worms at a profit. Every time we raise this in a meeting we are 
told it will be looked into but it never does…we have since decided to keep quiet’ 
(Discussion with women from village 29 at Dombolefu Ward, 1 August 2014). 
 
What can be deduced from the two statements above is that while women see the value in 
mopane worms and would like to contribute to the management of worm production and 
marketing, they are finding that space closed particularly by men who, it would appear, do 
not see much value in the worms. It should be noted though, that decisions on the 
management of the resource were made even with less involvement of local men of Bulilima.  
As an illustration, a decision was taken in 2011 by Bulilima RDC and an unnamed NGO to 
construct a marketing area for mopane worms in Bulilima district without consulting the 
villagers who harvest and sell the worms. When asked about this project, most villagers 
indicated having heard of the project as a report from their village heads. It was not clear why 
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the RDC decided to exclude the local villagers from deciding on the processing factory. The 
CEO however gave an unsatisfactory response that time was of essence when donors offer to 
sponsor a project hence; consultations can become laborious and time consuming.  
 
It was also learnt that village forums that discussed management of mopane woodlands were 
mainly called and chaired by the FC official. Such meetings were very few and far apart in 
Makhulela and Bambadzi (only 1 in Makhulela and 2 in Bambadzi, the entire 2014) because 
these wards are quite far from FC offices in Plumtree town (approximately 120km and 80km 
respectively). More meetings were conducted in Dombolefu. Locals reported attending more 
than 5 meetings in 2014. Dombolefu is about 10km from Plumtree town. The researcher had 
an opportunity of attending 3 meetings, 2 in Dombolefu and 1 in Bambadzi. In all the 
meetings, participation was of a passive nature as villagers just listened to what the FC officer 
was telling them. The contents of the agenda in all the meetings were the same: reminding 
villagers of the illegality of cutting trees and selling firewood. The researcher interpreted 
passive participation as some form of passive resistance. This was confirmed in a group 
discussion in Dombolefu: 
 
When people from Forestry Commission come here they threaten us with arrests and 
fines if we cut down mopane trees because they say it is now endangered species. But 
they don’t seem to understand that we use this tree for many purposes here so it is 
inevitable that we will cut it down…. Of course it is very difficult to argue with the 
Forestry commission official because he uses technical scientific language that we 
don’t understand and always mentions the law so we are afraid we might get arrested 
(Discussion with men from Village 29, at Dombolefu, 5 August, 2014). 
 
A similar sentiment was expresses by one old man from Makhulela: 
 
I have attended 2 meetings called by Forestry Commission in the last 5 years. They 
were teaching us about conservation issues. They told us not to cut down trees 
especially big mopane trees because that was illegal. We just sat and listened because 
at times they were using threatening language, talking about arrests if one is found 
cutting down trees. But it is impossible not to cut down Mopane trees because that is 
the only tree we have and we need to use. As far as I know, we have our own 
regulatory ways of managing the tree but now the Forestry guys are telling us to 
follow their ways because they are from government (Interview with an elderly man 
in Makhulela 1 Village, 7 July, 2014). 
 
What we learn from the two statements above is that the FC creates spaces through meetings 
to discuss mopane woodland management issues in Bulilima. However, it lacks the capacity 
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to hold such meetings more frequently. Moreover, participation in these meetings is mostly of 
a passive nature as the Forestry official often engages locals to lecture to them than discuss 
with them. The use of technical scientific language carries some form of power that scares the 
villagers into passive participation. The influence and power of the Forestry commission is 
also portrayed through legal threats to punish those who might break forestry law. While the 
FC has regulatory powers (through the Communal Land Forest Produce Act, 1987) officials 
working in Bulilima either chose to abuse these regulations or they do not understand the Act. 
According to the Act, inhabitants of the communal areas have the right to exploit any forest 
produce for their own use (Katerere et al., 1999). This means that the locals in Bulilima have 
the right to utilise their Mopani woodland to their satisfaction. The locals are not supposed to 
be threatened or denied access to their mopane woodland resources. 
 
Claimed spaces in the study were identified in the form of social groups that villagers created 
for themselves. Although that was the case, the study revealed that it was very difficult for 
local villagers to organize their own forums that excluded local leadership because of the 
polarized nature of the political environment in the study area and in the country in general. 
Self-organization for self-governance was likely to be viewed as a way of opposing 
established local structures which to ZANU PF could be viewed as a direct challenge to its 
power. It was understandable why local villagers would avoid alienating their local leaders: 
‘Why would we form forums different from the ones our leaders provide? We do not want 
people who go against what our government wants here in Makhulela. If there are people like 
that then they should leave this area’ (focus group discussion with war veterans from 
Makhulela Ward, 27 July, 2014). As a ZANU-PF dominated area, the researcher could not 
find any apparent dissenting voices. The assumption was that they were there as indicated by 
an MDC councilor in Makhulela, but were afraid to come out in the open. 
 
5.4. Summary 
 
This chapter analysed the power dynamics that influenced decision-making processes 
governing the access to, use and control of, mopane worms and woodland access in the study 
area. The predominant finding was that resource access, use and control was gendered. Power 
relations should therefore be understood within the context of different gender roles 
performed by different actors. Men, women and the youth accessed mopane resources in 
places and spaces created by institutions and institutional structures operating in the study 
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area. The study revealed that women’s spaces were not easy to identify and in most cases 
were located ‘in–between’ spaces not deeply coveted by men. Such spaces included forests 
around homesteads and grazing areas where women harvested mopane worms and firewood 
to meet their personal, household and community responsibilities. While women enjoyed 
resources ‘in-between’ spaces, they however did not have control rights over those spaces. 
They only had user rights allowing them to simply extract and use the resources. Men 
retained control rights which gave them decision-making powers. For instance, the study 
revealed that men controlled areas around homesteads and grazing. Men made decisions 
about the size of the area their homestead could privatise, hence control. In the grazing areas, 
they made decisions on who to exclude, and when, from utilising resources in the area. 
Women from the 3 villages under study argued that men tended to enforce customary laws to 
suit their own ulterior motives.. For example, customary laws were enforced to exclude cattle 
owners from other wards from grazing their cattle in the grazing areas of the communities 
under study. However, the same laws were relaxed when it came to mopane worm harvesting 
resulting in people from other areas competing for the resource with the locals. 
 
The chapter also analysed institutional structures that influence natural resource management 
at local level. Several structures were identified and classified into traditional and modern 
structures. While the villagers perceived traditional structure as being more influential in 
decision making at the local level, the study found that actual decision making powers lay 
with the modern structures which included the VIDCO, WADCO and RDC through their 
conservation committee. Traditional structures used delegated powers to enforce rules. 
Reality on the ground revealed a multiplicity of players with various decision-making powers 
that operated concurrently. The RDC for instance had the mandate to ensure that resources 
were managed in a sustainable manner. Traditional authorities, through the Traditional 
Leadership Act, also had the mandate of ensuring proper use of natural resources. 
Government structures such as Forestry Commission also had a legal mandate to sanction use 
of forest resources. The study revealed that conflicts were often inevitable. The Chairman of 
councillors for example, accused chiefs of being ignorant of the Traditional Leaders Act 
which is clear on natural resource control. Chiefs’ powers on natural resource use were 
delegated from the council. However, the Council Chair felt that some chiefs in the district 
acted as if they had sovereign decision powers to sanction natural resource use, even against 
council decisions. Decisions that related to land allocation or exclusion of some people from 
harvesting mopane worms for example, were said to rest with the councils not the traditional 
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authorities. The Council Chair cited an example where some chiefs discouraged their people 
from taking part in the construction of a trading area where people from the district could sell 
their mopane worms. The project subsequently collapsed because of lack of support. Another 
example of contestations and conflicts in decision making were revealed by chief village 
head and councillor of Makhulela. The two leaders argued during separate interviews that 
people who came from other areas to harvest mopane worms needed to get permission from 
them. The councillor argued that he had more authority to issue a permit because he had a 
stamp that made his permit official compared to village heads who only gave verbal consent. 
The chief village head argued that as traditional leaders, those in his position were in charge 
of what happened within their villages; hence they were the ones who should give permission 
to outsiders to harvest the worms. 
 
The chapter ended by analysing spaces of participation using the Power Cube analytical 
frame work. The framework identifies three spaces of participation – closed, invited and 
claimed. The study revealed that spaces of participation for the villagers were public forums, 
particularly public meetings. It was in these meetings where some important decisions with 
regards to natural resource access, use and control were made. However, participation in 
public forums was found to be influenced by varying power dynamics. For instance, women 
tended to participate passively compared to men. This was found to be caused by 
fundamental social belief systems that attribute power and leadership to men, while 
weakening women`s confidence to contribute actively to public forums. The study also 
revealed power dynamics amongst men, where respect was accorded to those who had more 
cattle. Such men were observed to be fearless in meetings, especially when the discussion 
was on grazing in the CAMPFIRE area. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN MOPANE WORMS AND WOODLANDS 
MANAGEMENT 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 analysed power relations that affected decision-making processes in access to, use 
and control of mopane worms and woodlands. It revealed that natural resource access in 
Bulilima was gendered and that any understanding of natural resource management should 
consider streamlining gender roles played by men and women. This chapter assesses the 
significance of local environmental knowledge in the management of mopane resources in 
the study area. It analyses the condition of this knowledge in the context of a dynamic society 
in which external actors have employed external scientific knowledge to justify control over 
decision-making processes pertaining to local natural resources. Knowledge in this study is 
integrated into the operation of power. For instance, this study has conceptualized power as 
constituting practices, techniques, and procedures that various actors engage in as they relate 
to one another. Such activities can be viewed as knowledge in themselves. The chapter adopts 
Beinart and Brown’s (2013) conceptualisation of local environmental knowledge as 
knowledge that emphasizes pluralism in African environmental landscapes and one that is 
shaped by particular environmental influences and resources and by specific histories. The 
chapter adopted the term ‘local’ rather than ‘indigenous’ knowledge because the communities 
under study had been highly mobile and thus more incorporated into national or global 
networks. Indigenous knowledge implies communities which have been less integrated into 
global activities (ibid). The environmental landscape in Bulilima was found to have been 
shaped and transformed by various events and trajectories which included the invasion by the 
Ndebele and the British South African Company in the 1860s and 1890s respectively 
(Msindo, 2012) and migration patterns which have continued since then. The chapter thus 
assesses local environmental knowledge that exists among various actors and institutional 
structures and how this knowledge shapes power dynamics in the management of mopane 
worms and woodlands in the study area.  
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6.2. Condition of local environmental knowledge on mopane worms and 
woodlands. 
 
The study discovered that local environmental knowledge influencing management of 
mopane worms and woodlands was interwoven into the social fabric of local people in the 
area. It is knowledge that has been passed from one generation to another through social 
activities and practices. Observations revealed that while belief systems and practices still 
existed in the study area, they now faced challenges from Western-science related knowledge 
systems. The analysis revealed that various actors or institutional structures appealed to both 
these knowledge systems in a bid to influence decisions on natural resource management. 
Levels of local environmental knowledge awareness and use were found to vary mostly by 
age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, education and religious beliefs. The state, on the other 
hand, was found to play a significant role in promoting Western aligned scientific knowledge 
at the expense of local environmental knowledge. Western scientific knowledge gave the 
state absolute power to control local resource as discussed further below. 
 
6.2.1. Local environmental knowledge on mopane woodlands 
 
Most of the local environmental knowledge used in the management of woodlands was 
generated through traditional belief systems and practices. While the study could not 
establish any ‘sacred belief systems’ associated with mopane woodlands, there were other 
practices which were employed to ensure that the woodland was used in a sustainable 
manner. For instance, there was a practice of personating big trees by naming them after local 
totems. While the practice was fast disappearing
64
, the researcher was shown some big trees 
at Mbimba village named after the Mbimba totem (izihlahla zako Mbimba: Mbimba’s trees). 
Illustrating this practice and its efficacy is the remark below: 
  
There are some big trees named after certain totems and associated with certain 
religious spirits more like some domestic animals. Such trees are usually left alone 
because people are afraid of cutting them. We do not know who gave those names but 
that has kept those trees alive (Interview with senior village head from Mbimba 
Village, 22
nd
 of April, 2014). 
 
A group discussion with men from Mbimba Village revealed that naming trees was also done 
for referral purposes: 
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 Interview with senior village head from Mbimba village. 
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Our grazing area is very thick with Mopane shrubs and bushes so much that it is easy 
for one to get lost. We have been using big trees as referral points so that we are able 
to locate our cattle or refer someone to a particular point. As such people have 
generally tended to respect such big trees. Some of the big trees within our 
community are used as meeting points for traditional ceremonies such as rain seeking 
ceremonies (FGD with men from Mbimba Village, 22 April, 2014). 
 
The two quotations above demonstrate that trees, especially mopane trees, because they were 
the dominant species, had multiple social functions. They needed to be protected through 
local management practices. Giving big trees names was a conservation measure that ensured 
respect from community members thereby minimizing chances of the trees being wantonly 
cut down. Headmen Mbimba of Mbimba Village noted that while the majority of people, 
especially those of the younger generation or immigrants, did not know why trees were given 
names, the mystery surrounding that practice served to protect a lot of big mopane trees in his 
area. He also noted that the social functions of big trees as referral points was part of local 
environmental knowledge which helped protect some big tress in the grazing area. One 
elderly man from Dombolefu gave the following quote to illustrate the importance of 
conserving big trees in areas where people live: 
 
Big trees do not only provide cool shades when it is hot but they also protect people 
and livestock during thunderstorms. Areas that do not have big trees are very 
dangerous when there is thunder because lightning goes directly to anything moving 
on the ground. Moreover, big mopane trees provide a good habitat for bees to settle 
and make honey which we enjoy a lot in this area (Interview with an elderly man from 
Dombolefu, 21 April, 2014). 
 
Other local environmental knowledge practices related to management of forests involved 
selective harvesting techniques. To illuminate this point, discussions with a group of elderly 
men from Makhulela 1 and Bambadzi revealed that it was a social norm in their areas that big 
live trees were harvested only to construct homes or cattle pens or when there was a need to 
limit tree growth for one reason or another. It was noted by most villagers that the duty of 
enforcing such practices rested on the village heads. The senior village head from Mbimba 
thus noted that: 
 
People here know that they shouldn’t just cut down big mopane trees. That knowledge 
is part of our social norms, our way of life. However, there are some people who defy 
such norms and take advantage of the fact that nothing will be done to them even if 
they cut big trees. Many of them are doing that though they know it is not allowed 
(Interview with senior village head, Mbimba Village, 24 April, 2014). 
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Mopane forests were found to be very important as sanctuaries for some religious spiritual 
ceremonies such as those related to the Manyangwa spiritual cult. As such, these forests were 
protected from depletion because people deeply revered them, especially those of the older 
generation who firmly believed in the Manyangwa spiritual cult. Young people from the three 
wards generally did not know much, nor were they concerned about the Manyangwa cult. 
They respected the forests where the ceremonies were being performed more out of fear than 
belief. A youth from Makhulela remarked: ‘We have heard of Manyangwa spiritual cult and 
we are told if you get to that forest you can disappear for days just wandering up and down 
until you die. We have never been there so we really do not know where it is neither do we 
want to get there’ (FGD with youths from Makhulela, 26 of April 2014). 
 
While the youths reported that they feared what might befall them if they tempered with 
forests where Manyangwa ceremonies were practiced, this fear cannot be expected to last 
long. That most people no longer believed in traditional spiritual religion
65
, and the growing 
trend of adopting Christianity meant that the fear of Manyangwa was likely to be eroded. 
There was therefore, a growing risk of mopane forests being harvested in an unsustainable 
manner as traditional spiritual religion that protected them became less relevant. 
 
6.2.2. Local environmental knowledge on mopane worms 
 
Local environmental knowledge used in the management of mopane worms was also found 
to be influenced by local norms and belief systems. Harvesting techniques included picking 
of big mature larvae either on trees or on the ground. Worms feeding high on tall trees were 
said to be inaccessible and thus usually left alone. The maturity of the worms was determined 
by the size of the worm. It was said that a mature worm could be as big as the middle finger 
of an average adult human being.
66
 Harvesting of big mature worms ensured a prolonged 
period of Mopane worm availability hence it meant locals had food for a long time.
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Knowledge of identifying the maturity of worms was not recorded anywhere in the 
communities. It was found to be acquired through observations as young men and women 
harvested with their parents or other elders. In one of the harvesting activities the researcher 
experienced, young girls were scolded by one old woman for picking very small worms: ‘If 
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 Group discussion with village heads from Makhulela, 22 April, 2014 
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 Interview with women observed harvesting worms at Makhulela, 22 April, 2014. 
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 Interview with an elderly woman from Dombolefu, 20 April, 2014. 
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you pick these small worms they will all disappear and might not come (sic back) for years.’ 
(Interview with an elderly woman from Dombolefu ward on the 21 April, 2014). 
  
Based on cultural and spiritual beliefs, picking of small mopane worms could have dire 
consequences such as the entire resource disappearing, something which local people could 
not afford to countenance. However, the practicality of such knowledge could not be verified 
though it ensured conservation of the worms and guaranteed future outbreaks as some would 
escape and complete the reproduction cycle.  The study also discovered that the big mature 
worms, especially those picked from the ground just before pupating, generally had little 
digested food in their guts and were said to be easier to process.  
 
Bare hands were used to pick up most of the worms. Few collectors were observed using 
gloves and these were found to be people coming mostly from the city of Bulawayo and other 
areas outside Bulilima. Mature mopane worms have hard thorns that can damage soft hands. 
People from urban areas reported that they felt uncomfortable using their bare hands. In 
contrast, the locals did not use gloves. In any case, the study established that spiritual leaders 
strongly recommended the collection of worms with bare hands, as the use of gloves was 
regarded as one of the reasons why the worms were disappearing. It is possible that the 
spiritual leaders recommended use of bare hands as a conservation mechanism as 
technologies by their very nature can quickly exhaust a resource in no time whereas using 
bare hands tends to ensure that it lasts longer. 
 
The indigenous San, as the researcher observed, seemed to prefer picking worms that were 
already on the ground to ones on trees. They collected enough for local trade with Kalanga 
and Ndebele communities. During the period of the study, few San people were seen trading 
directly with people from outside the district. In most cases, Kalanga and Ndebele would buy 
or do batter exchange with the San, meaning that the San did not benefit as much as the 
Kalanga and the Ndebele did. In short, the San were observed to be more resource conscious 
than the Kalanga and Ndebele. They ensured that there was minimal disturbance of the 
mopane tree. Besides picking worms on the surface, the San also dug those worms that had 
burrowed into the ground and pupated. Kalanga/Ndebele communities perceived this 
harvesting technique as barbaric.  The language used to describe such activity was therefore 
meant to demean and discourage the San. As one woman said at a Focus Group Discussion,   
‘Amasili (referring to the San people) eat disgusting things. They dig up mopane worms that 
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are in the ground and already changing to another form. Don’t know how they eat that 
because it’s disgusting’ (FGD with women in Makhulela, 22 April, 2014). 
 
Criticism by the Kalanga/Ndebele communities embarrassed the San communities who were 
forced to desist from the activity of digging up burrowing mopane worms even though it was 
part of their livelihood strategy. Digging up of the worms ensured that the San continued 
accessing mopane worms even long after they were finished on the surface and on trees. This 
practice by the San deserves further analysis. Unlike other people whose harvesting methods 
included breaking off tree branches (see Figure 6.1), the San’s local environmental practice 
was found to be less damaging. They preferred to let the worms come down the trees and 
then pick them. However, because of their low status in their communities, the San’s local 
knowledge was despised and considered archaic while that of the Ndebele/Kalanga 
communities was upheld. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Mpokuhle Ncube hangs from a mopane tree while harvesting Mopane worms 
in Bulilima (source, The Associated Press, Friday, January 25, 2013). 
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The processing of mopane worms was also found to be steeped in traditional conventions. 
The worms were degutted using bare hands, and then rinsed in water before being boiled. 
Boiling pots were supposed to be kept open all the time. The belief was that closing the pots 
would chase away the worms. Group discussions with local men, women and the youth in all 
villages under study revealed that this piece of knowledge was well entrenched amongst the 
locals. Management of mopane worms involved taking some of the worms to Manyangwa 
spiritual cult, for every outbreak, to thank the spirits for the worms. The belief amongst some 
locals was that Manyangwa played a part in ensuring the outbreak of mopane worms. 
Traditional leaders always led in this activity by organizing the collection of worms and 
selecting people to take the worms to Manyangwa. The chief village head from Mbimba 
pointed out that woman in particular performed the task of taking mopane worms to 
Manyangwa. He, however, could not give the reasons why women were always chosen. 
 
6.2.3. The waning influence of local environmental knowledge 
 
Much as traditional norms and beliefs played a key role in influencing knowledge on use of 
mopane resources, awareness and implementation, such traditional activities were found to be 
diminishing. In a survey conducted to gauge the level of awareness of local environmental 
knowledge, the study found out that there were more household heads who indicated 
ignorance of traditional practices regarding governance of mopane worms and woodlands in 
the study area (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). Traditional practices sought by the researcher included 
supernatural powers of religious spirits such as the Manyangwa spiritual cult. It was ironic to 
find out that there were more people who indicated lack of awareness of traditional practices 
governing mopane worm and woodland management in the 41-50 and 51 and above age 
groups. These are the age groups expected to have more knowledge on traditional practices 
than younger age groups. 
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Table 6.1 Awareness of traditional practices governing mopane worms by age 
 
 Age   Are you aware of any traditional practices 
governing mopane worms? 
Total 
Non Reponses Yes No 
10-20     2.7% 2.7% 
20-30   .9% 7.3% 8.2% 
31-40   2.7% 13.6% 16.4% 
41-50 .9% 8.2% 19.1% 28.2% 
51 and above   13.6% 30.9% 44.5% 
Total .9% 25.5% 73.6% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Table 6.2 Awareness of traditional beliefs governing mopane woodlands use by age 
 
 Sex Are you aware of any traditional beliefs 
governing Mopane woodlands? 
Total 
Non Reponses Yes No 
10-20    - 2.9% 2.9% 
20-30    - 7.7% 7.7% 
31-40 1.0%  - 16.3% 17.3% 
41-50 2.9% 3.8% 21.2% 27.9% 
51 and above 1.9% 4.8% 37.5% 44.2% 
Total 5.8% 8.7% 85.6% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Analysis of customary awareness practices by sex/gender revealed a similar trend as that of 
age presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. For instance, there were more people who indicated lack 
of awareness of traditional practices governing both mopane worms and woodlands than 
those who indicated awareness (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4). 
Table 6.3 Awareness of traditional practices governing mopane worms by sex 
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 Sex  Are you aware of any traditional practices governing mopane 
worms? 
Total 
None responses Yes No 
Male .9% 16.4% 50.0% 67.3% 
Female   9.1% 23.6% 32.7% 
Total .9% 25.5% 73.6% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Table 6.4 Awareness of traditional practices governing Mopane woodlands by sex 
 
 Sex Are you aware of any traditional functions 
governing mopane woodlands? 
Total 
None responses Yes No 
Male 5.8% 4.8% 56.7% 67.3% 
Female   3.8% 28.8% 32.7% 
Total 5.8% 8.7% 85.6% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Perceptions on the effectiveness of local knowledge in conserving mopane resources revealed 
that the majority of respondents did not have much faith in that knowledge. While they 
highlighted that local environmental knowledge was still important in conserving mopane 
worms and woodlands, the Likert scale shows that there were few who gave the ‘yes very 
much’ answer to the question on the importance of local environmental knowledge about 
mopane woodland and worm conservation (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). This could be an 
indication that the importance of local environmental knowledge is waning.  The proportion 
of those who did not know was quite high especially in the 51 and above age group in both 
tables, indicating that even the elderly had doubts about the usefulness of local knowledge. 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 Perceptions on local knowledge use and conservation of mopane worms by 
age 
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 Age Do you think local knowledge use can help conserve mopane 
worms? 
Total 
Non 
responses 
Yes Yes very 
much 
Not at all Don't 
know 
10-20   2.1%     1.0% 3.1% 
20-30   5.2%     3.1% 8.2% 
31-40 1.0% 9.3% 2.1% 1.0% 4.1% 17.5% 
41-50 1.0% 14.4% 3.1% 2.1% 8.2% 28.9% 
51 and 
above 
1.0% 13.4% 6.2% 6.2% 15.5% 42.3% 
Total 3.1% 44.3% 11.3% 9.3% 32.0% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
 
Table 6.6 Perceptions on local knowledge and conservation of mopane woodlands by 
age 
 
 Age Do you think local knowledge use can help conserve mopane 
woodlands? 
Total 
Non responses Yes Yes very 
much 
Not at all Don't 
know 
10-20 1.1% 2.1%       3.2% 
20-30   5.3%     2.1% 7.4% 
31-40 2.1% 9.6% 2.1% 1.1% 3.2% 18.1% 
41-50 3.2% 12.8% 4.3% 1.1% 7.4% 28.7% 
51 and 
above 
2.1% 14.9% 3.2% 6.4% 16.0% 42.6% 
Total 8.5% 44.7% 9.6% 8.5% 28.7% 100.0% 
Source: Primary Field Data 
While survey data portrayed a significant proportion of older citizens (41 years and above) as 
ignorant of traditional beliefs and practices influencing management of mopane resources, in-
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depth discussions with the same group revealed different dynamics. For instance, focus group 
discussions showed that most adults actually knew about some traditional norms but did not 
want to reveal that because of their Christian beliefs. One woman from Makhulela succinctly 
summarized this collective view: ‘Because many people are Christians now, especially 
women, they do not want to be associated with spirits such as Manyangwa. In most cases 
they will just tell you that they know about it but do not know what it means’ (Woman from 
Makhulela in a FGD, 24 May, 2014). 
 
The researcher further observed that most middle-aged adults did not want to be associated 
with the Manyangwa spiritual cult. The majority claimed to have heard of the spiritual cult 
but did not even know where it was. Their language and gestures showed that they did not 
believe in the tradition: ‘We have been told that we have to participate in Manyangwa 
ceremonies but some of us don’t believe in those traditional things. We are Christians and we 
believe in Jesus Christ’ (FGD with women from Mbimba, 27 June, 2014). The Manyangwa 
spiritual cult faces a number of challenges and its influence has been greatly reduced in the 
district. The councilor of Bambadzi summarized the situation in the following narrative: 
 
People still go to Manyangwa but the practice is no longer the same as it was in the 
80s and 90s. Back then people used to believe in a voice that came from Manyangwa 
shrine. Today we go there just for the sake of it. Some of us believe that the 
Manyangwa who is there is not the rightful person. We believe the man who is now 
there does not have the powers to do spiritual work as the former Manyangwa did. 
The advent of different religions, especially Christianity has also affected the belief in 
traditional religious spirits. Most Christians in the community do not believe in 
Manyangwa hence they do not partake in the practices of appeasing the ‘gods’. It is 
now a challenge to collect contributions such as maize meal, sorghum, mopane worms 
and so on, to take to Manyangwa. Those who do not believe in Manyangwa do not 
contribute. This has resulted in some conflicts between village heads and some 
Christians who argue that it is against their religion to contribute to what they do not 
believe in. There are also cases where those who are supposed to be custodians of 
traditional practices are also Christians at the same time. The late Headmen Mbimba, 
a traditional leader who was expected to promote such traditional beliefs did not 
believe in them because he was a Christian. There is a well-known story from 
Mbimba village that the Headmen once told people who were going to Manyangwa 
they should make sure that rainfall that comes as a result of their rain making 
ceremonies should fall only in their fields because he does not believe in traditional 
practices (Interview with Bambadzi Ward councilor, 22 September, 2014). 
 
This view was supported by one elderly man from Makhulela: 
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We used to fear and respect Manyangwa in this area. People used to follow every 
directive that came from there. But things have changed a lot now. Very few of us still 
believe in Manyangwa. Many people, especially the young ones and those who come 
from other areas do not believe in the spiritual cult. It is now very difficult to arrange 
ceremonies because people will tell you that they are Christians or simply that they 
don’t believe in evil spirits. The influence of Manyangwa is dying and we are now 
even ashamed of passing on the knowledge to our children (Interview with an elderly 
man from Makhulela, 22 April, 2014). 
 
The narratives in both quotations above clearly demonstrate the growth and strength of 
Christian beliefs in influencing knowledge about natural resource management in the area. It 
was evident from the study that the influence of traditional practices was diminishing and 
traditional authorities who were expected to be custodians of these practices did not have 
considerable influence to ensure their perpetuation. In a forestry policy study of Mafungautsi 
Forest Reserve, traditional authorities lamented the erosion of their authority due to young 
people who were no longer following traditional culture owing mostly to Christianity in the 
form of the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church (Mapedza, 2007). Most youths in this study 
commented that while they still applied local knowledge in their use of mopane resources, 
they did not know much about indigenous practices. They attributed their ignorance to their 
parents and other elderly people who kept this knowledge to themselves instead of passing it 
on to them.  
 
Other factors found to influence the increased undermining of traditional beliefs and practices 
included the commercialization of natural resources and the power of Western education. The 
Chief Executive Officer of the district noted that the return to the community of educated 
people – ex-teachers, nurses and soldiers – had fundamentally swayed the opinions of most 
communities with regard to the importance of indigenous knowledge and traditional 
practices. He pointed out that those with academic qualifications predominantly hold 
influential positions in the community. This has created an environment where Western 
management practices were seen as superior to local traditional ones: 
 
When we were growing up there used to be many big trees which had names. They 
were almost treated like humans. We used to have a few in our fields named after our 
great grandfathers. Such trees provided good shades and would host lots of Mopane 
worms. But they were also scary hence we did not cut them. However, with increase 
in the number of educated people and the influence of whites, people started cutting 
down those trees because they had been told that traditional religious spirits would not 
harm them. Such trees are almost finished in our area. What you see are these small 
trees now (Interview with an old man from Mbimba Village, 23 May, 2014). 
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In a focus group discussion with men from Mbimba Village, it emerged that local traditional 
knowledge related to the management of natural resources was the preserve of a few elderly 
people in the village. For instance, most men did not know much about indigenous 
knowledge associated with the use and management of mopane trees. The chief village head, 
who was turning 85 at the time, pointed out that the Mopane tree was used to predict rainfall, 
to the amazement of other men in the group. The chief village head argued that when mopane 
trees gave a lot of green leaves and seeds it usually portended drought. 
 
Commercialization had resulted in a rush to collect as much worms as possible. As such, 
harvesters tended to violate local norms of collection and processing of the worms. For 
instance, some harvesters were said to be collecting larvae that had not matured and also 
closing their pots while cooking to ensure that the worms came to a boil quickly. Some were 
said to roast the worms over a bed of hot coals (process known as ukungora, which is a 
Shona practice). There was widespread belief among the local traditional leaders and even 
other ordinary elderly villagers that the infrequency in the outbreak of mopane worms could 
be partly blamed on current harvesting and processing practices. They argued that picking of 
immature larvae angered the ‘Gods’ who reacted by punishing the people for these 
transgressions. It must be pointed out that only some old people believed in this phenomenon, 
thus highlighting the fact that only a few people were still steeped in traditional knowledge 
and beliefs. Commercialization had also resulted in an influx of people who descended on the 
district every time there was an outbreak. The researcher observed that some of the harvesters 
broke off tree branches in their attempt to speed collection or reach  worms that were high up 
a tree. Similar observations were also made by SAFIRE (2002) in their study of Mopane 
worm management in Bulilimamangwe. It was difficult to ascertain where the external 
harvesters were from.  
 
6.2.4. The State’s perceptions of local knowledge  
 
Literature on post-colonial conservation posits that most developing states inherited and 
promoted a science driven natural resource management approach from colonial nature 
conservation at the expense of local knowledge driven approaches (see for example 
Finnemore, 1996; Singh and Houtum, 2002; Mapedza, 2007 among others). Singh and 
Houtum (2002) argue that scientific disciplines have continued to create scientific 
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knowledges that have influenced contemporary governance of natural resources in the 
developing world. Scientific knowledge has been identified as a source of power used by the 
state to control natural resource use at local levels. Foucault (1980) refers to this form of 
power as ‘disciplinary power’. This was found to be the case in the study area where 
indigenous knowledge and authority were subsumed under formal state governance. An 
analysis of traditional governance structures revealed that they had become instruments of the 
state. These structures were accountable to those at the top than community members they 
were supposed to serve. As such, indigenous practices and local knowledge were only 
recognized as far as they served the interests of the state.  
 
An illustration of the last point above is that while legislations such as Communal Land 
Forest Produce Act (1987) allowed for traditional authorities to control local use of natural 
resources, it also opened local resources to state control by giving most powers to the 
Minister of Environment. Under the Act, the Minister could issue permits to anyone to 
exploit forest resources from any communal area. This means that local traditional practices 
could easily be overlooked. Discussions with the locals from the three wards revealed that the 
issue of permits was quite prevalent in the district. They reported seeing many people from 
outside the district with RDC or DA permits to harvest mopane worms, firewood and river 
sand from local rivers. Permits were reportedly more powerful than the authority of local 
traditional leaders:  
 
People from other areas come here with permits to harvest Mopane worms. Most of 
these do not know our local cultures and practices. They break branches from the 
trees and they harvest larvae when they are immature. Some even roast the worms on 
open fires, a practice that is rarely done in this area (FGD with women from 
Dombolefu, 12 February, 2014). 
 
The study also revealed that there were other state functionaries that indirectly contributed to 
the weakening of local knowledge systems. An instructive incident was an interview with war 
veterans from Mbimba and Makhulela Villages, during which it was reiterated that local 
resources exploitation should be driven by the idea of nationalism, meaning that resources 
should be made available to all Zimbabweans. This meant that outsiders could come into the 
district and harvest as much resources as they could as long as they were bona fide 
Zimbabweans. Such a discourse should be understood in the context that war veterans were 
seen as a powerful institution which often challenged local leadership in the area. They drew 
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their power and influence from having participated in the war of liberation, something which 
has become a prerequisite for one to earn the ruling party’s respect in the country. The study 
revealed that they had literally become a de facto institution in charge of resource control as 
their decisions were normally final: ‘We fought the liberation war so that all Zimbabweans 
can benefit from all natural resources in the country. As long as you are Zimbabwean from 
any corner of the country you can harvest mopane worms in Bulilima’ (FGD with war 
veterans from Makhulela, 18 April 2014). The fact that outsiders could exploit local 
resources in an unsustainable manner but do face any form of punishment demonstrated the 
weakness of local institutions, and by extension, the weakness of local knowledge systems.  
 
The study also found that situating natural resource management in the domains of rural 
district councils (RDC) and technical institutions such as Forestry Commission marginalized 
non-western knowledge systems. This observation is supported by DuBois (1991) who argues 
that quite often in such situations ‘other knowledges’ are rendered suspect, discredited, 
excluded, and ‘disqualified’. For instance, the Forestry Commission officer of Bulilima 
district highlighted that the Commission was closely monitoring the cutting down of the 
Mopane tree which had become endangered. This, however, was in contrast to local practices 
which encouraged managing the tree through pruning and removal especially in grazing areas 
because it had grown too thick and was thus hindering the growth of pastures. The 
commission either failed to see or overlooked the local people’s priorities. Pastures were 
preferred to thick Mopane forests because of the importance given to livestock in the district:  
 
The forest in the grazing area is too thick and we wish most of those mopane trees 
could be cut so that grasses can grow. We are however afraid of doing so because the 
forestry people can arrest us. Even our local leaders are not saying anything because 
they are saying they are waiting for authority from the offices (Focus group 
discussion with villagers from Mbimba Village, 11 February, 2014). 
 
In this context, the FC provided expertise knowledge that could not be questioned by the 
locals. According to the FC, cutting down mopane trees in the grazing area would likely 
result in degradation of grazing areas through soil erosion. Such scientific facts were seen as 
ultimate truths and thus had the tendency of scaring the local leaders into prohibiting any 
cutting down of Mopane trees. Moreover, the scientific knowledge had the support of 
statutory powers held by the Commission hence any contravention could result in 
prosecution. This brings in other powerful state institution such as the police and the judiciary 
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that enforce state regulations. As such, scientific knowledge as given by technical institutions 
such as the FC, further empowered the state to control structures at a local level. As already 
stated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, Zimbabwe, like other former colonized countries, inherited 
some colonial policies that sought to disempower traditional leadership by trivializing local 
indigenous knowledge while valorizing scientific knowledge (see also Chanock, 1991; 
Mamdani, 1996; Finnemore, 1996; Singh and Houtum, 2002; Mapedza, 2007). The state thus 
became powerful and could extend its control to the lowest structures. The same can be said 
to be happening in the post-colonial Zimbabwe where despite the rhetoric of decentralisation, 
the state is still much centralised. It is necessary however, to point out that though the FC 
provided expert knowledge on the use of mopane woodlands, this knowledge did not differ 
much to what the locals already knew. To this end, locals were discouraged from cutting 
down big trees because such trees were associated with spiritual beliefs regarding rainfall and 
lightning. The objective was the same as that of the FC – to conserve big trees.  
 
The interplay between the ‘exercise of power’ and the production of knowledge, results in 
continual expansion of both sources of power and knowledge, resulting in ‘disciplinary 
power’ (Foucault, 1980). While Foucault’s statement holds water in this study in that the 
government, through its various structures such as the FC and AGRITEX, constantly 
produced scientific knowledge with absolute truths and powers, traditional authorities still 
played a key role in controlling the lives of the locals through local and indigenous 
knowledge. Notwithstanding that Zimbabwe has gone through ‘institutional engineering’ 
episodes during the colonial and post-colonial times, co-opting or distorting the presence of 
traditional authority, the traditional institution has survived the onslaught (Chigwata, 2015). 
Villagers, for example, reported that the most visible institutional structure was the traditional 
institution in the form of village heads. As such, while the study established that the state had 
entrenched its power through scientific knowledge, it also ascertained that village heads still 
commanded respect among the multitude of villagers meaning that local environmental 
knowledge still played a big role in the lives of the villagers. 
 
The study also revealed that the government sought to control local knowledge by interfering 
with the functioning of spiritual cults such as Manyangwa cult.  A case in point is that some 
traditional leaders from the three wards argued that the religious institution of the 
Manyangwa cult had been weakened by government’s policy of putting the custodianship of 
the cult under local chiefs: 
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There is a lot of confusion with regards to ownership of the Manyangwa spiritual cult. 
The government confuses chieftaincy with knowledge of religious shrines. Chiefs 
now believe they can give advice on Manyangwa spiritual cult yet they know nothing 
about spiritual religion. Traditionally, spiritual cults advised chiefs and generally 
influenced beliefs and practices. It was never the preserve of chiefs to control shrines. 
There were always people who were religious leaders who had the powers believed 
by the communities (FGD with village heads at Dombolefu, 12 February, 2014). 
 
The CEO of Bulilima District weighed in by arguing that the government seemed to have 
prioritized chiefs at the expense of spiritual leaders who were the owners of the shrines. The 
ultimate consequence of disempowering spiritual leaders was the weakening of traditional 
practices and beliefs, consequently weakening local traditional knowledge. Spiritual religious 
cults represent autonomous institutions independent of government influence. Traditionally, 
they have been powerful institutions influencing society’s opinions and knowledge but, 
‘Today you find a religious leader consulting a chief as is the case with Manyangwa. This 
never used to happen. Chiefs consulted religious leaders who had the knowledge and 
authority on religious matters’ (Interview with Bulilima CEO, 12 February, 2014). 
 
6.3. Summary 
 
This chapter analysed how local knowledge influences the management of mopane worm and 
woodland use in the study area. Local knowledge systems accommodated various 
knowledges used at local level. The analysis revealed that some of the knowledge systems 
used were of an indigenous nature emanating from spiritual belief systems while some were 
developed as a result of social interactions in the area. Predominant findings were that 
customary laws, traditional beliefs and practices which generated indigenous knowledge 
systems, were still in existence, though there was no longer any uniformity in their following. 
Traditional leaders pointed out several factors that played key roles in the weakening of 
traditional beliefs. They highlighted the growth of different religious groups where Christians 
for example argued against and contested sacred practices of locals. Discussions on the 
Manyangwa cult revealed that a growing number of young to middle-aged people either did 
not know about it or did not believe in it at all. Most of the people in this group mentioned 
their Christian beliefs as being against partaking or believing in the Manyangwa spiritual 
religion. 
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The movement of people, outsiders coming into the district to harvest worms or locals 
moving in and out of the district as a result of migration to and from neighbouring countries 
like South Africa and Botswana, was also mentioned as a significant factor that had affected 
traditional belief systems. Outsiders coming into the district were said to be breaking 
traditional norms of natural resource use because of their ethnicity. Group discussions with 
women revealed that processing of mopane worms through roasting over an open fire, a 
process known as ukungora in Shona, was foreign to them and they attributed the 
infrequency of mopane worm outbreak to the activity. 
 
The analysis further revealed that local knowledge competed with Western scientific 
knowledge in the management of natural resources. The Forestry Commission, for example, 
used scientific knowledge to explain the dangers in cutting down of mopane trees. The Rural 
District Council also drew from Western scientific narratives of conservation in the 
development of the CAMPFIRE project. Such knowledge was accepted as undisputed facts 
hence anyone going against it faced prosecution. It became more dominant than local 
knowledge. As such, through technical institutions such as FC and other state bureaucracies 
such as the RDC, the state was able to control natural resource use at lower levels. It is 
necessary though, to note that local knowledge was still recognised by the state albeit as a 
strategy to ensure that it (state) gains total control of the people. For instance the state 
through various Acts such as the Traditional Leaders Act or the RDC Act talks of the need to 
respect local traditions and in some cases gives local leaders some powers to sanction use of 
natural resources. However, this study revealed that this was just a means to an end for the 
state since it still retained ultimate control. Promotion of traditional leaders through the 
Traditional Leaders Act emerged as nothing more than a way of gaining approval among 
local people. Nygren (1999) makes the same conclusion that there are some development 
agents in developing states who paid lip service to local knowledge in order to achieve their 
goals. 
 
The idea of Western scientific knowledge creating hegemonic power over local knowledge 
has been criticized by a number of scholars (see Nygren, 1999; Scoones, 1996; Escobar, 1995 
and others). Western knowledge has been criticised for its marginalisation and 
disqualification of non-Western knowledge systems yet the complexities of reality, the 
multiple perspectives of people involved and the contextualisation of knowledge in time and 
space requires that local knowledge plays a significant role (Escobar, 1995; Briggs, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In chapters 4-6, the empirical results from the study area have been presented in light of the 
research questions outlined in Chapter 1, following the theoretical and methodological 
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perspectives presented in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter is dedicated to discussing the 
general results in view of the theoretical arguments and approaches advanced for the study of 
power dynamics and local knowledge in the management of mopane worms and woodlands. 
Mopane resources are important sources of livelihood in Southern Africa as demonstrated in 
much of the literature used in this study. The thesis examined the events that affected natural 
resource management in Zimbabwe in general and Bulilima in particular, during the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. This contextualization was critical as it laid ground 
for understanding contemporary power and knowledge dynamics in mopane worm and 
woodland management in Bulilima district. The core of the thesis was thus to determine 
power configurations and assess the nature and significance of local knowledge used in the 
management of mopane worms and woodlands. In addition, the study explored the role of 
women in resource management institutional structures and decision-making processes. 
Emphasis was laid on gendered spaces and places associated with mopane worms and 
mopane woodland collection. The study adopted several complementary analytical 
frameworks for studying the power and knowledge nexus and how these influence general 
decision-making processes in natural resource access. This chapter also reflects on the 
methodological and theoretical frameworks adopted for the study. 
 
Sources of livelihoods in Bulilima district range from livestock rearing – mopane worm 
harvesting, collection of woodland products such as mopane timber for construction, poles, 
firewood and thatch grass – to crop production. This study has demonstrated how access to, 
and control over, these resources was mediated by the power/knowledge nexus embedded in 
the political and social life of the area. The study focused on Bambadzi, Makhulela and 
Dombolefu wards after recommendations from the Natural Resources Department of 
Bulilima District indicated that the three wards experienced higher mopane worm outbreaks 
and had thicker mopane woodland cover compared to other wards. Location of the three 
wards is geographically unique in that Dombolefu is close to Plumtree Town, approximately 
10km; Bambadzi is approximately halfway between Dombolefu and Makhulela, while 
Makhulela is the furthest and is unique in that it has San communities which provided a 
different dimension on natural resource access, use and control. The researcher had therefore 
hoped that differences in geographical location would result in varying dynamics in power 
relations and local knowledge in each ward. However, fieldwork revealed similar 
characteristics in terms of social set up, power dynamics and the local knowledge generated 
and used.  To illustrate, while Dombolefu’s close proximity to Plumtree Town resulted in 
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high frequency of interaction with institutions such as NGOs, government and quasi 
government departments, such as the Forestry Commission and the Rural District Council, 
decision making patterns with regards to Mopane worms and woodlands access tended to be 
similar to other wards. Furthermore, its proximity to law enforcement institutions from 
Plumtree Town did not protect its natural resources from being exploited by outsiders. The 
villagers reported that resources such as river sand and firewood were being extracted by 
external people and the security agents were well aware of that. Bambadzi and Makhulela 
also faced similar challenges indicating that distance from Plumtree Town was not a deterrent 
factor to resource exploitation. There were also similarities in the role played by traditional 
authorities in natural resource management.  
 
While the San people were only found in Makhulela Ward, their existence did not alter 
natural resource management patterns. The only difference is that the San people seemed to 
operate outside Ndebele/Kalanga social system and did not usually conform to the prevailing 
rules and regulations. For instance while there were restrictions on Ndebele/Kalanga speaking 
people from entering the CAMPFIRE programme area, the San seemed to transcend such 
restrictions. One of the reasons could be that the San did minimal damage to the natural 
environment compared to the Ndebele/Kalanga communities. The similarities in the nature in 
which institutions, institutional structures and individual actors affected power dynamics and 
local knowledge in all the three wards point to the fact that ward boundaries do not really 
mean much in terms of social fabric of the people of Bulilima.  
 
7.2. Reflections on power dynamics in natural resource governance  
 
Chapter 4 proffered a detailed conceptualization of Zimbabwe`s natural resource 
management in history. This conceptualization was critical to this thesis because it laid a 
foundation for situating contemporary patterns of access to, control and use of natural 
resources within a deeper historical perspective as is typical of other studies such as Berry 
(1989), McGregor (1995), Mandondo (2000a) and many others. Natural resource governance 
was considered within the framework of power and knowledge and how these shaped a 
community’s access to, control and use of natural resources. Chapter 5 provided an analysis 
of power relations as they affected mopane worms and woodland use in the study area. 
Findings from the study revealed that contemporary natural governance systems could be 
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better appreciated when contextualized within historical trajectories of natural resource 
governance in Zimbabwe. It is well documented in literature (see Matowanyika, 1991; 
Murombedzi, 2003; Mapedza, 2007, Kwashirai, 2009; 2012) that pre-colonial natural 
resource governance structures that largely relied on traditional religious systems, influencing 
knowledge creation and decision-making practices on natural resource access, use and 
control, were dismantled during the colonial era. The colonial state centralized power by 
developing governance systems that were more accountable to it than to the people they 
purported to serve. The post-colonial government, while managing to de-racialise natural 
resource use in the communities, has however been implicit in the perpetuation of central 
state control of natural resource governance through a local governance system that is top- 
down and a traditional system designed to implement decisions that suit the central state.  
 
A discussion on contemporary power dynamics influencing post-colonial natural resource 
governance in Zimbabwe and, indeed, other developing states, will be far from complete if 
not contextualized within the framework of decentralization policies which have influenced 
governance reforms since the early 1980s. There is abundant literature on how developing 
states sought to redress colonial governance systems through reforms that were intended to 
transfer management responsibilities and powers from the central government to a variety of 
local institutions (see Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2000; Mandondo, 2000a; Ribot, 2003; 
Meynen and Doornbos, 2004; Mfune, 2013). Such reforms were driven by the belief that 
local governments were the best institutions at promoting broad-based participation in local 
public decision-making. Decisions that reflect local needs were seen as a vehicle towards 
ensuring equitable, efficient, accountable and participatory governance that would give 
marginalised groups greater access to power and resources (see Anderson and Ostrom, 2007; 
Larson et al., 2010). In Zimbabwe, the Prime Minister`s directive, already discussed in the 
previous chapters, gave peasant communities a system of representation in the process of 
local planning (Mandondo, 2000a). Such reforms meant that natural resource management 
systems also had to be decentralised to lower institutions by transferring natural resource 
decision-making powers to them, hence the birth and growth of Community Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM). Such a move was envisaged as a fulcrum for democratic 
change (Ribot, 2003). 
 
 Despite rhetoric implying decentralised structures and merits of decentralised natural 
resource management in Zimbabwe and other developing states, scant attention has been 
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given to the fact that formal and systematic transfer of entrustments may have little to do with 
where influence and power lie at community level (Nemarundwe, 2004). This thesis thus 
contributes to the closing of a knowledge lacuna by focusing on power dynamics amongst 
actors and institutions where entrustments have been decentralized as well. 
 
 Findings from Bulilima revealed that there was, indeed, a huge gap between decentralization 
as a theory and what was actually decentralised. For instance, insignificant discretionary 
powers were found to be transferred to local authorities. Most of the decision-making powers 
were centralized around central government structures such as the RDC, quasi-government 
departments such as the Forestry Commission and local government structures such as 
VIDCO and WADCO. While several scholars have demonstrated that many governments in 
developing countries rarely devolve powers to local democratic institutions in the practical 
sense (see Ribot, 2003; Mfune, 2013 among others), Zimbabwe’s situation is even more 
intriguing in that decentralization of natural resource management powers is determined by 
prevailing political will.  
 
The Bulilima RDC, mandated by the state to control natural resource access and use, is 
basically a bureaucratic state institution with elected councilors sympathetic to the ruling 
government. The study revealed that councilors were the most powerful actors at the local 
level in the study area. While this might ideally seem appropriate for ensuring that there is 
democratic governance of resources as councilors are democratically elected entities, reality 
on the ground was different. Of the 19 elected councilors, 13 were from ZANU PF while only 
6 were from the opposition (divided between MDCT, MDC and ZAPU). This makes it easy 
for the central government to influence decisions in council forums since its councilors 
constitute the majority. In most council meetings that the researcher attended at Bulilima 
RDC offices, ZANU PF councilors always seemed to rubber stamp items that came from the 
central government without really giving them much scrutiny. There seemed to be some 
element of fear to oppose government directives, especially amongst ZANU PF councilors. 
Even the language they used implied ‘political correctness’. As such, even though they were 
democratically elected, they seemed too eager to please their party rather than be accountable 
to the people they served. Various natural resource management committees operating within 
villages were found to be either too weak to make any meaningful decisions or made 
decisions that suited the council than the locals within the villages. The RDC itself was found 
to be ineffective in enforcing by-laws for the management of natural resources. For instance, 
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the council chair highlighted that a by-law enacted by the RDC to prevent outsiders taking 
mopane worms out of the district had not been enforced. Some scholars have concluded that 
most RDC by-laws, although well-articulated at council level, lack knowledge and 
enforcement will in the communal areas (see Nemarundwe, 2004). 
  
The CAMPFIRE project, a classic example of a CBNRM programme in Bulilima, 
demonstrates a case where community participation in natural resource management is very 
low. Field results indicate that the RDC had failed to devolve proprietorship to lower levels in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy because of financial benefits associated with CAMPFIRE (see for 
example Madzudzo and Dzingai, 1995; Murphree, 1990; 1993). Communities, on the other 
hand, had to endure the dangers of wildlife. Elephants in particular were a problem because 
they invaded fields and destroyed crops yet the CAMPFIRE law prohibited anyone from 
harming them. Communities were not involved in decisions on how financial resources 
should be dispersed. Such decisions were usually made by the council and in the council 
offices where ordinary communities were less represented. This has alienated the project 
from the locals who see it as yet another government programme than a CBNRM programme 
(Campbell et al, 2001). 
 
 As such, conflicts arose as cattle owners, who happened to be in the majority in Bulilima 
communities, argued that their cattle should be allowed to graze in the CAMPFIRE area. 
Such conflicts resulted in some community members getting arrested because the RDC, 
which ran the project, had legal authority. Councilors, who were elected by the people to 
represent them, were found to be aligning with the council, a classic case of them being 
accountable to other bodies which were not part of the local communities. This left local 
communities without any accountable forms of representation, a disempowering process in 
itself (Mandondo, 2000a). 
 
Discretionary powers over natural resource use in Bulilima were thus found to be centralized 
around the RDC, an unaccountable local body. The RDC claimed ownership of land and trees 
under its jurisdiction through the Communal Lands Act (1982) and the Forest Produce Act 
(1987) (Nemarundwe, 2004). The 1988 RDCs Act further decentralised natural resource 
management authority to RDCs to enact by-laws for management of natural resources under 
their jurisdiction. Mandondo (2000a), Matondi (2001), Ribot (2003) and other scholars of 
decentralization have noted that this tendency of over-centralization of power and decision-
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making through regulatory frameworks such as the Acts mentioned above is not peculiar to 
Zimbabwe. It also happens in other developing countries such as Zambia (Mfune, 2013), 
West African states (Ribot, 2003) and even Asian countries such as India (see Poffenberger 
and McGean, 1996; Sinha et al., 1997). 
 
In Bulilima and, indeed, other districts in Zimbabwe, most key development decisions were 
made in the RDDC where the language used was alienating and visions of lower 
constituencies were often disregarded in favor of elite visions (also noted by Mandondo, 
2000a). Being a powerful arm of the council and presided over by the District Administrator, 
a government appointee, while also consisting of district heads of the government ministries, 
chairpersons of RDCs, other committees and district heads of national security organs, the 
RDDC was accountable more to the central government than to local communities. 
Mandondo (2001) argued that the way this committee was constituted was such that it 
operated through central government directives and as such sidelined community plans and 
visions. The functioning of RDCs in Zimbabwe has been likened to the Panchayats of India 
(Campbell et al., 2001). Panchayats are local government structures which failed in their 
mandate of representing the interests of local communities. In fact they are said to have 
sought control of local resources hence their rejection by the local people (Fisher, 1995). 
 
The study found that local government administrative structures such as the VIDCO and 
WADCO were institutions used by the central government to ensure that it had total control 
at the lowest levels. While they were supposed to be democratically elected entities, with 
candidates chosen from the community, reality on the ground however was that ZANU PF 
had a significant influence on who was chosen to stand for such elections. Some villagers 
who requested anonymity pointed out that the councilors politically influenced the 
nomination of candidates by using language that alienated those opposed to ZANU PF. For 
instance, in Bambadzi, villagers were told to vote for people who appreciated central 
government policies, implying that people should vote for those who supported ZANU PF. 
While these two institutions have a legal mandate, their lack of legitimacy and ability to 
enforce natural resource management rules and regulations made them rather invisible to the 
communities. Their invisibility did not imply lack of influence. The study revealed that the 
state often used these institutions to ensure that its programmes were accepted by the locals. 
To this end, it was mentioned by various groups in the study areas that VIDCOs and 
WADCOs became very active towards election time. Because their roles were not clearly 
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spelt out, they were vulnerable to abuse by government structures. In her study of Chivi 
District in Zimbabwe, Nemarundwe (2004) concluded that the role of VIDCO in woodland 
resource management was very obscure and village heads had a better relationship with 
communities compared to the VIDCOs. The implications for such an arrangement is that 
villagers remain disempowered since the lowest democratic institutions either do not know 
their roles or do not have enough autonomy to exercise their discretionary powers. 
 
While conflicts between traditional structures and locally elected democratic structures have 
been well documented by several authors (Mukamuri, 1995, Mamdani, 1996, Mandondo, 
2000a; Nemarundwe, 2004; Kwashirai, 2009) it is worth noting that such conflicts play into 
the hands of the central government. It is the state that sets unclear jurisdictions which result 
in duplication of duties especially between VIDCOs, WADCOs and traditional authorities.  
For instance, VIDCO chairs in some of the villages that this study focused on argued that 
people coming from outside to harvest mopane worms should get permission from them. The 
same VIDCO chairs also claimed authority with regards to enforcing fines on people who cut 
down big Mopane trees. Village heads also claimed authority on the same matter. The study 
found that local people continued to give more allegiance to traditional authorities than 
VIDCO and WADCO structures. It is worth noting that while the VIDCO and WADCO 
structures were accepted in other regions of Zimbabwe; in Matabeleland the locals viewed 
the structures with suspicion because they smacked of being instruments for exercising party 
political power in the first place. Some scholars regarded the formation of VIDCOs as a 
ZANU PF mechanism for politically and socially controlling Matabeleland (Stoneman and 
Cliffe, 1989; Mabhena, 2014). Mabhena (2014) further adds that the establishment of 
VIDCOs in Matabeleland involved political re-orientation of VIDCO members who were 
expected to be loyal to the state and the party. It is not surprising therefore why many locals 
developed negative attitudes towards both VIDCO and WADCO structures considering the 
fact that many of them supported PF ZAPU, a direct rival of the then ZANU.   
Other quasi-government departments identified as having an influence on natural resource 
management in the study area included the Forestry Commission and AGRITEX. The 
Forestry Commission in particular acted as an overseer of how local communities utilized 
mopane woodlands. While the Communal Land Forest Produce Act (1987) gives rights to 
inhabitants of any communal land to exploit forest resources for their own use, it however 
does not permit commercialization of the produce or to give it to persons who are not part of 
that community. Moreover, the Act allows for the direct involvement of the central 
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government with a provision for the Minister of environment to issue permits to anyone to 
exploit forest resources from any communal area. This provision disempowers local 
democratic institutions such as the council. Similar findings on the state’s failure to devolve 
adequate discretionary powers to lower democratic bodies have been documented for Zambia 
(Mfune, 2013) and other West African countries (Meynen and Doornbos, 2004). In Zambia 
for instance, the Parliamentary Committee on local governance noted that: 
 
... despite decentralisation being an initiative of the government, there is not enough 
political will to implement it. Your committee is of the view that if government has 
difficulties implementing the national decentralisation policy, they should provide 
another policy direction instead of leaving the local government system in its current 
state... (Zambia National Assembly, 2008:2 in Mfune, 2013).  
 
While the Forest Commission could also issue commercial permits, the bureaucratic nature 
and cost of acquiring such permits tended to deter many Bulilima locals.  In addition, 
decisions to issue permits were found to have been polarized by the prevailing political 
situation in the country. Discussions with locals revealed that outsiders who came to exploit 
firewood resources always boasted of their links with the ruling ZANU PF party. The ruling 
party’s insistence on the ideology of nationalising natural resources had a detrimental effect 
on local people’s access to local natural resources. For instance, a group of war veterans 
interviewed in Bambadzi and Makhulela insisted that every Zimbabwean should have access 
to mopane worms and woodlands in the district. Similar sentiments were expressed by some 
councilors indicating their tendency to serve their master (ZANU PF) at the expense of their 
people.  As such, outsiders, who were well connected to authorities, easily got permits to 
extract local resources (Campbell et al., 2001). 
 
Various studies (see Ribot, 2003; Bazaara, 2002 and others) noted that many commercial 
decisions that have been centralized by a number of developing states were more political 
rather than technical. In Bulilima, for instance, the study revealed that issuing of permits to 
commercialise mopane firewood was political. ZANU PF councilors made it clear that those 
with divergent views from the ruling party should not be allowed to benefit from local 
resources. It seemed the local authority would rather have outsiders exploiting local resources 
as long as they were sympathetic to the ruling party. This study demonstrated in Chapter 5 
that outsiders had been accessing Mopane woodlands from Dombolefu and Makhulela wards 
for commercial purposes while locals could only use the resource for domestic purposes. 
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It emerged in this study that traditional institutions had also been used to legitimize state 
agendas, further weakening local people’s control of their own natural resources. In Bulilima 
and indeed in Zimbabwe as a whole, there is clear state interference with the functioning of 
traditional institutions. The functions of chiefs for example are not so different to their 
colonial function. The fact that the president appoints chiefs creates a patronage scenario 
where chiefs become accountable to the president than their people. The same goes for 
headmen who are appointed by the Minister of Local Government and village heads 
appointed by chiefs. This arrangement enables the state to have total control of the traditional 
institutions, hence control of local people. According to the Catholic Commission for Justice 
and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) (2013), it was common practice to see war veterans 
working closely with chiefs, headmen and village heads to threaten those who were opposed 
to ZANU PF. 
 
Through the Traditional Leaders Act, traditional leaders now have more power and influence 
in their communities. While all land belongs to the state, chiefs and village heads are allowed, 
through delegated privileges (Ribot, 2003), to informally control the distribution and use of 
land and its resources ensuring that communities stay loyal to them (CCJPZ, 2013). The 
problem with this form of arrangement is that privileges are open to state abuse as it often 
gives and withdraws them. This explains why traditional authorities in Zimbabwe merely act 
for those who delegate authority, mainly the RDC and the state. According to Ribot (2003) 
they become subjects to the higher authorities and have little discretion of their own. For 
instance, the Traditional Leaders Act empowers the traditional leaders to enforce rules and 
exact fines which however accrue to the RDC. Mandondo (2000a) has argued that there has 
not been much change in the way the state treats traditional authorities in the colonial and 
post-colonial Zimbabwean state. In both eras, traditional authorities have been used to 
entrench central governments’ interests while disempowering the locals. 
 
The study also revealed that the state had managed to infiltrate and dilute the influence of 
spiritual religious institutions, traditionally very influential in natural resource governance. It 
has argued and demonstrated that the transferring of the Manyangwa spiritual cult’s 
management to the chiefs severely weakened it. Spiritual religious cults had their own 
spiritual leaders who advised chiefs and not the other way round. The influence of chiefs, 
who are ignorant of spiritual religious issues for that matter, has resulted in conflicts over the 
192 
 
leadership of the Manyangwa cult as chiefs have their own leader whom they want to install 
even though the Bulilima communities dispute the legitimacy of that person.
68
 It is important 
to note, however, that even though traditional institutions have been weakened, a range of 
controls linked to tradition still exist. For example, there is still more compliance with 
cultural norms and beliefs than formal institutions (Campbell et al., 2001). While a 
significant number of women interviewed indicated that they were Christians, the same 
women also highlighted that they knew about the existence of the Manyangwa spiritual cult 
and still complied with some of the traditional norms. 
 
Some scholars (see Mandondo, 2000a; Ribot, 2003 and others) note that central governments 
in developing countries support customary authorities for selfish ends. Customary authorities 
are seen as vote banks for national elections (Ribot, 2003) while they are also easier to 
integrate into patronage as they are appointed directly through government linked structures, 
in the case of Zimbabwe. The discussion above has centered on institutional power dynamics 
affecting Mopane worm and woodland management in Bulilima. The dynamics of power 
were also analysed amongst and between actors involved in natural resource use in the study 
area. 
 
7.2.1. Reflections on actor power, gender, spaces and places in mopane 
worm and woodland management 
                                                   
The analysis of gendered spaces and places revealed complex internal differentiations within 
the communities of Bulilima. The study found out that there were huge differences among 
community members in the way they influenced decisions in natural resource use and access. 
Community members were found not to be as homogenous as the term would suggest. 
Indeed, the homogeneity of communities has been questioned by various scholars (Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999; Nemarundwe, 2001; 2005), for example. Agrawal and Gibson (1999:63) 
noted that the conception of ‘community’ as a unified organic whole, fails to attend to 
differences within communities and these differences affect resource management outcomes. 
Apart from the gendered nature of the community in Bulilima, there were other attributes that 
differentiated these members and thus affected their access, use and control of resources in 
the study area. For instance, the community of Makhulela had multiple ethnic groups: 
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Kalanga, Ndebele and the San. The Kalanga/Ndebele groups are traditionally farmers and 
cattle herders while the San are hunter-gatherers. This difference has a significant impact on 
who controls what resources. The study found that generally the Kalanga/Ndebele 
communities were more concerned about grazing areas and cattle while the San wished they 
could be allowed to go back to the forest where they could easily access wildlife and other 
natural resources. Another significant attribute between these groups was that the population 
of the San was very low and according to the RDC statistical documents, households were 
less than one hundred. As such, it was clear that in the absence of strong democratic 
institutions, the San were always going to be at a disadvantage when it came to formal 
decision-making processes. 
 
The study therefore revealed that spaces created in the formal structures for the San people 
were very few. In fact, they were not represented in any formal structure in the district. This 
meant that crucial decisions were passed on their behalf. For instance, they had no say in their 
re-location from the current CAMPFIRE project area to where they were at the moment of 
carrying out this study. They were given a flimsy explanation that they had to be integrated 
into a ‘normal’ social system, a polite way of saying they needed to integrate into the 
Ndebele/Kalanga way of life. Needless to say that has failed so far and has further alienated 
the San people from other ethnic groups which regard them as an inferior group. 
 
Spaces for participation in public forums were limited for the San people mainly because of 
the stereotype that they are inferior to other ethnic groups. They lacked representation in 
formal structures yet they were still considered part of the Makhulela community – the 
‘other’ but within. This, however, does not imply that the San are a hopeless group. They 
have remained united in their resistance from being integrated into Khalanga/Ndebele 
communities and that has caught the attention of the authorities. For instance, the CEO of 
Bulilima lamented the impact of some of the development initiatives imposed on the San 
arguing that they had instead worsened the plight of the San. NGOs, in particular, have been 
accused of imposing development programs that are not in sync with the San people’s way of 
life.  They have also remained resolute in their demand to be returned to Mabhongwane 
Game Park, where they originally came from. The study also revealed that the San, unlike 
other ethnic groups, were prepared to walk long distances to access resources such as wildlife 
and mopane worms. Their lifestyle allowed them to camp in the forest for periods of up to 
two months before they could return home. Such strategies enable them to exploit resources 
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in places that are seemingly inaccessible to other groups.  The San also highlighted that their 
harvesting of mopane worms involved the digging up of those that would have burrowed into 
the ground. The Khalanga/Ndebele groups expressed disgust at such practices. 
 
Deficiencies in the concept of community as a homogenous entity can also be exposed by 
reflecting on the diversity within the Khalanga/Ndebele groups. Attributes such as sex, class, 
age and wealth played a role in an individual’s ability to influence decisions in public forums. 
The same attributes thus influenced access, use and control of natural resources in the study 
area. Wealthy cattle owners tended to have more influence on public decisions that impacted 
natural resource use compared to those with few or no cattle at all. While mopane worms and 
to a certain extent mopane woodlands were a major source of livelihood for the poor, wealthy 
cattle owners did not put much emphasis on these resources. They were more concerned with 
grazing land. Hence, they would ensure that institutions that excluded other people from 
grazing their cattle on their land were enforced. On the other hand, institutions that are meant 
to guard against outsiders from competing with locals in harvesting mopane worms and 
woodland were weak and rarely enforced. The less wealthy suffered from the double tragedy 
of being poor powerless to influence institutions that could protect local resources they 
depended on. 
 
When faced with more powerful institutions such as the RDC, some cattle owners realized 
that they stood to gain a lot when they appealed to ZANU PF organs for support. In their 
ongoing struggle to access grazing in the CAMPFIRE project area, they sometimes used 
language and text synonymous with the ruling party rhetoric. For example, the researcher 
overhead this utterance: 
 
Raising cattle is part of indigenization policy so they should be allowed to graze their 
animals in areas with good pastures such as the CAMPFIRE area. Some we heard 
arguing that: CAMPFIRE project is there to benefit a few people who are connected 
to these white people who come to hunt. They must be MDC people because ZANU 
PF would not prioritise whites over blacks (Focus group discussions with cattle 
owners from Makhulela, 22 August, 2014). 
 
There are times when they appealed to their member of parliament (MP) who happened to be 
from ZANU PF party. The MP used his power to convince RDC officials to allow some 
community members to graze their cattle in the project area much to the frustration of the 
Rural District Council CEO. While the MP had no jurisdiction or power to make decisions 
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about the operations of CAMPFIRE, the fact that he belonged to the ruling party tipped the 
balance of power towards him. RDC officials argued that one had to be very cautious when 
ZANU PF got involved in such matters because there was a risk of victimization. Cattle 
owners thus used collective action as well as political links to bargain powerfully in order to 
access grazing land. The fact that some local leaders (the CEO, councilors, chiefs, village 
heads and other influential villagers) were cattle owners made this group politically powerful.  
While conflicts between cattle owners and RDC over the CAMPFIRE project area use raged 
on, it is also important to note that cattle owners periodically gained access to the area. For 
instance, they renegotiated terms of access during droughts and famine. During the severe 
droughts of 1992 and 2002, they were allowed to graze their cattle in the CAMPFIRE area. 
Behnke and Scoones (1992) have observed similar arrangements among pastoral groups in 
Botswana. 
 
Age was found to influence decision-making in a complex way, especially amongst women. 
While it has been extensively documented in literature that men often dominate decision-
making in community based natural resource management (see for example Peluso, 1992; 
Nemarundwe, 2001), it is important to note that this literature overlooks the diversity that 
exists among women. In Bulilima, the study found that older women had as much respect and 
influence as men. They certainly had greater decision-making powers than most of the young 
women, save for those married to powerful leaders within the communities. In the meetings 
the researcher attended, older women participated actively, arguing with their male 
counterparts while other women participated passively and rarely made their opinions heard. 
A similar study conducted by Bradley (1991) supports findings of this research. Bradley 
observed that among the Luhya in Kakamega in Kenya, older widows had significantly 
greater decision making powers than younger widows with regards to planting, care and 
disposal of woodlot and fencerow trees.  
 
Findings from the study reveal that the youths constituted a group that generally lacked 
representation in both formal and informal institutions. Programs that targeted the youths 
were very few. One explanation given by the RDC CEO was that most of the youths were 
only interested in migrating to South Africa and Botswana hence the challenges of 
implementing long term development programs targeting them. The study also found that the 
youths were generally not organized, in that they lacked their own associations that could 
give them bargaining power. They rarely attended community meetings and even when they 
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did, their participation tended to be passive. As such, most of the decisions were made on 
their behalf. For instance, while they harvested Mopane worms for commercial purposes, 
they got exploited by the buyers who determined the price. Selling as individuals made them 
vulnerable to the buyers. Moreover, the youths competed for the same market with other 
mopane worm harvesters in the communities. The market seemed to prefer trading in 
commodities such as kitchen utensils, food stuffs and second hand clothes while most youths 
preferred trading for cash. As such, they did not get much. Youths from Dombolefu also 
pointed out that they were missing out from potentially benefiting from abundant mopane 
firewood which became available after big mopane trees were felled by elephants. This was 
because they could not bargain as a group. 
 
Also important is to point out that in their lack of agency; youths from Bulilima were not a 
homogenous group. Like women, some had devised strategies to influence decision-making 
practices in their communities. The most notable strategy was the joining of the ZANU PF 
sponsored youth league. While this league was a formal ZANU PF institution, it however 
operated in an informal manner, with its youths secretly terrorizing community members 
perceived as belonging to the opposition. These youths were feared in the community as they 
got their power from the ruling party structures. It was an open secret that some of these 
youths were in the government’s payroll though representing interests of a party. Such youths 
were found to be powerful in influencing decisions in the study area. Speaking on condition 
of anonymity, some members of the community pointed out that selling of mopane firewood 
depended on one’s identity and political links. Those linked to the ruling party (referring to 
young men who were always seen with scotch carts full of fresh firewood going to Plumtree 
town) were untouchable. 
 
Power dynamics were also analyzed through an examination of the complexity and 
dynamism in gendered mopane worms and woodland tenure regimes. This was done by way 
of highlighting spaces and places where men and women used and exerted control over 
mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima. In all natural resource management landscapes, 
relationships among tenures generally depended on the fluidity of social and ecological 
conditions, forcing men and women to renegotiate their terms of access to specific resources 
(Rocheleau and Edmunds, 1997). The tenure categories where mopane worms and woodlands 
were clustered represented spaces and places in which men and women used mopane worms 
and woodlands and in which they exercised control over these resources. What emerges from 
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the analysis is that the three tenure regimes were very complex and yet negotiable. Women 
largely accessed natural resources through usufruct rights derived from social relationships 
such as marriage. For instance, virtually all land was de-facto owned by men in the 
communities while women had to negotiate access to mopane worms and woodlands by 
taking advantage of their relationships with men. Men informally privatized land around their 
households and then claimed ownership. Women, on the other hand, were not afforded that 
opportunity because of cultural bottle necks which entrusted control of land to men. Women 
did however, gain access to mopane worms and firewood from mopane trees by virtue of 
being wives or daughters of the husbands or fathers respectively, and who headed the 
household. Moreover, it was reported by some men in the study areas that mopane worms in 
particular were culturally women’s business. This created a space for women to exploit the 
resource freely. 
 
Grazing and CAMPFIRE areas were considered men’s spaces where cattle were grazed and 
men occasionally picked mopane worms. Women however also had customary rights in this 
area. Rocheleau and Edmunds (1997) point out that it is important to disaggregate rights of 
access to specific resources to determine which products are controlled by women and which 
by men. In the case of Bulilima, women had rights to collect mopane worms and deadwood 
from trees in the grazing area but customary practices forbade them from harvesting fresh 
mopane wood. Fresh mopane wood was used by men to fulfill some of their responsibilities 
such as home or kraal construction. Such wood was thus seen as a men’s resource. It is 
important to note however that the commercial appeal of mopane worms and woodlands  put 
women’s rights over these resources at risk. Findings from the study revealed that during 
periods such as droughts, a significant number of men also competed with women in 
harvesting the worms for sale. It was also reported that there was generally a growing number 
of men who were harvesting mopane worms for commercial use than before. Unemployment 
was also mentioned as the reason why many young men were venturing into firewood selling, 
even though it was illegal. Such changes have a potential of redefining the status of these 
resources from being women’s resources to being men’s. Rocheleau and Edmunds (1997) 
thus note that factors such as commercialization have a potential effect of precipitating a 
radical redefinition and valuation of resources and subsequent reconfiguration of gendered 
spaces. Women in Bulilima will have to renegotiate their right to access mopane worms and 
dead wood, especially in places like grazing areas and CAMPFIRE project area. It is also 
most likely that as resources are redefined and spaces reconfigured, institutions that prevent 
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outsiders from harvesting mopane worms and firewood from the CAMPFIRE project area 
and communal grazing lands, will be enforced as men get involved in controlling these 
resources. 
 
While women’s rights and freedoms in accessing mopane worms and woodlands lay in-
between spaces not deeply coveted by men (see Rocheleau, 1988; 1997; Nemarundwe, 2005), 
this does not imply that women lacked agency. Groups such as burial societies or church 
organizations provided them with platforms to discuss social and development issues. For 
example, some argued that they used church links to open up markets in areas far away from 
their communities. At household level, some women claimed responsibility for privatising 
trees around homesteads arguing that they had influenced their spouses to do so. 
 
7.3. Reflections on LEK 
 
Knowledge in this thesis was analyzed in the context of its link to power; the 
power/knowledge nexus (Foucault, 1980). It has been argued that ‘while knowledge is not 
identical with power, it is so intimately linked with power that knowledge production 
processes, the acceptance of certain kinds of knowledge over others, and the ways in which 
different types of knowledge are and can be used, form an integral part of any understanding 
of power, (McLain, 2000: 40-41).  With regard to Bulilima, the emphasis on examining the 
significance of local environmental knowledge in the governance of mopane worms and 
woodlands. Local environmental knowledge is conceptualized in this study as that knowledge 
used by the locals in their day-to-day interaction with the natural environment. While some 
authors do not separate local knowledge from indigenous knowledge (see works by Maila 
and Loubser, 2003; Phuthego and Chanda, 2004; Uprety et al., 2012), this study finds it 
prudent to do so because of various reasons. Indigenous knowledge depicts a body of 
knowledge and beliefs, evolving through adaptive processes and handed down through 
generations by cultural transmission (Berkes, 1999; Ogungbure, 2013). This knowledge has 
connotations of conservative communities whose cultures are stagnant.  Communities in 
Bulilima were found to be less conservative than those implied by scholars such as Berkes 
(1999) and Ogungbure (2013)and had been affected by various historical events that had 
transformed some of their knowledge systems and beliefs. While indigenous knowledge 
systems, beliefs and practices could still be identified amongst the villagers, they had been 
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diluted in most cases and field evidence suggested that only certain groups such as the elderly 
and perhaps the San community upheld these beliefs and practices. Other groups applied 
knowledge that showed dynamism in culture. Scientific knowledge, usually held by 
technocrats, was also referred to as local knowledge by some scholars (see Olsson and Folke, 
2001). In this study, scientific knowledge emerged as a stand-alone knowledge system that 
had significant influence on the governance of natural resources in Bulilima. 
 
Enclaves of indigenous beliefs and practices used in the management of mopane worms and 
woodlands still existed in the district, albeit among a few elderly people. Traditional leaders 
still referred to various practices which they tried to enforce even though it was evident that 
the forces against such enforcement were too strong. Elderly men, for example, still knew 
some of the beliefs and practices associated with the conservation of the mopane tree. 
Naming of big mopane trees was one practice meant to protect the trees from being cut down 
at unsustainable rates. Women had more knowledge about traditional harvesting and 
preparation of mopane worms. The indigenous knowledge that older women and men had did 
not seem to improve their influence in terms of decision-making in mopane worm and 
woodland management in the district. Other powerful forces such as Christianity and the 
state, through scientific knowledge, had more significant influence in the governance of these 
resources. For instance, the influence of Christianity, which has been growing steadily since 
missionaries set foot in Zimbabwe, was very visible. Field evidence revealed that most 
people, especially women, did not want to associate with traditional practices. Young women 
in particular argued that some traditional norms and beliefs were contrary to their Christian 
beliefs. They did not believe that trees for example, should be given names and be used as 
spiritual meeting points, even in an effort to conserve big trees. In Bulilima, Wednesday was 
traditionally set aside as a sacred day for spiritual religious ceremonies. All community 
members were expected not to do any work on Wednesdays. A few old people still observed 
this day while the Christian majority did not. The Manyangwa spiritual cult also represents a 
traditional practice that is slowly but surely losing its relevance as Christian beliefs and 
practices become stronger and entrenched. In some of the focus group discussions conducted 
in Bulilima, women argued that the bible did not allow them to associate with cults such as 
the Manyangwa. This is a classic example of knowledge being created through a religious 
discourse which later influences power dynamics. McLain (2000) in Singh and Houtum 
(2002: 22) explains the strategic importance of discourse in understanding power as 
influenced by expert knowledge: ‘Discourse . . . connects thoughts with practice and thus can 
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be used strategically to influence existing fields of power.’ Christianity therefore was 
emerging as a strong and powerful force competing with traditional practices in the 
communities. 
  
The influence of scientific knowledge on the governance of natural resources in Bulilima 
cannot be ignored. This refers to expert knowledge applied by state linked institutions such as 
Forestry Commission and the RDC. The Forestry Commission argued for the conservation of 
mopane woodlands by stressing that mopane trees should not be cut down. The Commission 
used scientific forestry knowledge which owes its origin from colonial objectives of 
consolidating territory, resources and people (Drinkwater, 1989). RDC on the other hand 
used expert knowledge associated with CBNRM. The CAMPFIRE project, for example, was 
seen as key to the development of the district hence the efforts to protect the project area 
from cattle owners who are keen on grazing their cattle there. The knowledge that locals had 
on sustaining their livelihoods through cattle rearing was not seen as significant to the overall 
development of the district. Instead, the CAMPFIRE project was seen as having a better 
potential of ensuring development in the district.
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The state benefitted mostly from the influence of scientific knowledge in natural resource 
governance in the study area. Having inherited colonial systems of natural resource 
conservation, institutions such as the Forestry Commission and the RDC ensured that the 
state had direct control of resources at a local level. Fischer (2000: 29) notes that expert 
knowledge produces ‘truths’ that ‘supply systematic procedures’ for generation, regulation 
and production of policies that empower states. It would seem however, from this study, that 
expert knowledge was applied to those resources that were perceived to be of significance to 
the state (forests, wildlife). There was a gap when it came to non-timber forest products that 
were not so significant to the state. Mopane worms, for example, can be effectively managed 
through other knowledge systems and thus be controlled by those who utilize them the most – 
women.  
7.4. Reflections on theoretical frameworks 
 
7.4.1. Common Property Resource (CPR) 
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Common Property Resource (CPR) theory was found to be critical in understanding 
management systems for mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima. It provided a 
framework for analyzing decentralized natural resource governance structures. For instance, 
CPR management is thought to be one of the institutional vehicles to ensure efficient 
devolution of natural resource management (Campbell et al., 2001). Literature on CPR 
management has been very optimistic on the possibility of locals to design, operate, monitor 
and enforce their own institutional arrangements with regards to self-governance and local 
resources (see DFID, 1999; Fisher, 1995, Ostrom, 1994 and others). Agrawal and Yadama 
(1997: 458) further note that according to researchers, “local communities can create and 
sustain local institutions to manage their collectively owned resources quite successfully, 
often in the face of adverse pressures from the state, demographic changes and market 
forces.” Findings from this study, however, revealed that implementation of CPR 
management was not as simple and straight forward in the case of common pool resources 
like mopane worms and woodlands in Bulilima. For instance, there was an array of rules that 
applied to different tenure areas (see Chapter 5 on tenure categories for Mopane worm and 
woodland collection) in the district. As noted by Mandondo (1997) and Nhira and Fortmann 
(1993), these rules range from national to local and from formal to informal. While optimism 
about CPR management is derived from a focus on formal rule based systems (Campbell et 
al., 2001), there was a myriad management systems currently in operation in Bulilima. 
Mandondo (2001) notes that systems currently at play in most communal areas of Zimbabwe 
are built on controls derived from traditions, culture and norms. However, evidence from the 
field in Bulilima suggests that while tradition, culture and norms still played a significant 
role, other controls such as politics, and modern religion were coming into play. 
 
In Bulilima, the complexities in the controls at play made it very difficult to implement CPR 
management systems. This was evident even for CBNRM programmes such as CAMPFIRE 
which are meant to be managed under formal rule based systems. The study found out that 
there were diverse claims of management in the CAMPFIRE area which ranged from 
national to local and formal to informal. For instance, while the RDC was formally in charge 
of managing the CAMPFIRE program, cattle owners still felt that they had legitimate 
customary rights to access and use the project area. Evidence suggests that, indeed, cattle 
owners often negotiated their way into the CAMPFIRE project area, especially during 
drought seasons. As noted in Chapter 5, tenure categories where mopane worms and 
woodlands occurred were managed through complex controls. Forests close to homesteads, 
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while formally controlled through Communal Lands Forest Product Act, had also been 
privatised as households responded to their socio-economic needs. The same applied to the 
grazing areas which exhibited multiple management controls. It was highlighted in Chapter 5 
that grazing areas had common property-like and open access-like scenarios. The resource 
under exploitation determined how it was controlled. For example, mopane worms were 
exploited more under open access because the institutions that enforced common property 
were not active because those with power to enforce (men, traditional or elected authorities) 
did not put much value on the resource. However, forests and pastures in the same grazing 
areas were governed under common property arrangements which were enforced through 
local and customary institutions. Trees and grasses were coveted by men, hence had a 
different management system to mopane worms. It is thus difficult to implement CPR in most 
communal areas in developing countries as they are constantly contested, changeably and 
individually interpreted (Campbell et al., 2001). 
 
While CPR is an ideal theory for explaining the management of common pool resources such 
as mopane worms and woodlands, analysis should go beyond simplistic classifications (e.g., 
common property, private property, open access, state property) to an in-depth understanding 
of each landscape unit or resource, in terms of such characteristics as excludability, 
comprehensiveness, use destination, duration of use, allotment type, size, transferability, fees, 
operational control, operational requirements and security (Kundhlande and Luckert, 1998 in 
Campbell et al., 2001). In Bulilima for example, these characteristics were very significant in 
determining access, use and control of mopane worms and woodlands. Mopane worms for 
instance, were more of an open access resource in the grazing area but rules of excludability 
applied in areas around households. CAMPFIRE on the other hand was based on a resource 
with a very high economic value (Campbell et al., 1999) that provided powerful incentives to 
Bulilima RDC not to devolve proprietorship to lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
(Murphree, 1990; 1993; Dzingai, 1995). 
 
7.4.2. Political ecology and power 
 
The concept of power is at the centre of this thesis. Theories of power were used to explain 
how different actors related to each other as they utilised mopane worm and woodland 
resources. One of the objectives in this study was to find out how power was configured in 
Bulilima by asking questions such as: 1. How does history influence contemporary resource 
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governance? 2. How is power configured between actors and institutions that manage 
mopane woodlands and mopane worms in Bulilima? 3. What is the significance of local 
knowledge in the management of mopane woodlands and mopane worms in Bulilima 
district? 4. What role do women play within the local level institutional framework for 
mopane worms and woodland use and what impact does this have on sustainable use of these 
resources? All these questions require that one understands how different actors in the district 
related to each other as they went about their daily business. It is this relation that configured 
natural resource governance as it affected access, use and control of resources. This study 
largely adopted Michel Foucault’s postulations about power not as a commodity that can be 
‘appropriated’ but as something more fluid and ubiquitous (Foucault, 1986). Individuals are 
always simultaneously exercising power and undergoing the effects of power; they are 
constituted by power and at the same time are the vehicles of power. Power in this sense is 
“embedded in the very fabric” of the social system and “resides in every perception, 
judgement and act” of every individual (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998:459-460). The 
study applied the Institutional Analysis and Development approach (IAD) adapted from 
earlier efforts by researchers such as Ostrom (1994) and Anderson (2002) and the Power 
Cube framework by Gaventa (2005) to operationalise power analysis in Bulilima. Relations 
of power are analysed within a social space where actors interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (Ostrom, 2011). Within that social 
space, this study utilised the power cube to explore three dimensions of power: spaces of 
participation, forms of power and levels of decision making that were manifested as actors 
related to each other. 
 
Analysis of power began at the household level where gender roles were explored. The study 
found that an institution such as marriage shapes both men and women at home. For instance, 
the control of resources such as land and trees around the household fell under the 
jurisdiction of men. Customary laws also recognise men as the head of households hence they 
are de-facto owners of resources around homesteads. Indeed, Lastarria-Cornhiel (1995) cited 
in Rocheleau and Edmunds (1997) notes that throughout Africa, women are less likely to 
hold formal title to land than men. Men exercised control of trees around their homesteads 
and in their fields by privatising them. This behaviour seemed to be influenced by the 
perceived failure of local institutions in protecting natural resources managed through 
common property arrangements. Grazing areas, for example, have an array of rules that apply 
to them (Campbell, et al., 2001) and that is the basis of the weakness in management. It has 
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been reported in the analysis chapters that grazing areas became open access at times 
depending on the resource being exploited. In focus group discussions held in Mbimba and 
Makhulela, villagers were unanimous in observing that controls on the chopping down of big 
mopane trees were very weak even though the Forestry Commission threatened people with 
arrests once in a while. As such, villagers were responding to the weaknesses in the 
institutions by privatising trees around their homesteads. In the IAD framework, Acheson 
(2006) notes that local actors act according to specific institutional context as shaped by 
biophysical and socio-economic attributes. While decisions to privatise trees around 
homesteads were taken by men, women tended to benefit from such arrangements because it 
meant less competition for mopane worms and firewood from neighbours and outsiders. It 
was also revealed from the study that women actually played a significant role in ensuring 
that trees around their homesteads were privatised. This was revealed in group discussions 
with women who indicated that some of the decisions taken by their husbands were as a 
result of their persuasion. The marriage institution therefore also worked to women’s 
advantage as they exercised their power by encouraging their husbands to act. 
 
The knowledge that women possessed on mopane worm processing gave them an advantage 
over the control of worms that had been harvested. While men had an idea of how worms 
should be processed, their knowledge could not be compared to that of women. Moreover, 
the fact that most men in the district did not put much value in mopane worm harvesting 
created spaces for women to make decisions on the use of the resource at home. It must be 
noted though that women still remained with the challenge of access to the worms because 
the worms occurred on trees that belonged to men. This challenge was clearly manifested at 
community level where women’s access to mopane worms and woodlands in the grazing 
areas had to be intricately negotiated. As highlighted in Chapter 5, grazing areas were de-
facto male areas where they grazed their cattle. Management of these areas was complex and 
depended on factors such as the nature of the resource found in the area as well as political 
influence of individuals with access to the area. As an illustration, institutions controlling the 
harvesting of mopane worms in grazing areas were so weak that the resource became open 
access. It was a common practice to find people from as far as Bulawayo and other places 
camped and collecting mopane worms in communal grazing areas around Bulilima. Women 
and other worm collectors like the youth, had to compete with these ‘outsiders’ for the 
worms. Local authorities interviewed (councillors and village heads) did not show any 
enthusiasm for rules that could exclude outsiders who came to harvest worms. However, 
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when the issue of grazing was raised, the same authorities were very passionate about rules 
that should exclude non-community members from accessing the grazing areas. It is 
interesting to note that when it came to grazing areas, both traditional and modern institutions 
tended to find common ground. Access to grazing areas was also found to depend on one’s 
political affiliation. In Mbimba and Makhulela wards, it was reported that some of the cattle 
that grazed there belonged to some war veterans from other wards. Nobody dared touch their 
cattle because they were a feared group due to their role in the Fast Track Land Reform and 
Resettlement Programme and their association with the ruling ZANU PF party. 
 
While analysing power in terms of power relations makes us understand how different actors 
in Bulilima influenced decision making in the social arena, political ecology helps us 
understand how power relations operating at multiple scales shape natural resource 
management. It also provides a framework for analyzing natural resource conflicts as quite 
often human-environment interaction is certainly political and results in conflicts. In 
Bulilima, the study revealed that social actors were heterogeneous, multidimensional and 
culturally embedded. As such, conflicts over natural resource use were inevitable. It has 
already been demonstrated in some parts of this study that social actors in Bulilima were 
diverse and behaved differently towards natural resources. Men and women’s interests in 
natural resources tended to differ and that had an effect on how a resource was managed. For 
instance, men indicated that mopane worms were largely a ‘by the way’ resource especially 
when their livestock were doing well. As expected, men did not put much effort in 
monitoring the utilisation of mopane worms. Thatch grass harvested mainly in the 
CAMPFIRE area was a resource that provided interesting dynamics. To women and other 
poor households, these grasses were a source of income while to cattle owners they were a 
form of pasture. While women were allowed by the RDC to cut the grass for free, cattle 
owners had to negotiate access to the same grass. In most cases, when they did get this 
access, they had no regard for the women who also needed the grass for other uses. Evidence 
from the field suggests that women always lost in such conflicts as the cattle usually grazed 
all the grass. Their predicament was made worse by the fact that local leaders, be they 
traditional or modern, were all cattle owners, hence they temporarily united for the cause of 
their cattle.  
 
The heterogeneity of social actors was also reflected in ethnic diversity which had a 
significant impact on natural resource access, use and control. The San people found only in 
206 
 
Makhulela Ward in Bulilima were generally despised by the Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic 
groups. They lacked agency and their participation in community programs was generally 
poor. Accordingly, they did not have much influence in decision-making matters pertaining 
to a range of development issues in their community. There were times when they had been 
used by the ruling party just to garner more votes. In the run up to the country’s 2013 
harmonised elections, the ruling party ran a programme of ensuring that all the San people 
who were eligible had national registration cards and were also registered to vote. In 
exchange they were given food and ZANU PF regalia.
70
 It is important to note, however, that 
the San used their aloofness to get on with their lives with less interruption from the 
authorities or other ethnic groups. Discussions with their village head, Gogo Mamaree 
Kwenga Moyo, revealed that the San appreciated this minimal interaction. Moreover, they 
were considered less of a political threat by the government hence the limited control on 
them. They enjoyed free access to natural resources in the CAMPFIRE area while some even 
went as far as Hwange National Park. The actions of the San demonstrate the underlying 
subtleties of negotiation and manoeuvre that are in operation within power arenas (see Arce, 
1992). They employed conscious or tacit tactics to alter their power relations in the arena and 
hence were able to influence the course of planning in Bulilima. The fact that the 
Kalanga/Ndebele communities often left them out of their plans was an advantage for the San 
who wanted autonomy in the first place.  
 
Political ecology was also used in this study to understand historical processes which 
underlay current power dynamics in natural resource governance. The 1984 Prime Minister’s 
directive that reformed local government, created multiple institutional structures that altered 
and reconfigured power dynamics at the local level. While the post-colonial government had 
inherited a politicised environment, restructuring of local government effectively worsened 
that and brought the influence of central government more into local resource governance. 
The creation of VIDCO and WADCO structures, for example, while weakening traditional 
institutions, created conflicts between the two institutions. There was a duplication of duties 
resulting in administrative confusion. The study discovered that multiple institutional 
structures (councillors, village heads, VIDCO and WADCO) claimed responsibility for 
issuing licences to outsiders who wanted to collect mopane worms. Ultimately, no institution 
did so and this resulted in mopane worms being exploited as open access resource. 
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The traditional chiefly institutions were founded on the undemocratic principle of the fusion 
of legislative, executive and judiciary powers (Mandondo, 2000a). This arrangement 
enhanced colonial domination in what scholars referred to as decentralised despotism (see 
Chapter 4 and works from scholars such as Holleman, 1968; Weinrich, 1971; Mandondo, 
2000a and Mashinya, 2007). Traditional institutions have over the years been used to 
legitimise state influence. In Bulilima, traditional institutions were largely accountable to the 
ruling party than local people. Their autonomy was very limited as they had to make 
decisions that were always in line with central government agendas. It was not uncommon for 
local meetings chaired by village heads or chiefs to have agendas biased towards discussing 
ZANU PF issues. Chiefs in the study area were very clear on which party they supported and 
they openly encouraged their subordinates to support ZANU PF policies. In Bulilima, and 
indeed other regions across Zimbabwe, local authorities were structured in such a way that 
they entrench government thinking on communities. This has served to centralise power and 
decision-making regarding natural resource management in the central government and other 
bureaucracies such as the RDC. There were strong similarities between the contemporary 
local government natural resource management system and the colonial system. 
 
Political ecology and power theories have also been used in this study to analyse how 
discourse and knowledge systems are used to legitimise decisions taken by some actors with 
regards to the utilisation of natural resources. For instance, the government, through the 
Forest Commission, ensured that it maintained control over the utilisation of mopane 
woodland resources by using science to explain efficient and sustainable management 
techniques. The study revealed that communities were discouraged from cutting down trees 
because that might lead to undesirable environmental problems such as soil erosion or 
climate change. Local traditional knowledge that existed within communities was considered 
inefficient. There was a very close link between knowledge and power. Umans (1998) 
expresses the same idea, that knowledge processes are embedded in relations of power, 
authority and legitimacy. Scientists, for example, try to establish a “hegemonic knowledge” 
by using power techniques such as claiming universality, objectivity and neutrality. Rhetoric 
statements such as “deforestation leading to erosion and climate change” are universally 
accepted as absolute truths. Institutions or individuals that preach such statements become 
authorities. The effect of knowledge on power is best understood through Foucault’s 
‘governmentalisation of the state’ and subject formation. He argues that scientific disciplines 
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and knowledge influence governance through the exercise of power (Foucault, 1982). 
Conservation policy in Zimbabwe is premised on expert knowledge and this has the effect of 
consolidating state power with regards to natural resources. In Bulilima, the CAMPFIRE 
project was implemented following scientific advice that conservation can be effective 
through improvement of human – animal interactions. 
 
In this study, the influence of knowledge on power could be noticed among community 
members themselves. While indigenous knowledge was no longer as significant as it used to 
be, those who possessed it still commanded some respect in the community. During focus 
group meetings, it was revealed that communities often turned to traditional leaders or other 
elderly people in times of crisis. For example, in 2014, the year when fieldwork for this thesis 
was done, Mbimba and Makhulela wards experienced excessive floods last seen in the 
1960s.
71
 The logical explanation amongst many villagers was that the ‘gods’ were not happy 
and they needed to be appeased. Traditional leaders and elderly people led propitiation 
ceremonies. The implications are that while scientific knowledge had influence on how 
resources were utilised in Bulilima, local traditional knowledge was still called upon in times 
of crisis and those perceived to know more about cultural practices assumed control at that 
particular time. Women used their local knowledge on mopane worm harvesting and 
processing to control the resource. Most men pointed out that while they had an idea of how 
the worms were supposed to be processed, their knowledge could not match that of women. 
Some Mopane worms buyers interviewed in the field also claimed that they preferred getting 
worms from women than young men because women knew how to process the resource. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study was to examine the role of local environmental knowledge and 
explore power dynamics in the management of mopane worms and woodlands in the 
communal areas of Bulilima District, in the Southern region of Zimbabwe. The study’s 
results show that natural resource governance is a complex phenomenon in developing states. 
Institutions, power and knowledge played significant roles in influencing access, use and 
control of mopane worms and woodlands. The study analyzed the influence of elite capture 
of CPR governance by drawing on the historical context and politico-economic structure on 
                                                 
71
 Interview with Headman Mbimba from Mbimba ward (14 April, 2014) 
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rules in use and user decisions. A combination of theories related to New Institutionalism, 
common property, political ecology and power facilitated a thorough examination of power 
relations and knowledge significance in natural resource management in the district. These 
theories also made it possible to establish a link between natural resources, local decision-
making and inequalities that stemmed from the social, political and economic spheres in 
Bulilima.  
 
By drawing on the historical context of natural resource management in Zimbabwe, the study 
demonstrated that the state was a key player in determining access to, use and control of 
natural resources. From the colonial to the post-colonial state, the central government, 
through various processes, had sought to control the management of natural resources in the 
communal areas. Traditional institutions that put control of resource use on traditional leaders 
and the community had been weakened by deliberately taking away the powers of chiefs or 
pursuing and promoting environmental discourse and knowledge that privileged science over 
any other knowledge. The interplay of knowledge and power in resource management 
discussed in this thesis revealed that scientific culture and outside knowledge took 
precedence over local forms of knowledge in the management of the forests and wildlife 
resources in Bulilima. Mandondo (2000a) notes that this culture is inherently top-down, 
domineering and conditional while offering limited opportunities for alternative forms of 
empowering local communities. 
 
This arrangement was clearly seen in the development of conservation areas and later, the 
CAMPFIRE project area. The colonial state used the discourse of conservation, using 
scientific knowledge to justify its act while taking control of natural resource management 
from traditional institutions and actors. The post-colonial government adopted the same 
disempowering policies which have seen local practices, norms and cultures playing second 
fiddle to scientific methods. Results from the study revealed that the CAMPFIRE 
programme, though touted as an effective CBNRM program, was a discourse used to control 
natural resource use. Significant income that accrued from the CAMPFIRE project in 
Bulilima tended to benefit more those institutional structures linked to the state than the 
communities that bore the brunt of wildlife invasion. The traditional institution, which was 
once accountable to the locals in the pre-colonial era, was transformed to serve the state 
controlled institutions in the colonial and post-colonial era. In a similar study in Dwesa-
Cwebe Nature Reserve in South Africa, Matose (2009) observed that there had been 
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continuity in the subjugation of local people’s way of managing resources from the moment 
the area was made a reserve. Like in Bulilima, local people’s management practices had 
always been treated as inferior and inappropriate. 
 
The first objective of contextualizing Zimbabwe’s natural resource governance thus showed 
that history was key to understanding contemporary power dynamics in Bulilima. The study 
showed that some of the contemporary conflicts over resources had their roots in the colonial 
era when the colonial government appropriated land from the locals and introduced 
discourses such as conservation. The CAMPFIRE area was previously a community grazing 
area (lagisa area) before the colonial government decided to privatise it. Cattle owners had 
been battling for access to this area for quite some time. Msindo (2012) demonstrated that the 
installation of Ndebele chiefs in Bulilima and Mangwe areas, which are predominantly 
Kalanga communities, resulted in the dislike of Ndebele chiefs. The study revealed that the 
animosities still existed. For instance, one of the arguments raised by Bulilima CEO and other 
local Kalanga elders was that the Manyangwa spiritual cult had been weakened by the 
influence of Ndebele chiefs who did not have the knowledge nor mandate to control it. There 
was an ongoing conflict between chiefs and those who were supposed to be in charge of the 
Manyangwa spiritual cult. It is important to note that chiefs, through the Traditional Leaders 
Act, had the support of the state just as they had the support of the state during the colonial 
era. Another example of a historical event affecting contemporary natural resource 
governance issues in Bulilima relates to the movement of the San people from their native 
land, Mabhungwane area (currently CAMPFIRE area) to Makhulela Ward. The study showed 
that the San were treated as second class citizens in Makhulela, partly because the 
Ndebele/Khalanga people had stereotyped them as barbaric. This had implications for the San 
people’s participation in community activities. Their relationship with other ethnic groups 
was akin to the boss-servant relationship as they were made to work for other groups. They 
generally lacked decision-making powers with regards to resources around them as evidenced 
by individuals from the Ndebele/Kalanga groups cutting down trees just around their 
homesteads. 
 
The study concludes by identifying four themes that require further research. The first theme 
pertains to decentralisation policies that have failed to devolve power to communities at a 
local level. The second is about political influence in every aspect of decision-making in the 
communal areas of Bulilima. ZANU PF, in particular, is both a hidden and visible power 
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permeating almost every aspect of life in the communities. Those linked or sympathetic to the 
party are likely to get their way no matter what position they hold in the community. There is 
also a theme on women’s access to natural resources within men’s domains. The fourth 
theme pertains to the competition between local knowledge and other development 
knowledges in Bulilima District. For instance, science and Christian religion are domains that 
were seriously challenging the relevance of local environmental knowledge to the extent that 
dominant knowledge was now a combination of various knowledges. What was 
contextualised as local environmental knowledge in this study was possessed by a few 
people, the majority of them elderly citizens. 
 
The post-colonial state’s decentralization policy as a way of transferring power to the local 
people has been heavily criticized in literature (see Mandondo, 2000a; Nemarundwe, 2004 
and others) as a smoke screen. In Bulilima, power and knowledge dynamics were studied in a 
decentralized resource use context. Power was analyzed at multiple governance levels to 
understand its effect on Mopane worm and woodland access, use and control. There were 
multiple institutional structures and actors competing and negotiating access, use and control 
of Mopane worms and woodlands at a local level. Natural resource management was being 
decentralised to local structures in the hope that more local people would participate in 
decision making with regards to natural resource use. However, evidence from this study and 
other similar studies on natural resource governance (see for example Murphree, 1990; 
Murombedzi, 1992; Mandondo, 2001, Ribot, 2003) revealed that central governments did not 
devolve much decision making powers to local institutions. State controlled institutional 
structures such as the RDC, Forestry Commission, VIDCO and WADCO still made most of 
the decisions especially with regarding the control of mopane woodlands. Traditional 
institutions were also part of a local governance system which was accountable to the central 
government than the locals. The planning arm of the RDC, the RDDC, either made plans that 
suited those at the top or implemented plans that came from the top.  The study also 
concluded that decision-making powers were held by those who were either sympathetic or 
linked to ZANU PF ruling party. It did not really matter whether one held a position or not in 
the community. A link to the party often gave one enough freedom to participate in decision 
making. 
 
Much as that was the case in Bulilima, local participation can still be salvaged if there is a 
will to do so from the central state. For instance, strategies that target advocacy and 
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transparency could re-vamp these structures (Mandondo, 2000a). The RDC is already a 
democratic institution with councillors elected by the people through a ballot box. What is 
missing, therefore, is effective participation of the people which could be made efficacious if 
councillors genuinely consult people and not on political grounds. The situation in Bulilima 
and indeed other parts of Zimbabwe was such that the consultation process was very 
selective, with those belonging to the opposition rarely consulted. 
 
Traditional institutions, though having been weakened by successive governments and 
restructured to protect state interests, can still play a significant role in resource management 
as communities in Bulilima still lived by the norms, beliefs and local cultures. Unlike other 
government institutions that remotely influence activities, traditional institutions and 
practices were embedded in people’s way of life in Bulilima. To a large extent, people still 
followed local norms, practices and beliefs. The study showed that modern formal institutions 
tended to be activated when it came to resources that were of significant economic value such 
as wildlife and forests. CAMPFIRE was managed by the RDC with rangers monitoring 
activities of villagers who entered the area. Hunting or killing of wildlife was strictly 
prohibited and offenders faced jail term. On the other hand, Mopane woodlands, which were 
not part of the CAMPFIRE project, were not subjected to similar institutional control. Every 
day practices, norms and beliefs played a significant role in the management of mopane 
worms and woodlands. Elderly people still commanded much respect because of the 
knowledge they possessed. In focus group discussions, there was a tendency to refer issues to 
community elders to offer their advice or wisdom. Their environmental knowledge for 
example, gave them an elevated status in the community. Decisions related to traditional 
ceremonies were usually made by this exclusive group of people. 
 
Analysis of power also considered the role played by women in institutional structures 
responsible for mopane worm and woodland resource management. Results showed that 
women in Bulilima occupied less influential positions in both formal and informal 
institutional structures. Their numbers in these structures were also very low as indicated in 
Table 5.6 in Chapter 5. In committees where they held pole positions, for example, village 
natural resource committees, the study found that these committees were weak because they 
had women as leaders. Their influence on natural resource access, use and control was 
minimal. In a patriarchal society like Bulilima, this did not seem unusual. 
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The study results also show that women’s role in decision-making needs to be understood in 
terms of spaces available for women to access these resources. For instance, marriage and 
other customary institutions ensured that men had control over land belonging to the 
household while women had to negotiate ways of accessing resources found on this land. 
There were uneven relations of power between men and women. For instance, while women 
had access to mopane trees and worms around their households as a result of their 
relationship with their husbands or spouses through marriage, they however did not have 
control over mopane trees. Trees were seen and accepted as a male domain. Women and the 
youths had to gain access to mopane worms by negotiating for a space on men’s mopane 
trees. The study also revealed that men’s lack of interest in harvesting the worm created 
spaces for women and the youth to access and control the processing and marketing of the 
worm. However, it should be noted that such spaces are dynamic and their continued 
existence depends on men’s interest in mopane worms or lack thereof. The study revealed 
that factors such as economic hardships were transforming gender roles. For instance, men 
argued that their involvement in mopane worm harvesting was determined by drought, 
meaning that when rains were good they would rather concentrate on their cattle. When rains 
were bad, men also competed with women and the youth in accessing and processing the 
worms. Some men were willing to remain with their children at home while their wives went 
out to harvest the worms. 
 
Women’s dependency on natural resource spaces left behind by men made them subordinates 
and hence less influential in decision-making. Current formal and informal natural 
institutions were not really favorable to them. It has been argued for instance that women’s 
inability to obtain formal land titles puts them in a position of extreme dependence on men 
with respect to tree resource access (Rocheleau and Edmunds, 1997). Their rights to 
resources depend on those with ownership rights. In Bulilima, Mopane trees were de-facto 
owned by men and de-jure owned by women. Any interventions aimed at improving 
women’s access to these trees should first address the complexity and diversity of existing 
land use systems, property regimes and gender division of labour. Women’s rights to 
resources need to be improved from usufruct to ownership rights. This however requires 
interventions or programs that target embedded institutions and this is not easy. Perhaps one 
way of doing this is to formalise complex codes of multiple uses which recognize, reconcile 
and perhaps reform gendered rights to use forests, trees and their products. 
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Appendix 1: Household survey 
Date: January 2014 to December 2014 
Place: Bulilima District (Bambadzi, Makhulela and Dombolefu wards) 
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B1 Do you use mopane for 
firewood? 
1=Yes                2=No 
 
C1
6 
Where? 
1=In my piece of land; 2=Around 
my homestead; 3=Anywhere in the 
community; 4=Other (Specify) 
B2 Who collects the mopane tree 
firewood? 
1=Wife; 2=Husband; 3=Girl 
child; 4=Boy child; 5= Anyone 
at home; 6=Any female member 
of the household; 7=Any male 
member of the household 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
A
1 
What is the sex of the Household Head? 
1 = Male                               2 = Female 
 
A
2 
What is the marital status of the 
household head? 
1 = Single                              3 = 
Divorced/Separated  
2 = Married                           4 = 
Widowed  
5= Other (specify 
A
3 
What is the age of the household head in 
years (Number)?  
1=10-20                                  2=20-30 
3=31-40                                 4=41-50 
5=51 and above 
A
4 
What employment category do you fall 
under? 
1 = Formal,             2 = Informal       3 = 
Unemployed 
A
5 
Household size (No of People)________________ 
 
A
6 
Household composition 
Sex Family position  Age  Education 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Key 
Sex 
Male= 1; Female= 2 
Family position 
Father= 1; Mother=2; Child=3; Relative=4; Non 
relative=5 
Age 
1= Under 5, 2=5-18; 3=19-35; 4=45-65; 5=>65 
Highest educational qualification of the household head 
1 = Never went to school,       2 = Primary School,      3 = Secondary School,  4 = 
Vocational Training,    5 =  Tertiary Education; 6=Other (specify) 
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B3 Frequency of collection  
1=Daily(D);  2=Weekly(W); 
3=Monthly(M); 4=Other 
 
C1
8 
Does your household now spend 
more or less time on getting mopane 
firewood than you did 5 years ago? 
1= more; 2=about the same; 3=less 
B4 How has availability of mopane firewood changed over the past 5 years? 
1=declined; 2=about the same; 3=increased; 4=Don’t know 
B5 What are the other uses of mopane woodland besides firewood?  
List in order of importance. 
1._______________________ 2. _______________________3. 
_______________________ 
4. _______________________ 5. _______________________ 
B6 Would you use mopane wood for above mentioned uses over other wood 
species? 
1=Yes        2=No 
If Y explain 
why___________________________________________________________
________________ 
B7 Do you collect/harvest mopane worms?  
1= Yes;     2=No 
B8 If you collect mopane worms, 
where do you do this? 
1=Around homestead;   
2=Within the village;   3=Within 
the district;  4=Other 
(specify)___________________
_______________ 
C2
4 
If Yes, who is mostly involved in 
collection of mopane worms?  
1= Father ;     2=Mother;    3=Boy 
child;     4=Girl child;   5=other 
(specify) 
B9 What do you mostly use mopane 
worms for? 
1=Home consumption                
2=Selling 
3=Both                                        
4=Other (specify) 
C2
6 
What are the demand trends of 
mopane worms in recent years  
 1. Decreasing   2= increasing    3. 
No change    4. Don’t know 
B10 Explain your answer to 
C26:__________________________________________________________
__ 
______________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
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B11 Please fill in the table below if you harvest mopane worms 
Season/month 
harvested 
Used at home 
(quantity) 
Sell (quantity) Price/kg 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
B12 How do you use proceeds from 
the sales of mopane worms?  
1. Buying of food; 2. School fees 
and health;  3.Buying farming 
equipment; 4=Other 
C3
0 
How would you rate the outbreak of 
mopane worm in recent years   
 1= increasing;  2=decreasing;   3= 
no change;   4= Don’t know 
 
B13 If answer is 2 what has been the 
effect of the decrease to your 
household’s livelihood 
1=Severe effect on livelihood; 
2=Mild effect on livelihood 
3=No effect at all; 4=Other 
 
B14 How much time do you allocate to the following activities? 
 
Activity Months/ 
year 
Day/ 
week 
Family members 
involved 
Dry land 
cropping 
   
Mopane worm  
harvesting 
   
Mopane 
woodland 
harvesting 
   
Livestock     
Social activities    
 
 
C:                                    NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
INSTITUTIONS 
C
1 
Give the following a score out of 10 based on community visibility in natural 
resource management of Mopane worms and woodlands  
 
Institution  Score 
EMA  
Local traditional leadership  
NGOs  
The forestry commission   
Other   
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C
2 
What are the major contributions and let-downs of the institutions identified in 
D1 in managing mopane worms and woodlands? 
Institution Contributions Let downs 
EMA  
 
 
Local traditional 
leadership 
  
NGOs  
 
 
The forestry 
commission  
 
 
 
Other   
 
 
 
C
3 
What common village practices and norms govern mopane worm and woodland 
access in your village? 
 
  Common village practice   
Mopane worms 1 
 2 
 3 
Mopane 
woodland 
1 
 2 
 3 
 
C
4 
Do you think these common village practices and norms have positively 
contributed to the sustainable management of mopane worms and woodlands?  
 
1=Yes very much;  2=Yes but minimally;  3=No; 4=Don’t know 
 
C
5 
What are the major contributions and let downs of these common village 
practices and norms in mopane worm and woodland sustainable? 
 Common village 
practices  and norm 
Contributions Let downs 
Mopane 
worm 
1   
 
 
2   
 
 
3   
Mopane 
woodland 
1   
 
 
2 
 
  
 
C
6 
Do you think the formulation of the common village practices and norms was 
adequately undertaken regarding participation and relevance? 
1=Yes very much;  2=Yes but minimally;  3=No; 4=Don’t know 
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E: PERCEPTIONS,ACCESS AND RIGHTS  NB. Rights= Ngamalungelo 
 (a) Rights to harvest   
D
1 
Are you aware of any rights to harvest mopane 
worms and woodland resources in your area? 
1= Yes; 2= No 
D
2 
If Yes, do you think these rights are 
necessary? 
1=yes; 2=No 
D
3 
Who is allowed to harvest mopane worms within 
your community? 
1=Any household members (HH); 2= Only kraal 
members (KM); 3=Adjoining kraals 
(AK); 4=Open access (OA); 5=Other (O): 
explain. 
D 
4 
Who is allowed to harvest mopane 
woodlands within your community? 
1=Any household members (HH); 2=Only 
kraal members (KM); 3=Adjoining kraals 
(AK); 4=Open access (OA); 5= Other (O): 
explain 
D
5 
Is access to mopane worms 
1=Rights based; 2=Permit system?; 3=-Other 
(specify) 
 
D
6 
Is access to mopane woodlands 
1=Rights based; 2=Permit system?;3=-Other 
(specify) 
D
7 
If access to mopane worms is rights based who 
gives people the rights? 
1=Traditional leadership; 2=Statutory systems 
(Government Acts); 3=No one; 4=Other (specify) 
D
8 
If access to mopane worms is permit based 
who gives people the permits? 
1=Traditional leadership; 2=Statutory 
systems (Government Acts); 3=No one; 
4=Other (specify 
D
9 
If access to mopane woodlands is rights based 
who gives people the rights? 
1=Traditional leadership; 2=Statutory systems 
(Government Acts); 3=No one; 4=Other (specify  
D
1
0 
If access to mopane woodlands is permit 
based who gives people the permits? 
1=Traditional leadership; 2=Statutory 
systems (Government Acts); 3=No one; 
4=Other (specify 
D
1
1 
Do men and women have similar rights to harvest 
mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
2 
Can men and women hold similar permits to 
harvest mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
3 
Can men and women hold similar permits to 
harvest mopane woodlands? 
 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
4 
Can men and women hold similar permits to 
harvest mopane woodlands? 
 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
5 
Do men and women have similar rights to harvest 
mopane woodlands? 
 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
6 
Are there designated time endings on rights 
held in mopane worms (harvesting rights) 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
7 
If Y to E16, indicate 
how long) 
D
1
8 
Are there designated time endings on rights 
held in mopane woodlands (harvesting 
rights) 
 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
D
1
9 
If Y to E18, indicate how long?_______________________________________________ 
D
2
0 
May rights be leased for a specific period of time 
in mopane worms? 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
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D
2
1 
If Y to E20, indicate typical lease 
period_________________________________________________________ 
 
D
2
2 
 Allotment Type:  
Are rights 1=area based (AB), 2=volume based 
(VB) or3= both (B)? 
 
D
2
3 
Transferability: Of Rights: Can the rights be 
1=sold (S) ;2= leased (L); 3=Don’t know? 
 
D
2
4 
Payment 
Are there required payments for rights to harvest 
mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know  
D
2
5 
Are there required payments for rights to 
harvest mopane woodlands? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
1 
(F) Power dynamics 
Who makes decisions on how mopane worms 
should be used at home? 
1= Father ;     2=Mother;    3=Anyone who 
harvested them     4=other  (Specify) 
E
2 
Who makes decisions on how mopane 
worms should be harvested within the 
village? 
1=Women of the village;     2=Men of the 
village 3=Committee for natural resources;  
4= Traditional leaders;     5=Government 
instruments 6=Other 
(Specify)_______________________ 
 
E
3 
Who makes decisions on how mopane woodlands 
should be used within the village? 
1=Women of the village;     2=Men of the village 
3=Committee for natural resources;  4= 
Traditional leaders;     5=Government instruments 
6=Other (Specify)_______________________ 
 
 
E
4 
Are you aware of any rules governing the 
harvesting of mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
E
5 
If YES, what are those rules? 
 
E
6 
Who enforces those rules? 
1=Traditional institutions (Chiefs, Village 
heads); 2=Statutory institutions (RDCs, 
VIDCOS); 3=Local community institutions; 
4=Other 
(Specify)_________________________ 
E
7 
Are there people who break these rules? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
8 
If Yes to F8, Who often breaks these rules? 
1=Men; 2=Women; 3=Anyone in the 
community; 4=People from outside the 
community; 5=Other 
E
9 
What happens to people who break these rules? 
1=Cautioned by the traditional authorities; 
2=Cautioned using the statutory Instruments; 
3=Nothing is done to them; 4=Other 
E 
1
0 
Do you think those rules are helping in the 
conservation of mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
1
1 
If No, what do you think should be done to harvest Mopane worms 
sustainably?________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
E
1
2 
Are you aware of any rules governing the USE of 
mopane woodlands? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
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E
1
3 
If YES, what are those rules? 
 
 
E
1
4 
Are these rules followed? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
  
E
1
5 
Are there people who break these rules? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
1
6 
If Yes to F15, is the breaking of these rules a 
common thing in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
1
7 
 
Who often breaks these rules? 
1=Men; 2=Women; 3=Anyone in the community; 
4=People from outside the community; 5=Other 
E
1
8 
What happens to people who break these 
rules? 
1=Cautioned by the traditional authorities; 
2=Cautioned using the statutory Instruments; 
3=Nothing is done to them; 4=Other 
E
1
9 
Who/What enforces these rules? 
1=Traditional institutions (Chiefs, Village heads); 
2=Statutory institutions (RDCs, VIDCOS); 
3=Local community institutions; 4=Other 
(Specify)___ 
E 
2 
0 
Do you think those rules are helping in the 
conservation of Mopane woodlands? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
E
2
1 
If No, what do you think should be done to manage mopane woodlands sustainably? 
1.________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.________________________________________________________________________________ 
 PARTICIPATION 
F
1 
Are there any organizations governing access to 
mopane worms in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
 
F
2 
If Y to G1Are you or any member of your 
household a member of any organisation that 
is involved with governance of mopane 
worms in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
F
3 
Are there any organizations governing access to 
mopane woodland resources in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know  
F
4 
If Y to G1Are you or any member of your 
household a member of any organisation that 
is involved with governance of mopane 
woodland in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
F
5 
IF YOU ARE IN ANY ORGANISATION do you participate in decision making about use of Mopane 
worm and woodland resources in your community? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
F
6 
 Organisation Function Participation 
(Yes/No) 
Mopane worms 1   
 2   
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Mopane 
woodlands 
1   
 2   
    
 
F
7 
If you are involved, does someone in your household attend the meetings? 
1=Yes; 2=No  
F
8 
If ‘Yes to G7’: who normally attends the meetings and participates in other organisation’s activities? 
Tick 
Only the wife  
Both, but mainly the wife  
Both participate about equally  
Both, but mainly the husband  
Mainly sons  
Husbands only  
Mainly daughters  
 
Mainly husbands & sons 
 
Mainly wife & daughters  
Other; specify  
 
F
9 
 
What are your reasons for joining the named organisation? 
Reason Name of Organisation 
1 2 3 4 
Increased access to 
natural resources 
products 
    
Better natural 
resources management 
and 
more benefits in future 
    
Access to other 
benefits, e.g., 
government 
support or donor 
programmes 
    
My duty to protect the 
natural resources 
for the community and 
the future 
    
Better quality of 
natural resource 
product 
    
Higher price for 
natural resource 
product 
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Makes harvest of 
natural resources 
products more efficient 
    
Know natural resource 
better 
    
Reduce conflicts over 
natural resource 
Use 
    
More secure land title     
Being respected and 
regarded as a 
responsible person in 
village 
    
Social aspect (meeting 
people, working 
Together, fear of 
exclusion, etc.)| 
    
Learn new 
skills/information 
    
Forced by 
Government/local 
leaders/neighbours 
    
Other, specify:     
 
F
1
0 
Have you ever raised any views/comments to the 
organisations you participate in about mopane 
worm or woodland management? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
1
1 
If Y, do you think your views are taken 
seriously by the leaders of the organisations? 
1=Yes; 2=Yes very much;3=Not at all 
F
1
2 
If N, why are they not taken seriously? 
Explain_____________________________________________ 
F
1
3 
What are your general comments about access to mopane resources in Bulilima 
district?___________________________________________________________________________
_ 
F
1
4 
If you do NOT participate in any of the organisations that are involved with governance of mopane 
worm and woodland resources what is stopping you? Explain 
Reason Tick 
No organisation exists in the village  
I’m new in the village  
Organisation members generally belong 
to a particular family group (s) 
 
Cannot afford to contribute the time  
Cannot afford to contribute the required 
cash payment 
 
Membership will restrict my use of the 
resources, and I want to use the 
resources as I need 
 
I don’t believe organisations are very  
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effective in managing the natural 
Resources 
Lack of natural resources  
Not interested in the activities 
undertaken by organisations 
 
Corruption in previous organisations  
Interested in joining but need more 
information 
 
Organisations exist in village, but 
household is unaware of their presence 
 
Other, specify:  
 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES 
G
1 
 
Are you aware of any traditional functions 
governing the use of mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
2 
 
 
If YES, please explain any that you know 
G
3 
Are you aware of any traditional functions 
governing the use of mopane woodlands 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
4 
If YES, please explain any that you know 
G
5 
Are you aware of any supernatural powers of 
the ancestral spirits associated with mopane 
worms 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
6 
If YES, please explain any that you know 
G
7 
Are you aware of any supernatural powers of 
the ancestral spirits associated with mopane 
woodlands 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
8 
If YES, please explain any that you know 
H
9 
Do you think Indigenous Knowledge use can 
help conserve mopane worms? 
1=Yes; 2=Yes very much;3=Not at all;4=Don’t 
know 
G
1
0 
Do you think Indigenous Knowledge use can 
help conserve mopane woodlands? 
1=Yes; 2=Yes very much;3=Not at all;4=Don’t 
know 
G
1
1 
 
Do you know how to harvest opane worms in a 
sustainable manner? 
1=Yes; 2=No 
G
1
2 
 
Who taught you this knowledge? 
1=My parents; 2=Community members; 
3=Traditional leaders; 4=Government 
organisations; 5=Other (specify) 
G
1
3 
Do people in this community know how to 
harvest mopane worms in a sustainable manner? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
G
1
4 
 
If Y to H5, how did they get this knowledge? 
1=Traditional institutions; 2=Interacting with 
other community members; 3=Government 
institutions; 4=Other, 
(specify)___________________________ 
G
1
6 
Do you think people need further education in 
order to manage mopane worms and woodlands 
in a more sustainable way? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
G
1
7 
If YES to H17, where do you think they should 
get this knowledge? 
1=Traditional leaders; 2=Government 
organisations; 3=NGOs; 4=Community 
members; 5=Other (specify) 
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G
1
8 
Is there a monitoring mechanism to ensure that 
worms are harvested at a correct stage? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know 
G
1
0 
If Y to H7, who does the monitoring? 
1=Traditional institutions; 2=Community 
members; 3=Government institutions; 4=Other, 
(specify)____________________ 
G
1
9 
If Yes, why? Explain 
 
Gendered access to and control over Mopane resources  
esources Who has Access? Who has Control? Comments 
 M W B C M W B C  
Mopane 
worms 
         
Mopane 
woodlands 
         
Codes: M=Men; W=Women; B= Both; C=Community 
 
I2. How do women achieve power within the institutional frameworks governing mopane resources in the 
community? 
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Appendix 2: Standardised qualitative questions for key informant interviews 
 
1. Traditional Leaders 
 
Background Information 
a) Can you tell me about the history of your chieftaincy? (Only applies to chiefs) 
b) What is your understanding of ‘community’ in Bulilima since 1980? (Probe further on 
ethnicity, geographic boundaries and other ways community has been explained) 
c) What is the main source of livelihood for people in this area? Has it always been the main 
source since 1980? What type of natural resources do you have in Bulilima? 
 
Configurations of Power  
a) Who owns mopane woodlands and mopane worms in this community? And how? 
b) What role do you play in natural resource management? Do you make decisions on Mopane 
woodlands and Mopane worms ownership, use, access and benefit sharing? Do you have 
powers to punish those who break the rules? 
c) Are there any rules or regulations governing the use of these resources? (Probe further on the 
nature of rules. Are they fair to everyone, men, women, and children? Who stands to benefit 
from these rules and regulations?) 
d) Are there areas of conflict in the use of mopane woodlands and mopane worms? If so, are 
there any mechanisms in place for resolving conflicts? 
e) Do men and women have equal opportunity to own or inherit land? How? 
f) What is the process of decision making and how do women participate in this process? 
g) Do you think politics influences the functioning of traditional leaders in this area? (Probe 
further) 
 
Knowledge 
a) Are you aware of any traditional functions governing the use of mopane resources? Are you 
aware of any supernatural powers of the ancestral spirits? 
b) Do people have knowledge pertaining to mopane woodland and mopane worm management 
in the community? What kind of knowledge is this? (Indigenous, modern  ...etc) Where did 
they get it? What role do you play in knowledge transfer? 
Gender roles 
a) What role do women play within the local level institutional framework for mopane 
woodlands and worm use and what impact does this have on sustainable use of these 
resources? 
b) Are there any rules or regulations governing the use of mopane resources? (Probe further on 
the nature of rules. Are they fair to everyone, men, women, and children? Who stands to 
benefit from these rules and regulations?) 
 
2. Technocrats 
 
 Management institutions 
a) What role do you play in mopane resource management in Bulilima District?  
(What relationships exist with other institutions such as traditional authorities, VIDCOs, 
WADCOs etc. (who has power to make decisions? Where do they get this power?) Do they 
give any rights/permits to people? Does politics influence natural resource management? 
How? Any conflicts and how do you deal with that? 
b) Do you make any decisions on how mopane worms and woodlands should be accessed and 
used in this community?  
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c) How do people get access to mopane worms and woodlands? Are there people who are 
excluded? By who? Where do they get the power to exclude others? 
d) Are there other institutions that deal with Mopane Resource Management in Bulilima? (What 
is the relationship with RDC?) e.g. traditional institutions 
e) Do you think community management is very effective in mopane resource management?...if 
not, what do you propose? 
f) Are there any conflicts that arise as a result of mopane resource use? How do you solve these 
if they are there? 
 
Knowledge, Attitude and Practice 
a) Do you think people have adequate knowledge to manage mopane resources sustainably? (Do 
men and women have similar knowledge?) 
b) What kind of knowledge is this? (Indigenous, modern  ...etc.) 
c) How useful is the knowledge in the sustainable use of mopane woodland and mopane 
worms? 
d) Does everyone have access to this knowledge? 
e) What are people’s attitudes towards sustainable use of natural resources in Bulilima? 
f) What do you think could be influencing this attitude? 
 
Gender roles 
A. Are women involved in local level decision making with regards to natural resource use? 
(mopane woodlands and worms) 
B. Do you think the rules/institutions (formal and informal) governing the use of mopane 
resources is fair to everyone, men, women, and children?  
C. Who stands to benefit from these rules and regulations?) 
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Appendix 3: Question guide for FGDs 
 
Power 
1. Who monitors use of natural resources in your community? 
2. How do they do this? 
3. Are your views considered when it comes to decisions about natural resource use 
in this area? 
4. Where are most of the decisions about natural resource use made? In the 
community or somewhere else? 
5. How do women participate in community activities? 
6. Do women have access to any natural resource that they might want to use?  
7. If there are restrictions who restricts them and why? 
8. Who allocates land for building homes and for farming in the community? Do 
women enjoy similar privileges as men?  
 
Knowledge 
1. What is the state of local environmental knowledge with regards to managing 
natural resources in this community? 
2. Is such knowledge still available? Who has it? Does having it imply respect or 
power to make decisions in the community? 
3. Are traditional authorities doing enough to preserve and promote indigenous 
knowledge in this community? 
4. Do you think scientific knowledge is more efficient than indigenous knowledge in 
managing natural resources? 
 
Manyangwa spiritual cult 
1. What is the significance of Manyangwa spiritual cult to the lives of people in this 
community? 
2. Is Manyangwa spiritual cult still respected by people in the community? By 
authorities from the state? 
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Appendix 4: Gendered access to Mopane resources 
 
 
 
Products Major Users Who controls Rules governing 
access 
and management 
practices 
Comments on rule 
adherence 
 
Mopane 
woodland  
    
Mopane 
firewood 
 
    
Grazing 
area 
    
 
Mopane 
worms  
    
Thatch 
grass 
    
